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Chapter 1 shows the implications of credit and labor market imperfections on 
gender differences in agricultural labor productivity, especially highlighting how both 
imperfections negatively affect female productivity b  discouraging off-farm income 
generating activities and restricting access to inputs. The paper theoretically models the 
relationship between gender differences in agricultura  labor productivity and market 
imperfections and it provides empirical evidence consistent with our theoretical model by 
decomposing the contribution of different factors to such gender differences.  We find 
that   agricultural labor productivity is on average 44 percent lower on plots belonging to 
female-headed households than on those belonging to male-headed households; and that 
34 percent of the agricultural labor productivity gap is explained by spillovers from labor 
market gender differences and 30 percent is explained by gender differences in the use of 
purchased inputs. 
  Chapter 2 provides a decomposition analysis of the observed reductions in sulfur 
dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and ozone concentrations, i  the twelve richest European
countries. It quantifies the proportion of the reductions that can be attributed to fiscal 
policies, trade, and energy taxes. We find that increasing the share of fiscal spending in 
GDP and shifting the emphasis towards spending in public goods and against non-social 
subsidies significantly lower the concentrations of sulfur dioxide and ozone but not 
nitrogen dioxide. At the same time, energy taxes reduc  nitrogen dioxide concentrations 
but have no effect on ozone and sulfur dioxide. Finally trade openness has a direct effect 
on sulfur dioxide but no effect on nitrogen dioxide or ozone. Our estimates account for 
time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. 
  Chapter 3 is the first paper that uses the nationlly representative Malawi 
2009/2010 dataset. Its purpose is the initial statistical verification of the obtained data and 
provides a first assessment of agricultural productivity and gender in Malawi. We find 
that while female-managed plots are, on average, 25 percent less productive, 82 percent 
of this mean differential is explained by differencs in inputs, assets and household 
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Market Imperfections and Gender Differences in Agricultural 
Productivity in Malawi 
 




Two key features are prevalent in the Agricultural sector in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
The first one is the dominance of female labor in agriculture and the second one is the 
existence of a gender gap in agricultural productivity. The feminization of agriculture is 
evident in Sub-Saharan Africa, where women make up a higher proportion of agricultural 
labor than males, potentially ranging from 30 to 80 percent (UNECA 1982, FAO 1984, 
Doss 2011, Doss et al. 2011). Nevertheless, labor conditions in the rural sector are 
disadvantageous for women. The presence of gender diff rences in the rural sector is not 
surprising in the context of Malawi. In a 2004 survey, rural wages were 35% lower for 
females than males. Furthermore, around 89% of employed women are engaged in part 
time off-farm activities, in contrast to 67% for male. Women participating in rural wage 
employment tended to be concentrated in lower skillactivities- about 61.4 % - in contrast 
to the corresponding figure of 37% for males.   
 
The gender differentials in agricultural productivity range from 4 to 40 percent 
conditional on the country, the representativeness of the data, the type of crop, and the 
composition of households among other variables (Akresh, 2005; Alene et al., 2008; 
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Gilbert et al., 2002; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Moock 1976; Peterman et al., 2011; 
Oladeebo and Fajuyigbe, 2007; Quisumbing et al., 2001; Saito et al., 1994; Tiruneh et al., 
2001; Udry, 1996; Vargas Hill and Vigneri, 2011).  The disparity of large participation of 
women in agriculture, and the significant gender gap in agricultural productivity are the 
prime motivations for this study. The implications of both characteristics are that the 
agricultural sector may lag behind its potential in terms of productivity, and that a gender 
dimension exists within the issue at hand. Thus, it is important to understand the 
underlying reasons behind the differences in agricultural productivity between female and 
male farmers. 
Several key reasons for the observed gender gap in gr cultural productivity have 
been identified in the literature: gender differencs in (i) access and use of agricultural 
inputs, (ii) tenure security and related investments i  land and improved technologies, 
(iii) market and credit access, (iv) human and physical capital, and (v) informal and 
institutional constraints affecting farm/plot management and marketing of agricultural 
produce (Peterman et al. 2011). Cultural roles thatare assigned to males and females 
regarding domestic duties as well as other factors hat may underlie the gender 
segregation in crop production (i.e. staple vs. cash crop cultivation, high-yielding vs. low-
yielding variety cultivation, etc.) could be thought of as informal institutional constraints. 
However, the relationship between labor market discrimination and the observed gender 
gap in agricultural productivity has received little attention in the literature. 
 
This study focuses on gender differences in agricultural labor productivity. This is 
an important deviation from the prevalent literature that concentrates on agricultural land 
3 
 
productivity. The principal asset of the poor is their labor power, and a disproportionate  
number of poor households are headed by women1. Direct increases in labor productivity 
as well as labor opportunities raise the income-earning capacity which is particularly 
important for female-headed households.  
 
The literature has acknowledged the presence of multiple market failures in 
agriculture especially in the labor market. Labor supply behavior is affected by risk, 
search and transaction costs, locational preferences, g nder preferences, and gender 
discrimination (Barret, 1996; Biswanger and Rosenzweig, 1986). This drives a wedge 
between the marginal product of labor and the prevailing market wage rate for the same 
type of labor (Barret et al. 2008). The labor allocations resulting from this deviation from 
the equilibrium condition may be welfare-maximizing, thus individuals may still be 
optimizing their allocation of labor. As an importan  contribution of this paper we show 
that the wedge between the marginal product of labor nd the prevailing market wage rate 
varies by gender and is generally larger for women. We argue that this may be explained 
by market imperfections. 
 
The literature on gender discrimination has typically followed one of two 
avenues. One explores labor market discrimination in terms of wages in off-farm 
activities (O’Neill & O’Neill, 2006, Fortin, 2006). The other explores gender differences 
in the agricultural sector with a focus on issues rlated to inputs, credit access, market 
access, and cultural constraints (Peterman et al. 2010).  Our study contributes to the 
                                                          
1 In 2004/05 nationally representative household survey of Malawi, 78 percent of rural households were 
poor, 25 percent of these poor households were female-headed. 
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literature by both exploring the effects of gender iscrimination in the labor market on 
agricultural productivity, and by analyzing the implications for the agricultural 
productivity gender gap. 
 
This is one of the first studies to both theoretically nd empirically decompose the 
sources of gender differences in agricultural labor productivity and relate them to credit 
and labor market imperfections. There are several key implications. Credit markets may 
treat women and men differently in a discriminatory fashion which causes women to 
have less access to purchased inputs (FAO 2011b). La or market imperfections result in 
women receiving lower wages from off-farm activities than men (FAO 2011b, Hertz et 
al. 2009, Doss 2011, Doss et al. 2011). This spills over to agricultural labor productivity 
causing women to work less in off-farm activities and more on the farm than men 
therefore creating productivity differentials. Furthermore the additional off-farm time 
burden due to engagement in off-farm work is higher for women than men due to the 
burden of domestic activities women face which lead to a greater allocation of female 
labor towards on-farm work causing their agricultural labor productivity to be lower than 
men’s. In addition, differences in the household’s as et endowment and human capital 
may be the result of the long term effects of such market imperfections.  
 
The theoretical model of household farm productivity in this study deviates from 
the literature in a couple of ways. It examines agricultural labor productivity  subject to 
the head-of-household’s gender and traces the effects of labor market imperfections and 
credit market constraints on productivity. The model’s inclusion of gender specific off-
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farm time burden due to engagement in off-farm activities borrows from studies by 
López (1984, 1986) who examines how time allocation between on-farm and off-farm 
work has different connotations on utility as a consequence of commuting time required 
by off-farm work. He shows how the consideration of c mmuting time leads to a model 
in which the household acts as having different preferences between on-farm and off-
farm work, even if preferences are defined purely in terms of leisure. In this setting the 
optimization problem of the household becomes non-separable and thus the production 
decisions would be directly linked to the household’s characteristics and consumption 
decisions. Our theoretical set up models household preferences as additive and increasing 
in the present value of earnings and leisure (Eswaran nd Kotwal, 1986). Our model 
predicts that the gender specific off-farm time burden due to engagement in off-farm 
activities leads to labor productivity differences between men and women, with women 
as heads of household devoting a higher proportion of their time to agricultural activities.  
 
Predictions derived from the model are empirically illustrated using nationally 
representative data from Malawi. We explore gender differences in productivity at the 
plot level. We specifically compare female managed plots to male managed plots, noting 
that the respective managers are also heads of their households.  23 percent of the plots in 
the sample are managed by female heads of household. It is important to note that female 
heads of household include mostly divorced, separated, single, or never married women. 
Altogether this represents 86 percent of the female heads of household in the sample. The 
remaining 13 percent of female heads of household are m rried. Thus our examination of 
gender differences mostly pertains to female headed households in which a male spouse 
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is absent. Therefore the ensuing results may not necessarily apply to the case of female 
plot managers which live with their spouses. 
 
 The implemented econometric approach adapts a decomposition method from 
labor economics, most notably in the analyses of the gender wage gap, union wage gap, 
and growing wage inequality (Oaxaca, 1973 and Blinder, 1973). Our study specifically 
decomposes the average differences in agricultural labor productivity between plots 
belonging to male-headed households and those belonging to female-headed households 
into four effects: (i) labor market effect, (ii) purchased inputs effect, (iii) endowment 
effect, and (iv) pure marginal productivity effect which is the gender differences in 
coefficients of the various factors of production and household characteristics. 
 
The labor market effect refers to the portion of the agricultural labor productivity 
gender gap that is driven by gender differences in the number of hours the manager 
works on the plot. This effect may in part reflect the direct impact of labor market 
imperfections that affect men’s and women’s allocation of labor between on-farm and 
off-farm work differently, with men allocating more time to off-farm work than women. 
The purchased inputs effect refers to the portion of the gap explained by gender 
differences in the use of purchased inputs, such as fertilizer, pesticides, hired labor and 
agricultural implements; this may reflect the direct impact of credit constraints on 
agricultural productivity, which affects men and women differently, limiting further the 
capacity of women to buy agricultural inputs in comparison to men. The purchased inputs 
effect may also capture the indirect effect of the labor market imperfections, by capturing 
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the degree in which the credit constraint is relieved through off-farm income. The 
endowment effect includes gender differences in household characteristics and assets 
owned by the household; this effect may in part reflect the long term impact of labor 
market imperfections and credit market constraints that limit the capacity of 
accumulation of human and physical capital and that m y affect women more than men. 
If in fact the endowment effect is proven to be signif cant, this would be a manifestation 
of the non-separability nature of a household’s decisions, thus production decisions 
become directly linked to the household’s characteristics and consumption decisions. 
Finally, the pure marginal productivity effect is the portion of the agricultural labor 
productivity gender gap that is driven by gender differences in the set of coefficients of 
all the covariates included in the regressions, this effect may also encompass the long 
term effects of labor and credit market constraints on agricultural production as well as 
cultural and institutional constraints that may underlie gender segregation in crop 
production.  
 
Four key results can be derived from our study. First, agricultural labor 
productivity is on average 44 percent lower on plots belonging to female-headed 
households (female plots) than on those belonging to male-headed households (male 
plots). Second, 34 percent of the agricultural labor productivity gap is explained by 
spillovers from labor market gender differences and30 percent is explained by gender 
differences in the use of purchased inputs. Third, on average, agricultural land 
productivity on female plots in Malawi is 25 percent lower than on male plots. Fourth, 
when analyzing the gender gap at different deciles of the agricultural labor productivity, 
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it can be observed that the gender gap increases acro s the distribution, reaching a 
maximum value of 54 percent at the 70th percentile of the labor productivity distribution.   
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a theoretical 
model that aims to explain the gender differences in agricultural productivity in 
developing countries. Section 3 explains the strategy used to empirically verify the 
model’s predictions and presents the mean decomposition methodology used. Section 4 
describes the data and Section 5 shows the decomposition results. In section 6 we present 
the sensitivity analysis and Section 7 offers concluding remarks and expands on the 
policy implications of our findings.  
 
2 Theoretical Model 
 
 Farmers in developing countries face budget and working capital constraints. 
Given that they experience limited access to credit, they can alleviate credit constraints 
by generating income from off-farm labor activities. The labor allocation across on-farm 
and off-farm work, as well as the type and quantity of non-labor agricultural inputs 
chosen, are central to the productivity of the farm. We develop a model that characterizes 
the decisions made by different households taking into account the constraints faced a 
priori (choice of labor, on-farm or off-farm), whic in turn affect the allocations of 
resources ex post (labor and non-labor inputs used in the farm and consumption 
decisions). We assume the presence of credit market failures, as well as the existence of 
gender specific off-farm time burden and gender based differential treatment in the labor 
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market that determine the allocation of labor across n-farm and off-farm work. That is, 
given the presence of credit constraints for example, the decisions made by the household 
will differ depending on its composition and/or on the opportunities available to men and 
women, implying that choices made by a female-headed household will be different from 
the choices made by a male-headed household.  
 
2.1 Household Welfare Maximization 
 
 We posit that all households have the same preferenc s. We assume the utility 
function is additive and increasing in the present value of earnings (Y) and leisure (l) 
(Eswaran and Kotwal, 1986).  
 
( , ; ) ( )hhU Y l Z Y u l= +          (1) 
where hhZ  is a vector of exogenous household characteristics. 
 
The household allocates its time endowment (H) between leisure (l), on-farm 
labor (Lf), and off-farm labor (Lo). We model the existence of a gender specific “off-farm 
time burden” due to engagement in off-farm activities (López, 1984, 1986) which is 
determined by the structure of the household. “Off-farm time burden” as defined here 
includes commuting time as well as actual off-farm work time. The intuition is as 
follows. An increase in off-farm time is not simply an equivalent subtraction of hours 
spent on farm work or leisure. There is an additional time cost incurred due to several 
reasons. For instance households may have to alter their schedule to accommodate off-
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farm work. This cost of re-organization of activities may increase with every increase in 
time spent in off-farm activities. Furthermore, there may be synergies between on-farm 
work and household work including child bearing. Thus a reduction in time allocated to 
the farm may incur an additional cost increasing with every additional unit of time spent 
in off-farm work. Importantly such off-farm time burden may vary by gender. Female 
headed-households may face higher commuting time burden due to household care 
responsibilities that are culturally assigned to women (child care, cooking, getting water, 
etc.).  
 
Given the above considerations, and contrary to the s andard practice, we may 
regard the time constraint faced by the households as non-additive as follows: 
   
( )f oH l L g L= + +       (2) 
 
where ( )og L is “off-farm time burden” and is equal to  1o oLα α+ . 
 
The gender specific off-farm time burden has two parameters, oα  a fixed time 
incurred when the household participates in off-farm activities, which is the same for 
both male and female headed households and  1α  that represents the portion that is 
determined by the degree of household care activities, 1α  is greater than or equal to 1, 
with 1 implying that the household has lower household care responsibilities. We assume 
that the gender specific off-farm time burden due to engagement in off-farm work is 
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higher for female heads of household thus 1 1
F Mα α> , with F and M denoting female- and 
male-headed households respectively.  
 
The production process requires the use of two variable inputs: labor (Lf) and non-
labor inputs (X). Non-labor inputs include inputs such as inorganic fertilizer, improved 
seeds, and traditional seeds. For simplicity we assume that the farmer uses only 
household labor. The production function is presented as follows: ( , ; )f prodf X L Z  where 
prodZ  is a vector of exogenous farm characteristics. 
 
We define net income as equal to the sum of revenues from all sources minus 
household expenditures:  
0* ( ) ( , ; ) *f prodY w L pf X L Z X r= + −   (3) 
 
where w is the wage received in off-farm activities, r is the price of non-labor input X, 
and p is the price of output. All prices are exogenous. 
 
In addition, we assume that the household faces a working capital (liquidity) 
constraint where the inputs purchased are less than or equal to the amount borrowed plus 
the income from off-farm activities. The implicit assumption behind this constraint is that 
all expenses are incurred at the beginning of the production period. 
 




Thus a household maximizes its utility by allocating labor between on-farm, off-
farm work, and deciding how much non-labor input they will use by solving the 




max *( ) ( , ; ) * ( ( ))
o f
f prod f o o
L L X




* or X B wL≤ +     
        




max * ( ) ( , ; ) * ( ( )) ( * )
o f
f prod f o o o
L L X
V w L pf X L Z X r u H L L B wL X rα α ψ= + − + − − + + + −
        (5a) 
 
where ψ is the shadow price of the working capital constraint. 
 
Monotonicity of the utility function implies that the working capital constraint 
will be binding.  
 









α ψ∂ = − + ≤
∂







∂ = − + ≤
∂





ψ∂ = − − ≤
∂





∂ = + − ≤
∂
    (6d) 
 
where Ul denotes marginal utility of leisure and xf  and fLf  denote the marginal 
productivity of input X and on-farm labor respectively. 
 
2.2 Implications for Labor Allocation 
 
Under standard competitive capital and labor markets, the gender specific off-
farm time burden due to engagement in off-farm work does not affect the labor allocation 
decisions of the household, and thus the model is separable. Therefore, the household’s 
production decisions are independent from its consumption decisions and its 
composition. From the FOC, under competitive capital and labor markets, the household 
would follow the standard allocative efficiency rule to allocate labor between on-farm 
and off-farm work, and household characteristics will not play any role in the labor 






w pf=      (7) 
 
We now assume that the wage paid for off-farm activities is different for men and 
women, thus (1 )Fw w φ= − , where φ  represents the differential treatment of the labor 
market towards men and women and takes values between 0 and 1, with 0 representing a 
non-discriminatory labor market and 1 representing a discriminatory market. We 
speculate that the difference in wages reflects some type of discrimination which results 
in fewer opportunities for women than for men in the off-farm labor market.  
 
Additionally, the shadow price of the working capitl constraint ( )hhZψ  is a 
function of the household characteristics; hence it will be different for male and female 
headed households. Given that the working capital constraint might be binding, the 
existence of gender differences in wages and the gender specific off-farm time burden 
due to engagement in off-farm work, the household wi l allocate labor between on-farm 
and off-farm work as follows (from 6a and 6b): 
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Female headed households:   
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Consequently, the household will allocate labor towards off-farm work until the 
net benefit from off-farm work is equal to the net b nefit from on-farm work. Allocation 
of labor towards off-farm work will alleviate the working capital constraint, which can be 
shown through the effect of (1 )ψ+  on equation (8). The value of every hour worked in 
off-farm activities not only provides income but also relieves the working capital 
constraint. The marginal productivity of labor is an endogenous function of household 
characteristics, preferences, assets and labor market discrimination. In this setting the 
model becomes non-separable.  
 
Equations (8) and (9) show us that the allocation of labor in female-headed 
households tends to be towards farm activities despite lower farm labor productivity of 
women compared to men. 
 
The level of input X used also depends on the degree of the household’s credit 
constraint. From (6c) we know that the more constrained the households are the less they 
will invest in X: 
 
(1 ) Xr pfψ+ =       (10) 
 
The total effect of 1α  on agricultural labor productivity is ambiguous. Farm labor 
has a positive relationship with 1α . Less labor is allocated to off-farm work as 1α
increases. On the other hand the use of non-labor inputs decreases with 1α  because less 
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off-farm income is received, thus the working capitl constraint is exacerbated. The total 
effect of 1α  on agricultural labor productivity depends on which agricultural input (labor 
or non-labor) has a higher impact. The discriminatory effect due to differential treatment 
toward women in the labor market has also a negative effect on off-farm labor. The total 
effect of 1α  and labor market discrimination will cause female-headed households to 
allocate more time to on-farm work when compared to male-headed households. To sum 
up, the key mechanism is that fewer off-farm opportunities for women due to gender 
specific off-farm time burden as well as labor market discrimination leads to lower off-
farm income, essentially exacerbating any pre-existing liquidity constraints faced by 
female-headed households. The end result is female-naged plots are quite likely to 
have fewer non-labor inputs, ultimately reducing their productivity. 
 
2.3 The Gender Gap 
 
Dividing (8) over (9) we obtain a measure of differences in labor agricultural 
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The total labor market effect (gender discrimination and the gender specific off-
farm time burden) has a positive effect on the gender gap in agricultural labor 
productivity. The first term in equation (11) is unambiguously greater than 1 given that 
1 1
F Mα α> , and 0 1φ≤ ≤  which implies that male agricultural labor productivity is higher 
than that of female-headed households. Female-headed households will still remain in 
farm activities even when the return is lower than the return in alternative off-farm 
activities. This is because they have to account for specific household labor activities they 
are required to fulfill, and for the differential treatment with regards to off-farm labor 
opportunities. 
 
The second term in equation (11) reflects the effect of liquidity constraints on the 
gender gap in agricultural labor productivity, which is ambiguous. The difference in 
response to liquidity constraints may be different for male- and female-headed 
households, but the direction of the total effect remains an empirical question. Higher 
liquidity constraints increase the value of working in off-farm activities, thus might 
encourage the allocation of labor allocation in off-farm work. We can assume that the 
effect of the liquidity constraint does not compensate the effect of the labor market (if 
both effects have opposite signs), in which case, male-headed households will have 
higher productivity than female headed households an  the gender gap will be positive. 
2.4 Propositions 
 




(i) Higher gender specific off-farm time burden due to engagement in off-farm 
work and labor market discrimination in capital constrained households lead 
to higher availability of on-farm labor and lower availability of off-farm labor 
and therefore less off-farm labor income. A decrease in off-farm labor income 
reduces liquidity that might be used to buy non-labor inputs. This reduced 
liquidity effect may cause greater need for credit which in the context of credit 
market imperfections imply a larger negative impact of such imperfections. 
Labor market restrictions may exacerbate the effect of credit market 
imperfections, in agricultural households, reducing off-farm labor and 
income and thus the access to non-labor inputs.  
 
(ii) Female headed households have fewer opportunities for obtaining off-farm 
income and thus will have lower access to non-labor inputs and therefore 
lower agricultural labor productivity.  
 
3 Empirical Analysis 
 
 The econometric approach we use has been utilized in labor economics as part of 
the analyses of the gender wage gap, union wage gap, and growing wage inequality 
(O’Neill & O’Neill, 2006, Fortin, 2006). We use the mean decomposition methodology 
to look at the differences in agricultural productivity for male- and female-headed 




Regression-based decomposition methods have been widely utilized in labor 
economics following the seminal papers of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). Extensive 
use of Oaxaca-Blinder regression-based mean decomposition among applied economists 
over time extended its application to the decomposition of distributional statistics. It is, 
however, acknowledged that the questions attempted to be addressed by this method 
require a strong set of assumptions (Fortin et. al., 2011). We return to these assumptions 
after describing the decomposition. 
  
Decomposition methods follow a partial equilibrium approach, where observed 
outcomes for one group can be used to construct various counterfactual scenarios for the 
other group (Fortin et. al., 2011). Another characteris ic is that while decompositions are 
useful for quantifying, purely in an accounting sen, the contribution of various factors 
to a difference in an outcome across groups or a change in an outcome for a particular 
group over time, they are based on correlations, and hence cannot be interpreted as 
estimates of underlying causal parameters (Fortin et. al., 2011). However, decomposition 
methods do document the relative quantitative importance of factors in explaining an 
observed gap, thus suggesting priorities for further analysis and, ultimately, policy 
interventions (Fortin et. al., 2011). 
 
We regress Y, the log of value of output per hectare (land productivity)  for male- 
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where L is the number of hours of managerial labor per hectar ; X is a vector of k 
purchased inputs (pesticides, organic and inorganic fertilizer, hired labor, agricultural 
implements, improved seeds); Z is a vector of characteristics of the household that 
includes human and physical capital (wealth, land assets, household composition,  
location of the household and location of the plot, access to off-farm income and 
transfers); β0, βL, βk, δj are the associated vector of intercept and slope ceffi ients for 
male and female headed households; and ε is the error term under the assumption that 
E(εM) = E(εF) = 0.  The decomposition of the gender gap in agricultural land productivity 
is presented in Appendix A. 
3.1 Mean Decomposition Of Labor Productivity 
 
We use the resulting vector of coefficients from the land productivity regressions 
indicated in equations (12a) and (12b) to create a me sure of labor productivity (value of 
output per hour of managerial labor). We create measures of labor productivity in 
logarithm form by subtracting labor from land productivity 
ln( ) ln( / ) ln( / ).
Y
Y ha L ha
L
= −   
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The gender gap in labor productivity “DL” is expressed as the mean outcome difference: 
 
[ ( ) ( )] [ ( ) ( )]M M F FLD E Y E L E Y E L= − − −       (14) 
 
Substituting (13a) and (13b) into (14) and adding ad subtracting ( )M FLE L β , 
( )M Fk k
k
E X β∑ and ( )M Fj j
j
E Z δ∑ , we decompose the gender gap in labor productivity  
into the following four components: 
 
labor market effect
purchased inputs effect household endowment effect
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pure marginal productivity effect
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(15)  
 
In practice, we estimate equation (12a) and (12b) using the value of  output per 
hectare as the outcome variable. We use the resulting vector of coefficients, in 
combination with the mean values for each covariate of the male and female samples to 




The difference between the decomposition of the gender gap in terms of land 
productivity (Appendix A) and labor productivity isthat the disparity in hours worked by 
men and women is weighted by ( 1)FLβ − , which is the measure of the elasticity of labor 
in female plots. Hence, in this case, the fact that women work more than men exacerbates 
the average labor productivity gap between men and women. In contrast, the increase in 
on-farm work by women relative to men actually increases land productivity albeit in an 
inefficient way. 
 
The first component of equation (15) is the labor market effect, i.e. the portion of 
the gender gap driven by differences in quantities of labor allocated to on-farm work by 
the head of household. The second component is the purchased inputs effect, the portion 
of the gender gap that is explained by differences in levels of use of inputs that have to be 
bought such as fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, agricultural implements, and/or hired labor. 
The third component, the household endowment effect is comprised by differences in 
levels of observable characteristics of the household, including human and physical 
capital. The fourth component is the pure marginal productivity effect and corresponds to 
the portion of the gender gap explained by differences in the coefficients of each 
observable covariate included in L and in the X and Z vectors; as well as differences in 
the constant between male- and female-headed househld . 
 
The graphical representation of the gender gap in land and labor productivity and 
their respective components is presented in Figure 1.  It presents the value of output per 
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hectare (Y=y/ha) at each level of managerial labor hours per hectar  (L=l/ha). Curve 
  Male	EndowmentMale	Purchased	Inputs and curve   Female	EndowmentFemale	Purchased	Inputs are derived from the male and 
female regressions respectively. Curve   Female	EndowmentMale	Purchased	Inputs is derived using the 
coefficients from the female regression and the male average value of the variables 
included in the purchased inputs vector; this curve represents the level of agricultural 
productivity that a female-headed household would have if it had the same level of 
purchased inputs as a male-headed household, but the female level of endowment. 
Similarly, curve   Male	EndowmentMale	Purchased	Inputs  is derived using the coefficients of the female 
regressions and the male average level of the variables included in the endowment and 
purchased inputs vectors. LM and LF are the observed average levels of managerial labor
for the male and female samples respectively.  
 
Point A is the observed average male land productivity and point D is the 
observed average female land productivity. Point E is the productivity that women would 
get if they would work the same number of hours as men.  Point C is the land 
productivity that women would get if they had only the same level of purchased inputs as 
men, but the female endowment and would work the same number of hours as men, 
while point B is the land productivity that women would attain if they had access to the 
same level of endowment and purchased inputs and worked the same number of hours as 
men. 
 
The observed gender gap in land productivity is equal to the distance between YA 
and YD and can be decomposed into the four components presented in equation (A.4): the 
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pure marginal productivity effect is the distance YA- B, the endowment effect YB-YC, the 
purchased inputs effect YC-YE and the labor effect YE-YD. In the context of land 
productivity, the fact that women work more hours in average than their male 
counterparts has the effect of reducing the gender gap, counteracting the  purchased 
inputs, endowment and pure marginal productivity effects.  
 
The average labor productivity is obtained by dividing Y over L (
Y
L
) which is 
equal to the slope of a straight line from the origin to any point on the land productivity 
curve.  







= −  which 
is decomposed into the four components of equation (15): the pure marginal productivity 





















− . For comparison purposes, it is 
important to note that the average productivity in D is equal to the average productivity in 
D*. The labor effect is positive unlike the labor effect in the decomposition of the land 
productivity. In the case of labor productivity, the labor effect amplifies the gender gap. 
 This is consistent with the theoretical model which predicts that the gender gap in 
labor productivity will be larger than the gender gap in land productivity given that the 
labor market imperfections spillovers increase the allocation of labor to the farm. As 
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discussed earlier, this increases production in an inefficient way. Figure 1 illustrates this 
prediction. 
 
We attempt to use equation (15) to decompose the gender gap in agricultural labor 
productivity and relate it to the  components presented in equation (11): (i) the labor 
market effect may in part reflect the direct effect of labor market imperfections over 
agricultural production, (ii) the purchased inputs effect may represent the direct effect of 
liquidity constraints over agricultural production as well as the indirect effect of labor 
market imperfections, (iii) the endowment effect may reflect the long term effects of 
credit and labor market imperfections that  affect men and women differently and that 
limit the capacity to accumulate physical and human c pital over time, effect that may 
limit women more than men; and (iv) the pure marginal  productivity effect may also 
represent the long term impact of credit and labor ma ket imperfections as well as gender 
differences in the way households make decisions, due to institutional and cultural 
constraints that define the roles of males and femal s regarding domestic duties and 
gender segregation in crop production. 
 
3.2 Empirical Issues 
 
The decomposition methods described above are valid only under certain 
assumptions. Fortin et al. (2011) present a detailed ccount of the assumptions required to 
estimate the population parameters of interest. Twocrucial assumptions for the validity 




 The overlapping support assumption rules out cases where observable and 
unobservable covariates may be different across the two groups. Hence “overlap” refers 
to the similarity of the covariate distributions of both subpopulations.  It implies that no 
single value of the covariates (X, Z, L) attain specific values (X = x, Z=z, L=l) or ε = e 
exists to identify female plot management.   
 
 Ignorability refers to the random assignment of female plot management 
conditional on observable attributes. Specifically we worry that our male and female 
managed plots may not be randomly assigned. Ignorability allows us to assume that we 
have enough controls and thus,  conditional on these controls, our assignment of female 
plot management is essentially randomized.   It rules out what we typically call “self-
selection” based on unobservables. The additional essential assumptions required by 
detailed decomposition of the individual contribution of each covariate include additive 
linearity and zero conditional mean. The latter impl es that ε is independent of the 
explanatory variables. In other words, we assume that t ere is no unobservable 
heterogeneity that jointly determines the outcome and observable attributes. The former 
assumes a linear functional form. 
 
In exploring the existence and extent of the gender gap in a multivariate 
framework, the validity of findings largely depends on the plausibility of the ignorability 
and zero conditional mean assumptions, i.e. the extnt to which the estimation strategy 
addresses possible unobservable household-/plot-level heterogeneity that jointly 
determines plot agricultural productivity and observable covariates, including whether a 
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plot belongs to a household headed by a female. While t e most rigorous studies on the 
gender gap recognize the need for an instrumental variable strategy to deal with 
potentially endogenous observables, recovering instrumental variables that predict 
endogenous covariates without directly influencing the outcome is often not possible. We 
attempt to lend as much support to the assumptions  of overlapping support, ignorability, 
and zero conditional mean as possible by applying the added control approach and 
checking whether the estimations are robust to a range of sample alteration in order to see 
if the coefficients of interest change due to omitted variable bias. These sensitivity 
analyses are presented later in Section 6. 
 
 Additionally, we consider the possibility of revers  causality. This is less of a 
concern for inputs as it is widely accepted in the literature that agricultural inputs may be 
regarded as predetermined vis-à-vis the level of output (Griliches, 1963; Dinar et al., 
2007). This is due to the fact that agricultural production takes time to be completed and 
inputs are applied at the beginning of the season while the corresponding output is 
harvested at the end. It seems reasonable to assume that there is no correlation between 
the stochastic error and the predetermined inputs.  
4 Data 
 
This study uses data from the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3), 
collected from March 2010 to March 2011 by the Malawi National Statistical Office, 
with support from the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated 
Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) project. The IHS3 data were collected within a two-
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stage cluster sampling design, and are representative at the national, urban/rural, regional, 
and district levels, covering 12,271 households in 768 enumeration areas (EAs). The 
IHS3 instruments included Household, Agriculture, Fishery, and Community 
Questionnaires.  
 
All sample households were administered the multi-top c Household 
Questionnaire that collected individual-disaggregatd information on demographics, 
education, health, wage employment, nonfarm enterprises, anthropometrics, and control 
of income from off-farm income sources, as well as d ta on housing, food consumption, 
food and non-food expenditures, food security, and durable and agricultural asset 
ownership, among other topics.  
 
The sample households that were involved in agricultural activities (through 
ownership and/or cultivation of land, and/or ownership of livestock) were administered 
the Agriculture Questionnaire. The Agriculture Questionnaire solicited information on 
land areas, physical characteristics, labor and non-labor input use, and crop cultivation 
and production at the plot level, separately for the reference rainy and dry seasons.2 The 
data allow for agricultural production estimates at the plot level and for the identification 
of the manager of the plot3, as well as household members that owned4 and/or worked on 
                                                          
2 A plot was defined as a continuous piece of land o which a unique crop or a mixture of crops is grown, 
under a uniform, consistent crop management system, not split by a path of more than one meter in width. 
Plot boundaries were defined in accordance with the crops grown and the operator. 
3 For each plot, the following question was asked to identify the primary decision maker/manager: “Who in 
this household makes the decisions concerning crops to be planted, input use and the timing of cropping 
activities on this plot?” The questionnaire allowed for identification of one manager per plot, on whom 
individual-level information could be recovered from the Household Questionnaire. 
4 For each plot, the following question was asked to identify the plot owners: “Who owns this plot?” The 
question allowed up to 2 household members to be specified as owners.  
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each plot. Handheld global positioning system (GPS)-based locations and land areas of 
the plots were recorded, permitting us to link household- and plot-level data to outside 
geographic information system (GIS) databases. 
5 Results 
 
 Using the nationally representative dataset of agricultural households in Malawi 
described in the preceding section, we complete the following tasks in this section: (i) we 
provide empirical evidence for the propositions from the theoretical model, and (ii) we 
decompose the gender gap in agricultural productivity nto the four effects – the labor 
market effect, the purchased inputs effect, the endowment effect and the pure marginal 
productivity effect.  
 
5.1 Description of Gender Differences 
 
The descriptive statistics and the results from the tests of mean differences sorted 
by the head of household’s gender are presented in Table 1. The full sample consists of 
14,204 plots managed by the head of household, 23 percent of them are female headed 
households. The sample has been restricted to include only plots that are managed by the 
head of household and in which the manager works at leas  one hour per day on the plot. 
It is important to note that female headed households include mostly divorced, separated, 
single, or never married women, which together account for 86 percent of all female 
headed households. The remaining 13 percent of female headed households are married. 
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Thus our examination of gender differences mostly pertains to female headed households 
in which a male spouse is absent.  
 
 The agricultural productivity variable is proxied by the plot level gross value of 
output in Malawi Kwacha (MK) calculated by first multiplying the kilogram-equivalent 
quantity of production for each crop on a given plot by the median crop sales value per 
kilogram within the corresponding enumeration area (EA), and then aggregating across 
values of crop production. The median crop sales value per kilogram is computed within 
the corresponding EA only if at least 10 values are vailable from the survey data. 
Otherwise, the median crop sales value per kilogram is computed at a higher level, in the 
order of traditional authority, district, region, and country. Our outcome variable is 
computed by normalizing plot-level gross value of output with the area of the plot (land 
productivity). The measure of labor productivity is calculated by normalizing the plot-
level gross value of output with the total number of h urs of managerial labor on the plot.  
 
Table 1 provides evidence of the gender gap: the average of the log gross value of 
output per hour of managerial labor is 44 percent lower for female plots, while the 
average of the log of gross value of output per hectar  is 25 percent lower for female 
plots. This result provides some support for our model which predicts a gender gap in 
labor productivity that is larger than the gender gap in land productivity. The reasons 
posited for this difference in the theoretical model include labor market imperfection 
spillovers that lead to female-headed households allocating more labor to the farm thus 
decreasing labor productivity but increasing land productivity.  The gender differences in 
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agricultural productivity are also evident in the comparison of the Kernel density 
estimates of the log of land productivity for male nd female plots, as displayed in Figure 
2. The Kernel density estimates for the log of labor productivity for male and female 
plots are displayed in Figure 3.  
 
The overwhelming majority of the differences in the average values of the 
observable covariates across male- vs. female plotsin Table 1 are statistically significant 
at the 1 percent level. Female plots are, on average, overseen by individuals that are 8 
years older and have 2.5 less years of schooling with respect to their male counterpart. A 
significantly higher percentage of female plots exhibit manager-owner correspondence 
than male plots (78 vs. 58 percent).5 The incidences of joint ownership and exclusive-
male ownership stand both at 2 percent and 3 percent espectively, among female plots. 
In comparison, male plots are distributed more evenly across the ownership categories of 
exclusive-male (39 percent), exclusive-female (22 percent), and joint male-female (19 
percent). 
 
The average GPS-based plot area for female plots is 0.34 hectare, 8 percent 
smaller than male plots. The use of inorganic fertilizer per hectare is in average 18 
percent lower on female plots than on male plots. 
 
In terms of household labor use, the dynamics are also highly different on female 
plots vis-à-vis their male comparators, as can be seen in Table 1. The average amount of 
                                                          
5 The overwhelming majority of the owned plots (81 percent) are acquired through inheritance. Another 12 
percent is reported to have been granted by local leaders. The remaining are acquired as bride price (2 
percent), purchased with title (1 percent) and purchased without title (2 percent). 
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hours of managerial labor per hectare is 22 percent higher on female plots than on male 
plots, while female plots have 34 percent less family labor than male plots.6 Female plots 
have higher levels of exchange labor use, while hird labor is not significantly different 
between male and female plots. Female plots are also 5 percentage points less likely to be 
associated with households that receive agricultural extension service on topics that relate 
to crop production and marketing. Female headed households are 20 percent less likely to 
participate in off-farm work than male-headed households. Lastly, male-headed 
households are, on average, more likely to be associated with higher levels of wealth and 
access to agricultural implements.7 
 
5.2 Base Regression Results 
 
Table 2 presents plot-level land productivity regression results for the male and 
female plot samples in columns 1 and 2 respectively. We include the explanatory 
variables that have been widely used in the literature (López 1984, López 1986, Peterman 
                                                          
6 The plot-level measures of household labor input are the summations of rainy season labor hours across 
household members reported to have worked on a given plot. Individual labor input is computed as the 
multiplication of the number of weeks a household member worked on a given plot during the reference 
rainy season, the typical number of days worked per week during the reported number of weeks, and the 
typical number of hours worked per day during the reported number of weeks. The plot-level measure of 
hired labor (exchange) input is the sum of aggregate men, women, and child hired (exchange) labor days.    
7 The household wealth index is constructed using principal component analysis, and takes into account the 
number of rooms in the dwelling, a set of dummy variables accounting for the ownership of (i) dwelling, 
(ii) mortar, (ii) bed, (iii) table, (iv) chair, (v) fan, (vi) radio, (vii) tape/CD player, (viii) TV/VCR, (ix) 
sewing machine, (x) paraffin/ kerosene/ electric/ gas stove, (xi) refrigerator, (xii) bicycle, (xiii) 
car/motorcycle/minibus/lorry, (xiv) beer brewing drum, (xv) sofa, (xvi) coffee table, (xvii) cupboard, (xviii) 
lantern, (xix) clock, (xx) iron, (xxi) computer, (xxii) fixed phone line, (xxiii) cell phone, (xxiv) satellite 
dish, (xxv) air-conditioner, (xxvi) washing machine, (xxvii) generator, (xxviii) solar panel, (xxix) desk, and 
a vector of dummy variables capturing access to improved (i) outer walls, (ii) roof, (iii) floor, (iv) toilet, 
and (v) water source. The household agricultural imple ent access index is also computed using principal 
components analysis, and covers a range of dummy variables on the ownership of  (i) hand hoe, (ii) slasher, 
(iii) axe, (iv) sprayer, (v) panga knife, (vi) sickle, (vii) treadle pump, (viii) watering can, (ix) ox cart, (x) ox 
plough, (xi) tractor, (xii) tractor plough, (xiii) ridger, (xiv) cultivator, (xv) generator, (xvi) motorized pump, 
(xvii) grain mail, (xviii) chicken house, (xix) livestock kraal, (xx) poultry kraal, (xxi) storage house, (xxii) 
granary, (xxiii) barn, and (xxiv) pig sty. 
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et al. 2011) including plot area, labor and non-labor inputs, plot characteristics, and farm 
attributes including type of crop and the presence of inter-cropping which are expected to 
have a direct effect on productivity. We also include covariates capturing manager and 
household characteristics which may affect agricultura  productivity if the consumption 
and production decisions of the household are non-separable. Additionally, we include 
district level effects to account for time-invariant omitted variables at the district level.  
 
The land productivity regressions’ results are as expected; labor and non-labor 
inputs contribute positively to agricultural land productivity; while the area of the plot 
has a negative sign that reflects decreasing returns to scale of the production function. 
Additionally, household and manager characteristics are significant, possibly reflecting 
the non-separability nature of the optimization problem caused by the liquidity 
constraints and the labor market imperfections faced by households, as explained in the 
theoretical model in section 2.  
We now turn to the effect of different covariates on the production of male and 
female plots. Table 2 shows that only six coefficients are significantly different between 
the male and female regressions, at the 10 percent level of significance. The coefficients 
that are significantly different are inorganic fertilizer, area of the plot and area squared, 
exchange labor, child dependency ratio and extension. 
 
Plot area has a negative coefficient that is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level in the male and female samples; however the coeffi ient in the female regression is 
more than twice as high as in the male regression. We calculate the marginal productivity 
34 
 
of land, which is shown in table 3 and find that it is 12 percent lower in female managed 
plots compared to male-managed plots.  
  
The log of inorganic fertilizer use per hectare is po itively associated with the log 
of gross value of output per hectare, irrespective of the plot sample. However, the return 
to inorganic fertilizer use (i.e. the coefficient of inorganic fertilizer) is higher within the 
male plot sample than within the female.  
 
The log of managerial labor has a positive coefficient that is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level across the male and female samples. As shown in table 
3, the marginal productivity of female managers is 37 percent lower than the labor 
productivity of male managers. The coefficient of household labor is positive and 
significant in the female and male plots, but larger on male plots, while the coefficient of 
exchange labor is only significant on the male plotsample.  
 
The child dependency ratio, which is defined as thenumber of household 
members below the age of 10 divided by the number of household members aged 10 
years and above, has a substantial negative coefficient that is statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level only within the female-managed plot sample. The comparable 
statistics for the male-managed plot sample is negative nd statistically insignificant. 
 
With respect to the household characteristics, household size has a positive 
coefficient that is statistically significant irrespective of the plot sample; the magnitude of 
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the coefficient within the female plot sample is larger than within the male-managed plot 
sample. The gender differences in returns to child dependency ratio after controlling for 
household size imply that the burden of childcare is more likely to reduce female 
agricultural productivity than male agricultural productivity. The distance of the plot to 
the household compound is negative and statistically insignificant for the male and 
female samples, while the distance of the household to the nearest road is negative and 
not statistically significant for the female sample a one. 
 
5.3 Linking To The Theoretical Model 
 
Our theoretical model provides three key features: (i) the existence of non-
separability of consumption and production decision by the household due to the 
presence of market failures, (ii) female-managed plots use fewer inputs due to labor 
market imperfections and the gender specific off-farm time burden incurred when 
engaging in off-farm work that result in less off-farm labor income and (iii) given that 
female headed households have lower access to non-lab r inputs, female plots have lower 
agricultural labor productivity in comparison to male plots. 
 
As the base regressions in table 2 indicate, househld and manager characteristics 
are significant, possibly reflecting the effect of the labor and liquidity constraints faced 
by the household over the production decisions. This provides support for (i) a key 
assumption in the model that the nature of the optimization problem is non-separable. 
The descriptive statistics show the presence of a gender gap, lending support to point (iii).  
The average gross value of output per area of the plot is 25 percent lower for female plots 
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than male plots, and the average gross value of output per hour of managerial labor is 44 
percent lower for female plots than male plots.  
 
Base regression results in table 2 further illustrate that the child dependency ratio 
has a significant negative effect for female-managed plots but is insignificant for male-
managed plots even after controlling for household size. This implies that the burden of 
childcare is more likely to reduce female agricultural productivity than male agricultural 
productivity. In support of (ii) we find that female headed households are 20 percent less 
likely to participate in off-farm activities than male headed households and that female 
managers on average work 22 percent more hours per hectare than male managers, while 
the use of inorganic fertilizer is 20 percent lower in female plots.  
 
Finally, in Table 3 we present the estimates of the marginal land and labor 
productivities of male and female managers derived from the regressions in Table 2. The 
marginal productivity of land is 12 percent lower fo emale managers compared to male 
managers, while the marginal labor productivity of female managers is 37 percent lower 
than the marginal labor productivity of male managers. Consistent with our theoretical 
model, we provide the following explanations for the gender differences in land and labor 
productivity. The gender gap in marginal land productivity is due to lower access to non-
labor inputs for female managed plots relative to men given the complementarities 
between labor and non-labor inputs. The gender gap in marginal labor productivity is due 
to increased allocation of labor in female managed plots to farm activities given the labor 
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market discrimination that provides disincentives for emale head of households to 
engage in off-farm work. 
 
5.4 Mean Decomposition 
 
In the decomposition methodology, we uncovered fourcomponents of gender differences 
in agricultural productivity – labor market, purchased inputs, household endowment and 
pure marginal productivity effects outlined in section 3. We decompose the mean gender 
gap in agricultural land productivity and the agricultural labor productivity in order to 
rank the importance of each of the four components as indicated in (15) and (A.4) 
respectively. The decomposition uses the base regressions (section 5.2) which correspond 
to equations (12a) and (12b). We find that the decomposition results are consistent with 
the theoretical model. Gender gaps exist in favour of male-headed households for both 
labor and land productivity, however the gender differences are far greater for labor 
productivity. 
 
5.4.1 Land Productivity Decomposition 
  
 As mentioned in the theoretical model, we predict that the agricultural 
productivity of female headed households will be lower when compared to male managed 
plots, the theoretical model also states that the gender gap in agricultural productivity is 
explained by how differently households are affected by liquidity and labor market 
constraints which are influenced by the composition of the household and its preferences. 
From the theoretical model we expect the gender gap to be decomposed into differences 
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in levels of use of purchased inputs (male managed plots will have higher use), 
managerial labor  (higher levels for female-managed plots) and differences in levels of 
the assets and characteristics of the household.  
   Table 4 shows the decomposition of the mean gender differential in agricultural 
land productivity into the four effects specified in equation (15). The gender gap in land 
productivity is estimated at 25 percent. The four effects are all significant at the 1 percent 
level. 
 
The decomposition indicates that the purchased inputs and household endowment 
effects account for 57 and 37 percent of the total land gender gap respectively. According 
to our model, these two effects are a manifestation of the impact that liquidity constraints 
have on households as well as labor market imperfections, which are different for male 
and female headed households. Differences in purchased inputs reflect the direct effect of 
liquidity constraints and the indirect effect of labor market imperfections, while 
differences in the endowment of the household may be a result of the long term impact of 
such constraints. The labor market effect is estimated to be -0.5 percentage points, which 
represents 19 percent of the gender gap. The lattermeans that if women worked the same 
number of hours as men, their land productivity would be lower and the gender gap in 
land productivity would rise to 30 percent. The labor, endowment and purchased inputs 
effects account for 70 percent of the gender gap in land productivity. The remaining 30 
percent of the gender gap in agricultural land productivity is explained by differences in 
coefficients (the pure marginal productivity effect), which includes the differential effect 
of the child dependency ratio, distance of the plotto he household and distance to the 
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closest market, all of which are proxies to the gender specific off-farm time burden due to 
engagement in off-farm activities. 
 
5.4.2 Labor Productivity Decomposition 
 
 The theoretical model predicts specifically that labor productivity will be lower in 
female-headed households due to the different impact th t the liquidity constraints, labor 
market discrimination and gender specific off-farm time burden have over them 
compared to male-headed households (Equation (11)). As can be seen in Table 5, these 
predictions are consistent with the empirical results.  
 
The gender gap in agricultural labor productivity is estimated at 44 percent. The 
agricultural labor productivity gender gap is larger than the agricultural land productivity 
gender gap, due to the labor market effect which accounts for 34 percent of the total gap. 
In this case the fact that female managers work more hours in the plot than male 
managers exacerbates the agricultural labor productivity gender gap, unlike its effect on 
land productivity, where it reduces the gap. The labor market effect may be attributed in 
part to the direct effect of gender differential treatment in the labor market and should be 
considered as an upper bound. 
 
The purchased inputs and the household endowment eff c s are 29 and 20 percent 
of the gender gap respectively, which together with the labor effect explain 83 percent of 
the gender gap in agricultural labor productivity; the remaining 17 percent is explained 




5.5 Unconditional Decile Decomposition 
 
So far we have performed the decomposition at the mean. However going beyond 
the “average” farmer and understanding the heterogeneity in constraints faced by farmers 
with different gender and productivity profiles is crucial for the design and 
implementation of better targeted interventions aimed at bridging the gender gap. An 
important question is whether our findings, which are based on the sample means, are 
robust to the decomposition of alternative distributional statistics beyond the mean.  
 
A method that is similar in spirit to the mean decomp sition uses the recentered 
influence function (RIF) regressions proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) and provides a 
straightforward framework within which across-group differences in any distributional 
statistic could be decomposed. We rely on the RIF decomposition to provide estimates of 
the decomposition of the gender gap at different deciles of the agricultural productivity 
distribution. A detailed description of the methodology is presented in Appendix B. 
  
5.5.1 Land Productivity Unconditional Decile Decomposition 
 
Table 6 presents the gender gap estimates and RIF decompositions, both at the 
mean and at each decile of the agricultural land productivity distribution. The graphical 
representation of these findings is reported in Figure 5. The four effects in figure 5 are 
based on the RIF regressions that use the same set of independent variables included in 




Two key findings emerge from Table 6. First, the magnitude of the gender gap 
and the share of the gender gap attributed to the effect of purchased inputs increase 
steadily along the agricultural land productivity distribution. The mean and median 
gender gap is estimated to be 25 and 21 percent respectively. The magnitudes of the 
gender gap range between 17 percent at the 10th percentile to 39 percent at the 90th 
percentile. The purchased inputs effect of the decomposition accounts for 52 percent of 
the gender gap at the mean and 61 percent of the gender gap at the 90th percentile. This 
implies that the purchased inputs effect is the largest contributor to the gender gap. 
 
Second, the household endowment effect declines along the land productivity 
distribution. The decline of the household endowment effect on the gender gap is from 65 
percent at the 10th percentile to 35 percent at the 90th percentile.  
 
One interpretation of the declining importance of the household endowment effect 
and the increasing importance of the purchased inputs effect towards the land 
productivity gender gap is that at the lower end of the productivity distribution female-
headed households tend to be relatively more deprivd of endowments than male-headed 
households. However, at the other end of the productivity distribution, the relative 
deprivation of endowments is less important for females than males, given that the 
households overall tend to be richer. Thus, the purchased inputs effect becomes the 
dominant factor in explaining the gender productivity gap as differential access to 




5.5.2 Labor Productivity Unconditional Decile Decomposition 
 
Table 7 presents the gender gap estimates and RIF decompositions at each decile 
and the mean of the agricultural labor productivity distribution. The graphical 
representation of these findings is reported in Figure 6.  
 
 The estimates of the gender gap increase steadily cross the labor productivity 
distribution. The mean and median gender gap is estimated to be 44 and 49 percent 
respectively. The magnitudes of the gender gap range between 35 percent at the 10th 
percentile to 52 percent at the 80th percentile. However, at the 90th percentile the gender 
gap declines to 40 percent, which is still a high and significant value. This is a surprising 
result and could be due to increasing efficiency of w men, despite having less access to 
purchased inputs and lower endowment than men.8  
 
The labor market and the purchased input effects on the gender gap increase 
steadily along the productivity distribution. The increase of the labor effect on the gender 
gap is from 34 percent at the 10th percentile to 40 percent at the 80th percentile. The 
increase of the purchased input effect on the gender gap is from 23 percent at the 10th 
percentile to 38 percent at the 80th percentile. The two effects – labor market and 
                                                          
8We estimated our regressions dropping the top 10 percent of the productivity and the mean results do not 
change dramatically. The normalized difference betwe n the male and female samples of the top 10 percent 
of the land productivity distribution was calculated. Only 8 out of 26 independent variables and 30 district 
dummies have a normalized difference greater than 0.25, thus, it is possible to conclude that there is 
overlapping support across the groups at the higher end of the distribution.  
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purchased input – tend to work in the same direction due to the complementarity between 
labor and non-labor inputs. 
6 Sensitivity Analyses 
 
We are concerned about two main issues: (i) the validity of the decomposition 
methodology employed and (ii) whether the gender differences of interest – labor, 
purchased inputs, endowment including child dependency ratio, plot and household 
locations,  - are robust to various specifications. As noted earlier, the crucial assumptions 
for the validity of the aggregate decomposition include overlapping support and 
ignorability. The key assumptions additionally required by the detailed decomposition are 
additive linearity and zero conditional mean. A methodology that is proposed by Imbens 
and Rubin (2009) to assess the feasibility of the ov rlapping support assumption is 
centered on the idea of calculating a scale-free normalized difference for each covariate. 
They assert that the overlapping support across the groups of interest, in our case female 
vs. male plots, is adequate if the scale-free normalized differences across most of the 
covariates are less than 0.25. Table C.1 in the Appendix presents the scale-free 
normalized difference of the variables used in the regressions. Only 5 out of 26 
independent variables (and 30 district dummies) have  normalized difference greater 
than 0.25.  
 
In trying to lend support to ignorability and zero c nditional mean assumptions, 
we use all available data and econometric tools at our disposal, and first rely on an 
empirical approach that was pioneered by Altonji (1988), Murphy and Topel (1990), and 
44 
 
Altonji et al. (2005), based on the idea that the amount of selection on observable 
variables provides a guide to the extent of selection on unobservable counterparts. We 
use an informal version of the methodology applied by Acemoglu et al. (2001), and 
incorporate into our base specification, in a phased-in fashion, thematically-grouped 
control variables such that each regression is estimated with a different set of additional 
independent variables and that the results are compared to those from the base 
specification. Our purpose is to gauge the stability of the key regression coefficients that 
underlie our decomposition results. If the coefficients on the covariates included in the 
base specification are stable subsequent to the incorporation of additional covariates, they 
are less likely to change if we are able to take into account potentially missing omitted 
variables.  
 
To perform this analysis, we consider the following sets of variables: (i) 
enumeration area effects, (ii) plot geospatial characteristics informed by GIS data, (iii) 
other plot characteristics solicited by the IHS3, (iv) additional household characteristics, 
and (v) additional community characteristics.  Table C.2 in the Appendix includes the 
detailed list of the variables included in each set. Tables C.3 and C.4 present the base 
regression results and the estimates from the regressions including the additional controls 
for the male and female plot samples, respectively. An overwhelming majority of the 
coefficients, with respect to the base specification, are stable across the specifications and 
the plot samples, and do not change sign or significance. This suggests that the 




In addition, we checked for extreme data points that m y dominate the sign and 
significance of key estimates. We conducted two types of dominance tests. In order to 
account for extreme data points, we first re-estimated the model by excluding 
observations in the top and bottom 1 percent of the land productivity. The same 
procedure is followed by re-estimating the model without observations in the top and 
bottom 1 percent of managerial labor. The parameters are robust to the sample changes. 
Signs, significance and magnitudes of the parameter estimates from these models are 
shown in Table C.5 in the Appendix.  
7 Conclusion 
 
This study presents a theoretical model that sheds light on the mechanisms 
underlying gender differences in agricultural productivity. It focuses on the effects of 
labor and credit market imperfections as well as on other long term structural factors that 
affect female- and male-headed households differently. The empirical approach provides 
evidence of the relative quantitative importance of factors that lie behind the gender gap 
in agricultural labor productivity, providing evidence consistent with the predictions of 
the theoretical model. 
 
This study theoretically and empirically uncovers the importance of market 
imperfections behind the gender gap in agricultural labor productivity. Liquidity 
constraints, labor market discrimination and off-farm time burden due to engagement in 
off-farm work, which differ greatly between men and women, result in lower agricultural 
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labor productivity in plots belonging to female- in comparison to male-headed 
households.  
 
Our paper proposes several possible mechanisms consistent with a gender gap in 
agricultural labor productivity. Households diminish the effect of credit constraints on 
their production decisions via participation in off-farm activities. Participation in off-farm 
activities depends on access to off-farm opportunities and the composition of the 
household. Female-headed households may be discouraged to participate in off-farm 
activities due to discrimination. Additionally, female-headed households might opt not to 
participate in off-farm work after considering the additional gender specific off-farm time 
burden,  which is the opportunity cost of carrying out traditional household activities 
attributed to them (such as child care, getting water, and cooking). The lack of 
participation in off-farm work by women may imply they have lower access to 
productive inputs, exacerbating the effect of liquidity constraints and resulting in them 
being less productive than men. It is not only the eff ct of the labor and credit market 
discrimination but also the synergy between them that disfavors women ultimately 
leading to their lower agricultural labor productivity in comparison to men.  The 
empirical estimation is consistent with the predictions of the model, the effect of labor 
market imperfections, liquidity constraints and household characteristics lead to lower 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics & Results from Tests & Mean Differences 










          
Sample size 14,204 10,962 3,242     
Outcome Variable 
Ln Value Output per hectare  10.42 10.48 10.23 0.2 *** 
Ln Value Output per hour of managerial labor 4.56 4.66 4.22 0.4 *** 
Plot Managerial Labor Input Use 
Ln Managerial Labor (hours/ha) 5.9 5.8 6.0 -0.2 *** 
Purchased Inputs 
Pesticide/herbicide use yes/no 0.019 0.021 0.012 0.009 *** 
Organic Fertilizer use yes/no 0.112 0.114 0.105 0.009 
Ln Inorganic Fertilizer (kg/ha) 3.275 3.317 3.135 0.2 *** 
Ln Hired labor (days/ha) 0.547 0.555 0.520 0.0 
Agricultural implements Asset Index 0.687 0.842 0.161 0.7 *** 
Proportion of area of the plot under improved varieties 0.372 0.383 0.333 0.0 *** 
Proportion of area of the plot under export crops 0.079 0.094 0.028 0.1 *** 
Endowment of the Household 
Ln Area of the plot (ha) -1.224 -1.203 -1.294 0.1 *** 
Ln Area of the plot (ha) Squared 1.978 1.926 2.153 -0.2 *** 
elevation (m) 893.9 908.8 843.5 65.3 *** 
plot distance to hh 1.970 2.058 1.675 0.4 ** 
Inter-croppped 0.353 0.325 0.448 -0.1 *** 
Manager is equal to one of the owners 0.625 0.579 0.782 -0.2 *** 
Age of the manager 42.98 41.18 49.07 -7.9 *** 
Years of Schooling of the manager 5.206 5.796 3.214 2.6 *** 
Non-Managerial Household Labor (hours/ha) 531.5 577.1 377.6 199.5 *** 
Ln Non-Managerial Household Labor (hours/ha) 5.317 5.767 3.795 2.0 *** 
Ln Exchange labor (days/ha) 0.213 0.182 0.316 -0.1 *** 
Household Size 4.892 5.157 3.995 1.2 *** 
Dependency Ratio 0.704 0.701 0.713 0.0 
Ag extension services receipt 0.311 0.322 0.271 0.1 *** 
HH has any off-farm income  0.423 0.443 0.354 0.1 *** 
HH receives other transfers/safety net help 0.216 0.213 0.227 0.0 * 
Wealth Index  -0.701 -0.605 -1.025 0.4 *** 
HH Distance (KMs) to Nearest ADMARC 8.196 8.195 8.200 0.0   





Table2: Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the Mean Decomposition 















 Purchased Inputs 
  








 Ln Inorganic Fertilizer (kg/ha) 0.070*** 0.058*** *** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) 








 Proportion of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.041** 0.025 
 (0.018) (0.034) 




 Household Characteristics and Endowment 
  
 Ln GPS Total Area of the plot (ha) -0.155*** -0.354*** ** 
(0.040) (0.074)  
Ln GPS Total Area of the plot (ha) Squared 0.056*** 0.006 * 
 
(0.014) (0.025) 






























 Ln Exchange labor (days/ha) 0.042*** 0.013 * 




Table2: Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the Mean Decomposition (Cont’d) 













 Dependency Ratio -0.008 -0.068*** ** 
 
(0.016) (0.018) 
 Agricultural Extension Receipt 0.030* 0.131*** *** 
 
(0.017) (0.031) 




















 Number of observations 10,962 3,242 
 R2 0.380 0.373 
 Adjusted R2 0.376 0.362 
 Robust standard errors in parenthesis.  
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Marginal Productivity of Land in Agricultural Production 
Male Headed Households Female Headed Households Difference 
113,213*** 81,877*** 31,336*** 
(2,237) (3,161) (3,872) 
    
 Marginal Productivity of Labor in Agricultural Production 
Male Headed Households Female Headed Households Difference 
28.4*** 17.8*** 10.6*** 
(1.38) (1.42) (1.98) 






Table 4. Decomposition of the Gender Gap in Agricultural Land Productivity 
 
 
A. Mean Gender  Gap   
  
Male Plots  
10.477*** 
(0.009) 







B. Decomposition of the Mean Gender Gap+  
  
Labor Market Effect -0.046*** 
 
(0.005) 
Purchased Inputs Effect 0.129*** 
 
(0.012) 
Household Endowment Effect 0.090*** 
 
(0.018) 






note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  







Table 5. Decomposition of the Gender Gap in Agricultural Labor Productivity 
 
 
A. Mean Gender Gap   











B. Decomposition of the Mean Gender Gap+ 
  
Labor Market Effect 0.150*** 
 
(0.014) 
Purchased Inputs Effect 0.129*** 
 
(0.012) 
Household Endowment Effect 0.090*** 
 
(0.018) 






note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  









Table 6.  Decomposition of the Gender Differential in Agricultural Productivity at Selected Points of the  
Agricultural Land Productivity Distribution 
 



















           
Male Plots 10.48*** 9.25*** 9.68*** 9.99*** 10.24*** 10.46*** 10.69*** 10.94*** 11.26*** 11.73*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Female Plots 10.23*** 9.08*** 9.51*** 9.78*** 10.02*** 10.25*** 10.44*** 10.68*** 10.93*** 11.34*** 
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Mean Gender Gap 0.25*** 0.17*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.22*** 0.21*** 0.2 6*** 0.26*** 0.33*** 0.39*** 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04) 
           
B. Decomposition of the Mean Gender Gap+                   
  
         Labor Market Effect -0.05*** -0.07*** -0.04*** -0.03*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.03*** - 0.05*** 
 
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) 
Purchased Inputs Effect 0.13*** 0.09*** 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.13*** 0.14*** 0.24** * 
 
(0.012) (0.025) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.015) (0.025) 
Household Endowment Effect 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.07*** 0.10*** 0.09*** 0.1 4*** 
 
(0.018) (0.042) (0.030) (0.025) (0.024) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.023) (0.039) 
Pure Marginal Productivity Effect 0.07*** 0.03*** 0. 5*** 0.08*** 0.08*** 0.06*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.13 *** 0.06*** 
 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
           
Number of observations 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1,  




Table 7.  Decomposition of the Gender Differential in Agricultural Productivity at Selected Points of the  
Agricultural Labor Productivity Distribution 
 



















           
Male Plots 4.66*** 3.25*** 3.73*** 4.06*** 4.34*** 4.63*** 4.92*** 5.23*** 5.60*** 6.15*** 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) 
Female Plots 4.22*** 2.90*** 3.30*** 3.59*** 3.87*** 4.14*** 4.41*** 4.69*** 5.08*** 5.75*** 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) 
Mean Gender Gap 0.44*** 0.35*** 0.43*** 0.47*** 0.48*** 0.49*** 0.51*** 0.54*** 0.52*** 0.40*** 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) 
 
         B. Decomposition of the Mean Gender 
Differential                   
  
         Labor Market Effect 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.21*** 0.24*** 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Purchased Inputs Effect 0.13*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.11*** 0.14*** 0.15*** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.16** * 
 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) 
Household Endowment Effect 0.09*** 0.11** 0.10*** 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.11*** 0.07** 0.04 0.10** 
 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) 
Pure Marginal Productivity Effect 0.07*** 0.05 0.12*** 0.14*** 0.08** 0.08** 0.10*** 0.13*** 0.07* -0. 10 
 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) 
 
          
Number of observations 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 14,204 























Figure 1. Land and Labor Productivity Gender Gap Decomposition into Endowment, 









  Female	EndowmentFemale	Purchased	Inputs 
  Female	EndowmentMale	Purchased	Inputs 
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Figure 2. Kernel Density Estimates of the Log of Gross Value of Output per Hectare for 
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Figure 3. Kernel Density Estimates of the Log of Gross Value of Output per Managerial 
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Figure 4. Decomposition of the Land Productivity Gend r Gap  
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Figure 5. Decomposition of the Labor Productivity Gender Gap  












10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
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Decomposing the roles of fiscal, trade and environmental policies 
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1 Introduction 
This paper provides a decomposition analysis of the observed reductions of the 
concentrations of sulfur dioxide, nitrogen dioxide and ozone, in the twelve richest 
European countries. It quantifies the proportion of the reductions that can be attributed to 
fiscal policies, trade, and energy taxes. We show that fiscal spending policies and 
increasing trade openness explain the largest portion of the observed reductions of 
production-related pollutants (e.g., sulfur dioxide) while energy taxes explain most of the 
observed decreases of pollutants originated mostly in consumption activities (e.g., 
nitrogen dioxide). This is the first econometric study that compares the effects of fiscal 
expenditure policies, energy taxes and trade openness on environmental quality in 
Europe.         
   This analysis shows that a policy factor that so far has been largely neglected 
plays a key role in affecting pollution: fiscal spending. The impact of fiscal spending has 
proven to be important in most areas of the economy.1 However the relationship between 
fiscal policies and environmental quality has received little attention in the literature.2 
                                                          
1 Studies have focused for example on the effects of public expenditure level and composition on poverty 
reduction, income distribution and inequality (Kaplow, 2006), unemployment (Fougerè et al., 2000), 
education (Hanushek, 2003), and many other areas. 
2 Exceptions are the theoretical models of Barman & Gupta (2010) and Gupta & Barman (2009) and López 




The study of the impact of fiscal factors is likely to be especially important in Europe 
where the participation of government spending in the economy tends to be higher than in 
most other regions of the world (Dewan and Ettlinger, 2009).  
In addition to fiscal spending, our analysis also examines how increases in trade 
intensity affect pollution in wealthy countries.3 Earlier studies (such as Grossman and 
Krueger, 1992; Antweiler et al., 2001; Frankel and Rose, 2005) have examined the effect 
of trade on pollution using samples that include a large proportion of middle income and 
poor countries. These studies have found that trade re uces pollution. The environmental 
improvements in middle and low income countries may be due to greater imports of 
cleaner technologies that already exist in rich countries (Antweiler et al., 2001). 
However, it is possible that trade may not increase environmental efficiency in rich 
countries; it may merely induce them to shift production towards cleaner outputs thus 
displacing their dirty industries to poorer countries. Lastly, we analyze the effect of 
energy taxes and certain environmental regulations which may increase the incentives in 
rich countries to produce new and more environmentally efficient technology (Knigge 
and Görlach, 2005).  
Empirical studies on trade and environment do not control for the level and 
composition of government spending and energy taxes. H nce, these studies may be 
affected by omitted variable bias as recognized by Antweiler et al. (2001). Typically two 
way fixed effects (TWFE) are used to deal with the bias; however this procedure is not 
efficient in controlling for country specific time-varying omitted variable bias. 
                                                          
3 Gassebner et al. 2010 survey the literature and fi that excluding OECD countries from the sample 
provides different results; specifically the relationship between GDP growth and pollution loses 
significance.  This suggests that focusing on the richest countries of Europe could provide new insights 




The literature analyzing the effects of energy and environmental taxes on 
pollution has mainly used simulation exercises, rather than econometric modeling 
(Baranzini et al., 2000; Fullerton and Heutel, 2007, Fullerton et al., 2009). This is mainly 
due to the lack of suitable data that may capture the variability of institutions, regulations 
and enforcement variables that may affect pollution (Morley 2010). Another strand of 
literature has used firm or industry level data (Millock and Nauges, 2006; Morley, 2010). 
These studies find that energy and environmental taxes have a negative and significant 
impact on air pollutants. However, these studies may be affected by the issues concerning 
time-varying omitted variables.. 
Our study aims to empirically estimate the effects of the level and composition of 
government expenditures, trade, and energy taxes on three major air pollutants: sulfur 
dioxide (SO2), nitrogen dioxide (NO2) and ozone (O3). 4  SO2 is produced by industrial 
processes and electricity generation and is considered mainly a “production-generated 
pollutant.” A significant part of NO2 and O3 is produced by road vehicles implying that 
both pollutants may be considered as mainly (but not totally) “consumption-generated 
pollutants.”5 We improve the analysis of pollution determinants regarding two other 
important aspects: 
1. We introduce a method that generalizes the conventional Fixed Country Effects 
(FCE) approach; a method that we call Time-Varying Country-Specific Effects (TVCE). 
The TVCE method reduces the risk of spurious correlation between pollution and the 
explanatory variables of interest caused by time-varying as well as fixed unobserved or 
                                                          
4 We select these pollutants because their measurements are reliable and consistent over time, they have the 
largest number of observations available, they can be regulated, and accepted quality standards exist for 
them (EPA, 2010). 




difficult-to-measure variables which may be correlat d with the latter. While we directly 
control for certain environmental regulations, there may be other economic and 
institutional variables that may affect pollution which are either unobserved or difficult to 
measure, such as regulation enforcement that may chnge over time and is specific to 
each country. The TVCE is a parsimonious approach that allows for controlling for 
omitted variables without measuring them directly.6     
2. We use a new dataset of air pollution for Europe. The existing empirical 
estimations have used the GEMS/AIR data which have observations for the period 1971-
1996, (Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Antweiler et al., 2001; Harbaugh et al., 2002; 
Bernauer and Koubi, 2006). Our sample, using more rec nt data, has the advantage of 
including more monitoring stations in each of the countries analyzed, for the 1995-2008 
period. The number of observations available for SO2 (about 16,000 observations 
distributed over 2,666 monitoring stations in 12 countries), for example, is five times 
larger than in the old data set. This large number of observations allows us to implement 
the TVCE method, which, as we shall see, requires us to estimate a large number of 
auxiliary coefficients.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses conceptual 
issues, Section 3 presents the econometric model, Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 
summarizes the results and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                          
6 An alternative method to control for time-varying unobservable variables is the so-called Added Controls 
Approach which sequentially introduces a large number of controls (Altonji et al., 2005). Nevertheless, 
Altonji et al. (2005) do caution about this methodology:  “….[it] is dangerous to infer too much about 
selection on the unobservables from selection on the observables if the observables are small in number and 
explanatory power or if they are unlikely to be representative of the full range of factors that determine an 




2 Conceptual Issues 
 
To analyze the impact of government spending composition, it is important to use 
a taxonomy of expenditures that is conceptually meaningful and consistent with the 
available data. López and Galinato (2007) proposed a taxonomy of government 
expenditures that distinguishes between expenditures on what they term “public goods,” 
defined as those that alleviate the negative effects of market failures, and expenditures on 
“private goods,” which do little to mitigate market imperfections.7  Accordingly, 
government expenditures on public goods include expenditures on education, health, 
social transfers, environmental protection, research nd development (R&D), knowledge 
creation and diffusion, as well as conventional public goods such as, institutions and law 
and order. By contrast, government expenditures on private goods are subsidies to special 
interest groups including credit and input subsidies, farm commodity programs, subsidies 
to the production and consumption of fossil fuels, industrial subsidies, and others.  
 Unlike government expenditures on private goods, expenditures on public goods 
may complement rather than substitute private sector spending. Household subsidies, 
both direct and indirect via education and health care provision, mitigate the negative 
effects of liquidity constraints on investments in human capital (e.g. Galor and Zeira, 
1993) which according to recent studies affect a significant portion of households even in 
                                                          
7 Fiorito and Kollintzas (2004) provide a different but related taxonomy based on the relationship betwe n 
the types of goods provided by the government and private consumption. Public goods are defined as those 
that cannot be provided by the private sector such as defense, public order and justice. Merit goods include 
health, education and others that are in part provided by the private sector but where the public sector may 




wealthy countries (Zeldes, 1989; Japelli, 1990; Grant, 2007; Attanasio et al., 2008).8 
Investment in environmental protection, research and development, and creation and 
diffusion of knowledge, finance activities that otherwise would be under-funded due to 
generally insufficient market incentives for the private sector to invest in these areas 
(Dasgupta, 1996; Hoff and Stiglitz, 2000). 
López et al. (2011) develop a theoretical model identifying the channels by which 
the level and composition of government spending may affect the environment.  They 
find that the reallocation of government expenditure f om private to public goods 
improves environmental quality indicators.  They find that increasing the share of public 
goods expenditures on total government spending contributes to the expansion of 
aggregate output (or GDP), changes the composition of production towards human 
capital-intensive industries (and away from physical  capital-intensive ones) and 
promotes investments in R&D. Hence, these factors induce  three effects on production-
generated pollutants: (1) Scale Effect: the expansion of aggregate output may increase 
pollution; (2) Composition Effect:  a reduction in pollution due to the restructuring of 
production in favor of human capital–intensive activities that tend to pollute less than 
physical capital-intensive activities; (3) Technique Effect: increasing investments in 
R&D and in diffusion of knowledge, which may lead to the development of 
environmentally cleaner technologies.9 
                                                          
8 In addition, studies have shown that human capital investments often have spillovers that increase their 
social value beyond their private returns (Blundell et al., 1999; Fleisher et al., 2010). 
9 Given that the output elasticities of energy (or electricity) range from 0.3 to 1.35 for OECD countries 
(Adeyemi and Hunt, 2007; Liu ,2004 and Olund, 2010), macroeconomic policies such as fiscal spending 
may have an impact on production related pollution by affecting its sources such as output from electric 




Furthermore, reallocating fiscal spending towards public goods may also reduce 
consumption-generated pollution by shifting consumption towards less polluting goods. 
For example, raising the share of public goods may entail greater investment in public 
transportation which substitutes for private transportation which, in turn, often implies 
less demand for energy and hence less pollution. In addition more investments in R&D 
increase the supply of fuel efficient cars and energy saving appliances including air 
conditioning and heating units. 
The impact of trade expansion on the environment has also been associated with 
scale, technique and composition effects (Grossman and Krueger, 1992; Antweiler et al., 
2001; Frankel and Rose, 2005). The effects of trade vary depending on the nature of the 
pollutant and on the economy’s level of income. Increases in the volumes of trade may 
cause an expansion of economic activity (scale effect) thus, ceteris paribus, raising 
production-generated pollution. Trade may also induce a technique effect on pollution but 
this effect has been mainly considered to be due to the fact that trade increases income, 
which in turn may raise the desire for stricter environmental regulations. Hence, if we 
control for real income, taxes and regulations, the eff ct of trade should capture mostly 
the output composition effect. Trade could also affect pollution by facilitating transfers of 
technology. The increased technology transfer effect is most important for poor countries 
that tend to be the ones that receive technologies from the more advanced countries. 
However, given that our sample includes only rich countries which are the ones that 
generate environmentally cleaner technologies, this effect should be limited in their own 




Environmental regulations and environmental taxes may have an effect on the 
environment mostly through the technique effect, by reducing the level of emissions per 
unit of goods produced or consumed (Knigge and Görlach, 2005). Environmental and 
energy taxes directly increase the costs of “dirty” inputs or of dirty consumption goods 
such as fuels or gasoline, thus inducing their savings and substitution.  While these 
policies may also induce some output composition effect by increasing the relative price 
of outputs that use dirty inputs more intensively, this effect is likely to be weak.  As Karp 
(2011) argues, one possible explanation for the weakness of the composition effect of 
environmental policies is that the costs of complying with environmental regulations 
account for only a small share of total production costs, creating little incentives to 
relocate production of dirty goods.   Thus, unlike economy-wide policies, energy taxes 
and regulations are likely to have first order effects on techniques and the structure of 
consumption goods and only a second order effect on pr duction composition.   
Controlling for the scale effect (as we do in this paper), given the sample of rich 
countries that we use and the type of pollutants considered in our analysis, it is expected 
that energy taxes and environmental regulations mostly amplify the technique effect; 
trade mostly influences the composition effect in the case of production pollutants and 
has little effect on pollution produced by consumption activities. Fiscal policies may 





3 Econometric Model 
 
We assume that the annual average pollutant concentratio  at monitoring station i,
in country j at time t, ijtZ  , is determined by a vector reflecting the stocks of public and 
private goods provided by the government, Gjt , trade intensity, jtTI , country-specific 
energy taxes, jtM , and environmental regulations at the country level, jtR .  In addition, 
we control for the three year moving average of per capita household final consumption 
expenditure (as a proxy for permanent per capita income), jtY .  Additional controls 
include temperature (heating degree days), jtE , and monitoring station characteristics, 
X ij . Finally, the model controls for unobserved monitoring station effects and time-
varying unobserved country effects.  
1 2 , 3 , 4 5 , 6 7 ( )ijt ij j t j t jt j t jt jt ijtZ a a TI a M a R a Y a E aψ ζ τ ε= + + + + + + + + +j,t-1 ijG X   (1) 
{ }1,2,......., ,i I∈ { }1,2,......., ,j J∈  { }1995,.......,2008 ,t∈  
Where  ijψ  is an unobserved monitoring station effect that can be fixed or random; ( ) jtζ τ  
is a function of time that controls for fixed and time-varying country-specific effects;  
1995;tτ = −  and ijtε  is an idiosyncratic error that is assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed with zero mean and fixed variance. 
While we have data on government expenditure flows for various key 
components we do not have reliable measures of their respective stock levels, Gjt . We 
thus write Equation (1) below in differences so that the annual differences of the 
government stocks can be approximated by the lagged level of corresponding 





  1 2 , 3 , 4 5 , 6ijt ij j t j t jt j t jt jt ijtz ti m r y E vψ α α α α α α ε= + + + + + + + +j,t-1g    (2) 
 where, , 1ijt ijt ij tz Z Z −≡ − ; j,t-1 jt j,t-1g G -G≡ ; , 1jt jt j tti TI TI −≡ − ; , 1jt jt j tm M M −≡ − ; 
, 1jt jt j tr R R −≡ − ; , -1 -1-j t jt jty Y Y≡ ; 1( ) ( )jt jt jtv ζ τ ζ τ −≡ − ; ijψ  is an unobserved monitoring 
station effect; ijtε  is an idiosyncratic error that is assumed to be independent and 
identically distributed with zero mean and fixed variance.10 
The jtν  effect corresponds to the TVCE. We approximate the jtν  effect by a (T-
2)th order (country-specific) polynomial function of time,  
          2 3 20 1 2 3 2,........
T
jt j j j j T j jtb b b b bν τ τ τ τ µ
−
−
= + + + + + +    (3) 
where, 0 1 2 2,, , ,......,j j j T jb b b b −  are country-specific coefficients of the polynomial function 
of τ ; jtµ  is the residual; T is the maximum number of observations for a country. Using 
(3) in (2) we obtain the estimating equation where th  new disturbance term is 
ijt ijt jtε ε µ≡ + . The ( 2)
thT −  order (country specific) polynomial function of time in 
Equation (3) is the maximum order of approximation that allows for sufficient degrees of 
freedom to estimate the effects of observed country va iables on pollution. 
The TVCE method is related to methods used in the li erature (Cornwell et al., 
1990; Jacobsen et al., 1993; Friedberg, 1998; and Wolfers, 2006). However, these studies 
choose up to a second order polynomial of time to capture individual or region-specific 
slow moving omitted variables. The main advantage of the TVCE model proposed here is 
that it does not arbitrarily restrict the degree of approximation to a second order 
                                                          




polynomial as the earlier studies cited did. Instead the degrees of freedom in the data 
determine the limit of the time trend polynomial in the estimation. This approach allows 
for a much more flexible approximation of the omitted variables impact and hence 
reduces significantly the risks of omitted variable iases affecting the coefficients of the 
variables of interest. 
There are a number of possible omitted variables that the function jtν  may control 
for. The main omitted variables which we are concered about are regulations and 
especially their degree of enforcement. There are sev ral characteristics about regulations 
that do not lend themselves to be easily accounted for. They tend to suffer from constant 
revisions over time, for instance, existing regulations may include more sectors or new 
regulations may be proposed and adopted. The stringency of regulation enforcement 
might increase over time (but not necessarily linearly). Also, the evolution of 
enforcement of the same regulations may differ across countries. All these factors make 
regulation stringency and enforcement difficult to measure and therefore hard to control.   
Regulations and their enforcement are specifically  concern for this study since 
they may follow similar patterns over time as the sare of public expenditures over total 
government spending in many countries, which suggests a positive correlation between 
the omitted regulation and our variables of interest. This in turn implies that failing to 
control for the effect of the time-varying omitted variables may bias the coefficients of 
the relevant explanatory variables upwards (more negative).  
Including our proposed TVCE approach, there are a few other candidate 




standard country fixed effects model (FCE), (ii) country by year fixed effects which 
consists of fully interacted country and time dummies (iii) country specific trends which 
is essentially country dummies interacted with a time trend and (iv) the TVCE approach 
proposed above. 
The limitation of the standard country fixed effects approach (i) is that it does not 
account for time varying omitted variables. Most of the potential omitted variables 
mentioned such as regulation stringency and enforcement are not fixed for each country 
and tend to vary over time. In contrast, our proposed TVCE approach, do control for 
time-varying omitted variables as long as the omitted variables exhibit some degree of 
systematic variations over time. 
To fully control for the effects of the omitted variables it would be necessary to 
use the complete matrix of country-year dummies, which is approach (ii). There are two 
potential advantages of the TVCE approach with respect to using the country by year 
fixed effects model. Estimating a ( 1)thT − order polynomial function of time for each 
country is equivalent to using the complete matrix of country-year dummies because in 
this case we would estimate T independent parameters for each country (the country-
specific constant term or fixed effect plus T-1 parameters corresponding to the slopes of 
the polynomial), in total T x J independent parameters. Thus the TVCE specification that 
estimates a ( 2)thT − order polynomial has the advantage of estimating fewer parameters 
than approach (ii). The second and most important advantage of the TVCE approach over 
the country by year fixed effects is that in the latter it is impossible to estimate the effect 




eliminated. For the TVCE approach we can use  the ( 2)thT −  order approximation which 
means that the TVCE approach comes close to a full co ntry by year fixed effects model 
but also allows to estimate the effects of country-wide explanatory variables.11  
Finally, the use of country specific time trends (iii) imposes a linear functional 
form of the omitted variables while the TVCE approach allows for a more flexible 
functional form using country specific polynomials of the time trend. It is also important 
to note that the TVCE approach is a generalization of both the standard FCE (i) and the 
country-specific time trends approach (iii)12.  
  The TVCE method is indeed a generalization of the standard fixed-country 
effects model. It can be assumed that the FCE apply to estimations in levels and thus 
taking first differences, as in equation (2), would wipe them out. More generally, we may 
apply the FCE to a regression in differences instead of one merely in levels.13 Applying 
FCE to first differences can be interpreted as a first order approximation of the 
                                                          
11 The TVCE approach indeed follows the tradition of classical regression analysis of using prior 
information (or assumptions) as a means of economizing the number of parameters. For example, in pure 
cross-country regressions the full use of country effects would not allow estimating the effects of the 
(observed) variables of interest, and thus a common approach is to use regional effects instead of country 
effects. The prior information or assumption is that the countries within the region may have common 
unobserved effects.    
12 While our assumption that the unobserved time patterns can be fully captured by the (T-2)th polynomial 
approximation is not certain, we can test whether t jtµ  residuals (and therefore the ijt ijt jtε ε µ≡ +  
error term) are time-independent. If the hypothesis that the residuals are time- independent is not reject d, 
then the ( 2)thT −  order polynomial approximation may be sufficient to uncover the full time pattern of 
omitted variable effects on the endogenous variable.  H nce, the TVCE approach would be effective in 
mitigating time-varying country-idiosyncratic biases caused by omitted variables. By contrast, rejection of 
the hypothesis of time-independent residuals would s ggest that the effects of omitted variables are not 
fully controlled for.     
13 The inclusion of the FCE in regressions in differenc s has often been used in literature examining the 
determinants of economic growth (defined as log difference of per capita GDP), in which FCE are used to 
control for unobserved time-invariant country specific characteristics (see for example, Fölster and 




unobserved country effects.14 In cases where the total number of time observations per 
country is greater than 3, the ( 2)thT −  order approximation of the TVCE method is more 
general allowing for the FCE-in-differences estimators to be nested within the TVCE 
estimators.  That is, the FCE-in-differences model can be tested as a special case of the 
TVCE by parametrically testing the following restric ions, 1 2 2,.... 0j j T jb b b −= = = =  for 
all { }1,2,.......,j J∈ , while 0ojb ≠ , for at least somej . 
 
4  Data  
The air pollution data consist of annual averages for SO2, NO2 and O3 
observations, measured at a large number of monitoring stations in the 12 richest 
European countries for the 1995-2008 period. These air quality measures are taken from 
the AirBase dataset maintained by the European Enviro mental Agency. The complete 
list of countries is provided in Table D.1. 
Government expenditure, household final consumption and trade data are 
obtained from the EUROSTAT database. We use the functional classification of 
government expenditures at the general government lvel.15 The government 
expenditures on public goods include expenditures on public order and safety, 
environment protection, housing and community amenities, health, recreation, culture 
                                                          
14 If the country effect in the level equation is 00 0j jb b τ+  then by first differencing the regression, the 
level FE ( 00 jb ) vanishes and the FCE applying to differences becom s 0 jb . 
15 This classification, organizes government expenditures in ten general categories, according to their 
objectives or purposes, which is of the government’s administrative or organizational structure. The 
categories are: (i) general public services, (ii) defense, (iii) public order and safety, (iv) economic affairs, 
(v) environmental protection, (vi) housing and community amenities, (vii) health, (viii) recreation, culture 




and religion, education and social protection. Trade intensity is defined as the sum of 
exports and imports of goods and services as proporti n of GDP. 
The implicit tax rate on energy is obtained from EUROSTAT Statistical Books 
(2010). The temperature indicator (heating-degree-days) is obtained from the 
EUROSTAT database16. Table D.2 presents the description and source of data, while 
Table D.3 provides summary statistics of the variables used in the regressions.  
In the sample there is high variation in SO2 concentrations among monitoring 
stations and over time. Some stations have reported reductions in SO2 concentrations of 
up to 50% over the period. NO2 concentrations have not decreased as much as SO2. 
However NO2 concentrations have high variation across monitoring stations and 
countries. Ozone concentrations have increased in some stations located in Southern and 
Central Europe. See Table D.4 for measures of variability of the pollutants and Tables 
D.5, D.6 and D.7 for the annual averages of each pollutant across countries and years. 
The main explanatory variables show a large degree of variation over time and 
across countries as shown in Figures D.1 and D.2. The share of public goods in total 
government expenditure has increased over time for most of the countries. Germany and 
Denmark have the highest shares reaching values of 0.78 to 0.79 in some years; while 
Belgium and the Netherlands exhibit the lowest shares of the period with values as low as 
0.65. Similarly, the share of total government expenditure over GDP varies significantly 
across countries and within countries during the sample period. The countries with the 
lowest share of total expenditure over GDP are Spain and the United Kingdom, with 
                                                          
16 We control for heating degree days in our estimation, but are unable to account for cooling degree days 
due to lack of data. However, this omission may not be so serious given that most countries in our sample 
have only small windows of time in the summer when air conditioners may be used, and even then their 




shares as low as 0.38 in some years, and the countries with the highest shares include 
Sweden, Finland and Denmark with shares as high as 0.62.  
 
5 Estimation and Results 
 
We estimate equation (2) after normalizing the total government expenditures by 
GDP and the government expenditures on public goods by total government 
expenditures. We also normalize trade intensity (exports plus imports) by GDP. These 
normalizations are convenient because they yield unit free measures of the variables, 
which diminish the problems of comparing currency values and inflation across time and 
countries. 
We use a sixth order polynomial approximation for the time-varying country 
effects (equation 3). The reason for limiting the approximation to the sixth order is that in 
our unbalanced panel data there are countries for which we have only eight years of 
observations. This effectively implies that we can estimate a maximum of seven 
coefficients per country to capture the jtν  effect (the 0 jb  and the six tjb  coefficients for 
each country) in order to preserve sufficient degres of freedom to estimate the variables 
of interest.        
The monitoring station effect ijψ  may be uncorrelated with the observed 
explanatory variables in which case we can use a random station effects model. 
Alternatively, we may allow for arbitrary correlation between the unobserved monitoring 
station effect and the observed explanatory variables in which case we would need to use 




effects in combination with time-varying country-specific effects (RSE-TVCE and FSE-
TVCE, respectively). We present the results obtained using RSE-TVCE in Table 1 while 
Table 2 shows the FSE-TVCE estimators.17 If the station effects are correlated with the 
explanatory variables, the FCE-TVCE would be consistent and the RSE-TVCE may not. 
However, the results from both estimators are statistically similar which means that both 
are consistent. Given that the RSE-TVCE estimators use both the within and between 
variation while FCE-TVCE only rely on within country variations, the former are more 
efficient (Kennedy, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002). We use th  RSE-TVCE estimators for the 
subsequent analysis.  
5.1 Specification Tests   
5.1.1 Testing the Fixed Country Effect model.  
 
We test the null hypothesis that 1 2 3 4 5 6 0j j j j j jb b b b b b= = = = = =  for all j  
which, as discussed earlier, is a test for the validity of the fixed country effects model. As 
indicated in the bottom of Table 1, the restricted model is rejected at the 1% level of 
significance in favor of the TVCE model for each of the three pollutants, meaning that 
the often used fixed country effect specification is statistically rejected.18  
The coefficients 1 2 3 4 5 6, , , , ,j j j j j jb b b b b b  are jointly significant at the 1% level of 
significance and the majority of them are individually significant. This, in conjunction 
                                                          
17 The standard errors in all the estimates are robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation. 
18 Additionally, we test whether the residuals from the RSE-TVCE estimations are time independent by 
regressing them on a time trend τ ( ijt constantε βτ= + ).The null hypothesis that the residuals are time 
independent is not  rejected at any reasonable level for any of the pollutants; p-values for the associated 




with the relatively large impact that including these effects has on the coefficient 
estimates of the key variables, reflects the importance of the RSE-TVCE approach.19  
5.1.2 Reverse causality.  
Consistent with the econometric model presented in Section 3, the normalized 
government expenditures are lagged in the model. This may avoid the direct reverse 
causality between these variables and the pollutant, often a source of biases in the 
estimated coefficients. In principle it would still be possible that such lagged 
expenditures are correlated with other concurrent omi ted variables which would bias the 
coefficients. However, as we argued earlier, the country-specific time-varying effects 
largely minimize such a risk as these effects control for omitted variables. 
  It may be argued that reverse causality could be an issue for energy taxes as the 
tax variable is not lagged. Higher levels of pollution may be a factor that induces 
governments to raise energy taxes in which case ther would be an upward (less negative) 
bias on the energy tax coefficient. However, it is unlikely that the level of energy taxes is 
influenced much by variations in local pollution asenergy tax policies are mostly 
motivated in renewable energy and climate change policies rather than in local pollution-
related objectives (Newberry, 2005; Biermann and Brohm, 2005; Decker and Wohar, 
2007). But even if reverse causality were indeed an issue, the finding of a negative effect 
of the energy tax on pollution, as we do  when using the RSE-TVCE estimates, would 
merely make such estimates a lower bound measure of the true effect and would not alter 
                                                          
19 Table G.1 in Appendix G presents a summary of the analysis of the predicted values of the TVCE 
function. In most countries the effect of the omitted variables has been negative for SO2, and has changed 
sign over time for NO2 and O3. The majority of predicted values of the TVCE function are non-monotonic 




the sign of the estimates. That is, if we corrected for reverse causality bias, the estimates 
of the energy tax effect would be even more negative han the ones obtained in the 
estimations.      
 
5.2  Analysis of the Estimates  
 
5.2.1 Impact Analysis 
 
The estimates indicate negative and significant effects of the government 
spending level and composition on SO2 and O3, and negative but not statistically 
significant effects on NO2, as shown by the coefficients of the share of expenditures in 
public goods over total government expenditure and the share of total government 
expenditure over GDP in Table 1. Trade shows a negative nd significant effect on SO2 
concentrations but not on the other pollutants, ande ergy taxes exert a negative and 
significant effect on NO2 but not on the other contaminants.  
In Table 3 we show the elasticities for the main determinants of each pollutant. 
The importance of each of these effects is also expressed by the relative changes within 
the sample (impact of changing the explanatory variables in one standard deviation, 
expressing it as proportion of the sample standard eviations of the pollutant). Increasing 
the share of government expenditures on public goods by 1%, holding total government 
expenditure constant, may result in a 3.9% reduction of SO2 concentrations and a 1.25% 
decrease in O3 concentrations. Increasing the share of expenditures on public goods by 
one standard deviation reduces SO2 concentrations by 22.7% and O3 by 19.4% of their 




The concentrations of SO2 and O3 may be reduced by 2.6% and 0.82% 
respectively if total government expenditure increases by 1%. The increase of one 
standard deviation of the share of total expenditure with respect to GDP may result in a 
standard deviation reduction of 35.1% for SO2 and 31.7% in the case of O3.   
We find that the elasticity of energy taxes is -0.31 for NO2. If the energy tax rates 
increase by one standard deviation, the concentration of NO2 may be reduced by 12% of 
its standard deviation.20  The estimated effects of energy taxes are not significant for SO2 
which is caused mainly by industrial processes and electricity generation. We did not find 
statistically significant effects of energy taxes on O3 which is formed by certain 
precursor gases in combination with weather conditions.21  Our results suggest that 
energy taxes only affect pollution levels caused mainly by road and off-road fuel 
consumption.  
Trade has a negative and significant effect on SO2 but does not have a significant 
effect on neither NO2 nor O3 concentrations. The estimates imply that increasing trade 
intensity by 1% may result in a 1.1% reduction of SO2 concentrations. If trade intensity 
is increased by one standard deviation, SO2 concentrations are reduced by 49% of its 
standard deviation. Hence, as predicted by our conceptual analysis, trade affects 
                                                          
20 These findings are consistent with the elasticity estimates in a few studies that have measured these 
effects. Millock and Nauges (2006) estimate elasticities of energy taxes on NO2 and SO2 that vary from -
2.7 to -0.2 depending on the industry analyzed. 
21  One of the reasons energy taxes do not have a significant effect on O3 concentrations might be the 
nature of this pollutant since it is not emitted directly by any source and it is rather formed by the
combination of certain precursor gases especially under hot and sunny weather conditions (EEA, 2007). 
Another possible reason might be the positive effect of energy taxes over the participation of diesel 
vehicles on the automobile fleet (data that is not available for all countries and time periods); diesel 
vehicles tend to emit three times more ozone-precursor gases than gasoline vehicles. Vestreng et al., 2008 





“production” pollutants most likely through the composition effect but does not affect 
“consumption” pollutants.    
The coefficients for the level of per capita household consumption are positive in 
our estimates and mostly significant while most existing empirical studies for high 
income countries obtain a negative effect on local pol utants (Antweiler et al. 2001; 
Bernauer and Koubi 2006; Deacon and Norman, 2007).  This divergence may stem from 
our effort to mitigate the omitted variable biases by controlling for energy taxes, 
environmental regulation and other unobserved economy-wide variables that may be 
positively correlated with per capita income or consumption and that have a negative 
impact on pollution. The standard estimates are likly to attribute the effects of these 
variables to per capita income and thus conclude that increasing per capita income or 
household consumption may reduce pollution. By contrast our estimates isolate the pure 
effect of income or consumption on pollution.  
 
5.2.2 Comparison across different specifications  
 In the conceptual section we justified the use of the TVCE model and indicated its 
advantages over alternative specifications. Tables E.1, E.2 and E.3 present the results of 
RSE, RSE with Fixed Country Effects (RSE-FCE), and RSE-TVCE with the full range of 
orders of approximation from 1 to 6.22 The sign and significance of the results of our 
main coefficients are retained as they stabilize with h gher polynomials of the time trend. 
A few results are however worth noting. As we contrl for time varying omitted variables 
and increase the order of approximation, both the magnitude and significance of the share 
                                                          
22 The results for the Fixed Monitoring Stations Effects with Time Varying Country Effects (FSE-TVCE) 




of government expenditures on public goods increase. This may imply that the higher 
order approximations of the TVCE are capturing unobserved country level variables that 
are correlated with spending and pollution . Similarly, we find that in our base 
estimations trade has no significant effect on NO2 and O3 pollutants. However, using 
simple RSE-FCE estimations the effect of trade becomes negative and significant. This 
may imply that our TVCE approach may be capturing country-wide omitted variables 
such as the degree of regulations enforcement which may be biasing upward the RSE-
FCE estimations of the impact of trade on NO2 and O3. 
 
5.2.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
 
In addition to the specification tests reported earli r, we performed a series of 
sensitivity analyses to ascertain the robustness of the estimators. We checked for extreme 
data points that may dominate the sign and significance of key estimates and looked for 
individual country dominance.  
We conducted two types of dominance tests. In order to account for extreme data 
points, we first re-estimated the model by excluding observations in the top and bottom 
1% of the share of government expenditures on public goods. The same procedure is 
followed by re-estimating the model without observations in the top and bottom 1% of 
the energy tax rate, pollutant concentration and tra e intensity. The parameters are robust 
to the sample changes, except for the case of tradewhen dropping the bottom 1% of SO2 
observations. This result indicates that the effect of rade is weak even on production 




expenditure as well as other unobserved factors. Signs, significance and magnitudes of 
the parameter estimates from these models are shown in Tables F.1 to F.6 in Appendix F.  
The second type of tests focuses on the effect of potential country dominance. We 
re-estimated our benchmark models, dropping one country at a time, to check whether 
they alter the parameter estimates of the share of public goods (for the SO2 and O3 
regressions), of the energy taxes (for the NO2 regressions) and of trade (for SO2). As 
shown in Figures F.1 to F.4 in Appendix F, removing one country at a time does not 
affect the sign and significance of the estimated parameters, with the exception of share 
of public goods over government expenditure in the O3 regression, which seems to be 
dependent on Italy.23 
5.3 Decomposition Analysis. 
 
Table 4 shows the average annual changes in all pollutants for the analyzed period 
and the decomposition of fiscal, trade and environme tal policy effects on each one of 
them. SO2, mainly a production pollutant, has decreased very rapidly over the period at 
an annual rate of 8.5% but NO2 and O3, considered mainly consumption pollutants, have 
not improved nearly as much. NO2 concentrations have f llen by only 1.4% per annum 
and O3 concentrations have increased in almost all countries showing an average annual 
rate of increase of 0.9%.  
As mentioned in the conceptual section, we expect fis al policies to mostly affect 
air pollution concentration via the composition and technique effects, with trade having a 
                                                          
23 It is worth noting that Italy includes a large number of observations, more than 1,500 observations or 
about 8% of the total. This does not necessarily indicate a lack of robustness of the estimators; it i indeed 
remarkable that the coefficients are robust to the exclusion of all other countries even if dropping idividual 




larger effect through the former on production pollutants and a negligible effect through 
the latter on consumption pollutants. We also expect that environmental policies and 
energy taxes would affect consumption pollution mainly via the technique effect.  As can 
be seen in Table 4, these predictions are fully corroborated by the empirical results. 
SO2 reductions are mostly explained by trade and fiscal policies, which together 
explain practically all the observed reductions, meaning that without those policies SO2 
levels would have increased over the analyzed period. The large contribution of trade and 
of the increased share of expenditures in public goods over total government expenditure 
and of the share of total government expenditure ovr GDP may be the result of the 
production shift towards cleaner, possibly more human capital-intensive industries. 
Environmental regulation, specifically the “Large Combustion Plant Directive” (see 
Table A.2 for a detailed description of this regulation), also contributes to the reduction in 
SO2 concentrations possibly through a technique effect.  
In the case of NO2, energy taxes explain a major part of the observed modest 
reduction; about 52% of this reduction is most likely due to their direct effect causing 
higher energy prices and hence less consumer demand for energy. They may also induce 
a technique effect that reduces pollution. This suggests that energy taxes are an effective 
instrument to reduce this type of pollutant, and reflects the European countries’ demand 
(on average) for less NO2 emissions per unit of goods consumed.  
Fiscal policies associated with an increased participation of government spending 
in GDP and progressive shifts towards the provision of public goods have a strong 
(unintended) effect towards reducing ozone. In fact, the combined effect of the observed 




by more than 1% per annum. That is, if Europe had not i creased the share of 
government spending in GDP and if it had not changed the spending composition 
towards public goods, ozone would have increased twice as fast as what was actually 
experienced.  The European fiscal spending policies may explain why in these countries 
O3 concentrations have not increased nearly as much as in other regions of the world. 
Additionally, fiscal policies are the only policies considered that have any effect on 
ozone, which is probably the most difficult to control among the measured pollutants.  
6 Conclusion 
This study finds that fiscal, trade and energy tax policies implemented by the 
twelve richest European countries are important determinants of pollution through 
various mechanisms. Large and increasing public sector participation and increasing 
prioritization of public goods over private goods in the European countries analyzed have 
had a hitherto ignored effect by reducing the concentrations of sulfur dioxide and ozone 
but not nitrogen dioxide. In addition, we find that the high energy tax policy adopted by 
the majority of the European countries over the last few decades have substantially 
contributed to reduce the concentrations of nitrogen dioxide but have no effect on ozone 
and sulfur dioxide. Finally, trade openness has a direct effect on sulfur dioxide but no 
effect on nitrogen dioxide or ozone.  
These results should be regarded as an added incentive for EU countries to at least 
persist if not increase the emphasis on fiscal policies and energy taxes that trigger the 
development of new technologies. The study may alsopresent an argument for other 
countries which have not yet adopted these policies to implement them. The results have 




countries which currently have much lower energy taxes and fiscal spending policies that 
are heavily oriented to provide private goods instead of public goods. Pursuing fiscal 
policies as adopted by some European countries may potentially have a large unintended 
environmental pay-off. 
To the best of our knowledge this is the first paper that systematically examines 
the role of fiscal spending policy, trade and energy taxes on Europe’s environmental 
quality, using a methodology that obtains estimates mostly free from time-varying 
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Random Monitoring Stations Effects with Time Varying Country Effects (RSE-TVCE)  
 
  
 Ln Diff SO2 Ln Diff NO2 Ln Diff O3 
Share of expenditures in public goods over 
total government expenditures (lagged) 
-5.33**  -0.19 -1.69** 
[1.27] [0.49] [0.52] 
    
Share of total government expenditures over 
GDP (lagged) 
-5.52** -0.37 -1.73* 
[1.78] [0.71] [0.77] 
    
Time difference of Energy Tax Rate  
-0.11 -0.18** 0.057 
[0.06] [0.03] [0.04] 
    
Time difference of Regulation over large 
Plants 
-0.49**   
[0.07]   
    
Time difference of Regulation over NOx 
 -0.34 1.54 
 [0.51] [0.83] 
    
Time difference of Log of Trade 
(X+M)/GDP 
-1.13** -0.41 -0.21 
[0.40] [0.25] [0.43] 
    
Time difference of 3-Year Moving Average 
of Ln of Household final consumption per 
capita   
0.053**  0.004 0.026* 
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] 
    
Number of Observations 16,222 19,374 15,282 
No. of Monitoring Stations   2,666 3,176 2,274 
Overall R-Squared 0.11 0.06 0.10 
Specification tests:    
Testing the fixed country effects-random site 
effects model: 
Log Likelihood Ratio Test  
Ho: 1 2 2,....... 0j j T jb b b −= = = =  
426** 322** 316** 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Not reported in the table are 77 coefficients for each equation for the variables that capture the TVCE, 12 




Table 2  





 Ln Diff SO2 Ln Diff NO2 Ln Diff O3 
Share of expenditures in public goods over 
total government exp (lagged) 
-5.92** -0.27 -1.68**  
[1.34] [0.54] [0.58] 
    
Share of total government expenditure over 
GDP (lagged) 
-6.17** -0.12 -1.61 
[1.91] [0.79] [0.86] 
    
Time difference of Energy Tax Rate  
-0.14* -0.20** 0.05 
[0.07] [0.034] [0.04] 
    
Time difference of Regulation over large 
Plants 
-0.47**   
[0.08]   
    
Time difference of Regulation over NOx 
 -0.55 1.70 
 [0.66] [1.06] 
    
Time difference of Log of Trade 
(X+M)/GDP 
-1.09* -0.37 -0.23 
[0.48] [0.27] [0.48] 
    
Time difference of 3 Year Moving Average 
of Ln of Household final consumption per 
capita   
0.06*  0.04**  0.05**  
[0.02] [0.01] [0.01] 
    
Number of Observations 16,222 19,374 15,282 
No. of Monitoring Stations   2,666 3,176 2,274 
Overall R-Squared 0.12 0.07 0.13 
Specification tests:    
Testing the fixed country effects-random site 
effects model: 
Log Likelihood Ratio Test  
Ho: 1 2 2,....... 0j j T jb b b −= = = =  
463** 361** 403** 
Robust standard errors in brackets.  
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Not reported in the table are 66 coefficients for each equation for the variables that capture the TVCE, 12 





Elasticities and Sample Quantitative Effects  
  
SO2 NO2 O3 
Elasticity of the Share of Public 
Goods 
 -3.91** n. s. -1.25** 
Change in the pollutant when the 
Share of Public Goods increases by 
one Standard Deviation (% of std dev 
of pollutant) 
 -22.70%** n. s. -19.45%** 
Elasticity of the ratio of total 
government expenditure over GDP 
 -2.63** n. s.  -0.82* 
Change in the pollutant when the 
ratio of total government expenditure 
over GDP increases by one Standard 
Deviation (% of std dev of pollutant) 
 -35.10%** n. s.  -31.37%* 
Elasticity of the Energy Tax Rate n. s.  -0.31** n. s. 
Change in the pollutant when the 
Energy Tax Rate increases by one 
Standard Deviation (% of std dev of 
pollutant) 
 n. s. -12.32%** n. s. 
Elasticity of Trade -1.13** n. s. n. s. 
Change in the pollutant when Trade 
increases by one Standard Deviation 
(% of std dev of pollutant) 
-49.23%** n. s. n. s. 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 



















of growth of 
the pollutant 
(%) 
Annual average contribution  (in percentage points) 












Regulation Energy taxes 
SO2 -8.51 -5.56* -2.27* -3.79* n. s. -2.76* 
NO2 -1.37 n. s. n. s. n. s. -0.58* n.s. 
O3 0.91 -0.39* -0.71* n. s. n. s. n.s. 
 
Note: The rates of growth used to create this table were calculated as the annual average growth. In te case of the 
pollutant the annual rate of growth of each monitoring station was calculated, and then a country average was taken 
for each country and finally the average over all of the years available in the sample. For the rest of the variables at 
the country level, first the rate of growth with resp ct to the previous year was calculated then the average of the 
whole period. 




Chapter 3: Caught in a Productivity Trap: A Distrib utional Perspective 
on Gender Differences in Malawian Agriculture 
 
By: Amparo Palacios López1 
 
"[C]hildren shrieking at play; and women bent double - most with infants slung on their 
backs - hoeing the corn and beans; and the men sitti g n the shade stupefying themselves 
on chibuku, the local beer, or kachasu, the local gin."  
 
Paul Theroux, Dark Star Safari: Overland from Cairo to Cape Town (2002) 
 
“While a great deal has been learned about what works and what does not when it comes 
to promoting greater gender equality, the truth remains that progress is often held back 
by the lack of data or adequate solutions to the most ‘sticky’ problems.” 
 





Globally, 1.4 billion people, or one quarter of the population of the developing 
world, live in extreme poverty, and an additional 1.2 billion live in moderate poverty. The 
analysis of regional contributions to global poverty indicates that although sub-Saharan 
Africa represents only 12 percent of the world population, it accounts for 27 percent of 
the global poor, and that poverty in sub-Saharan Africa is being reduced at a much slower 
pace than elsewhere (Chen and Ravallion, 2008).2 Aggregate agricultural growth has 
                                                          
1 With Talip Kilic and Markus Goldstein 
2 The poverty rate in sub-Saharan Africa is estimated to have declined only 3 percentage points, from 54 to 




been documented to bring disproportionate gains to the poorest in the developing world.3 
In sub-Saharan Africa, nearly 75 percent of the extreme poor reside in rural areas, and 91 
percent of the rural extreme poor are estimated to participate in agriculture. As 
smallholder agriculture is the predominant form of farm organization in the region (FAO, 
2009), smallholder agricultural productivity growth has been identified as a key driver of 
poverty reduction and increased food security.4 In targeting sustainable poverty gains 
through smallholder-based agricultural growth, national development plans across sub-
Saharan Africa have emphasized the reduction of gender differences in agricultural 
productivity. Most recently, FAO (2011) asserted that if female farmers had the same 
access to productive resources as men, they could increase yields by 20 to 30 percent, 
which could increase total agricultural output in developing countries by 2.5 to 4 percent 
and lift 100 to 150 million people out of hunger. Increased productivity among female 
farmers is also often argued to result in double-barreled payoff: (i) poverty alleviation 
through positive impact on overall smallholder productivity growth, and (ii) improved 
development outcomes for the next generation.5 
 
Although the estimates of gender differences in agricultural productivity 
(henceforth referred to as the gender gap)6 cross sub-Saharan Africa range widely from 
4 to 40 percent, the majority cluster around 20 to 30 percent. The studies that compare 
                                                          
3 Ligon and Sadoulet (2008) document that a 1 percent rise in agricultural GDP results in 6 percent income 
growth for the lowest income decile of the population.  
4 Irz et al. (2001) estimate that for every 10 percent increase in farm yields, there has been a 7 percent 
reduction in poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. 
5 See WB (2011), and Doepke and Tertilt (2011) for a review. 
6 Agricultural productivity is commonly proxied by major crop production quantity per hectare or gross 




productivity outcomes on female- vs. male-managed plots across and within households 
provide further support for the presence of systemaic and persistent gender differences in 
agricultural productivity in the region (Akresh, 2005; Alene et al., 2008; Gilbert et al., 
2002; Goldstein and Udry, 2008; Moock 1976; Peterman et al., 2011; Oladeebo and 
Fajuyigbe, 2007; Quisumbing et al., 2001; Saito et al., 1994; Tiruneh et al., 2001; Udry, 
1996; Vargas Hill and Vigneri, 2011). The major reasons for the observed gender gap 
have been identified as gender differences in (i) access to and use of agricultural inputs, 
(ii) tenure security and related investments in land and improved technologies, (iii) 
market and credit access, (iv) human and physical capital, and (v) informal institutional 
constraints affecting farm/plot management and marketing of agricultural produce.7 
Regardless of whether the comparisons are made across or within households, the 
common thread across the relevant literature is that e gender gap disappears or 
diminishes significantly once the researcher controls for the factors discussed above. 
 
Despite what could be perceived as a well-established evidence base on the extent 
and proximate causes of the gender gap across sub-Saharan Africa, the overwhelming 
majority of empirical studies on the topic have used data from small-scale surveys that 
were limited in terms of geographic coverage, topic, or attention to intra-household 
dynamics (or, in some cases, all three). With the exception of Akresh (2005), none of the 
above-referenced papers rely on nationally-representative survey data. Dearth of 
nationally-representative, methodologically-sound data collected in heterogeneous 
                                                          
7 Cultural roles that are assigned to males and females regarding domestic duties and those that may 
underlie the gender segregation in crop production (i.e. staple vs. cash crop cultivation, high-yielding vs. 




settings across sub-Saharan Africa has in turn inhibited the computation of externally-
valid, rigorous estimates. Our study seeks to start filling this gap by providing a 
nationally-representative analysis of the gender gap in Malawi, using a different 
econometric approach than existing studies.   
 
Our econometric approach is underlined by the use of an identification strategy 
that has been utilized extensively in labor economics s nce the seminal studies of Oaxaca 
(1973) and Blinder (1973), most notably in the analyses of the gender wage gap, union 
wage gap, and growing wage inequality. Specifically, we decompose the average 
difference in agricultural productivity between male-managed and female-managed plots 
into (i) the portion that is driven by gender differences in levels of observable attributes 
(i.e. the endowment effect), and (ii) the portion that is driven by gender differences in 
returns to the same set of observables (i.e. the structure effect). To our knowledge, this is 
the first time this method has been applied to understanding the gender gap.    
 
Complementing this aggregate decomposition analysis, we provide a detailed 
decomposition of the mean gender gap, identifying the contribution of each observable 
covariate towards the endowment and structure effects. In contrast with the available 
microeconomic evidence, the detailed decomposition d cuments, within a partial-
equilibrium framework, the relative quantitative importance of each factor in explaining 




of differences in key factors contributing to the gnder gap so that the emerging insights 
could inform the design of policy interventions addressing the gender gap at its roots.8  
 
The second contribution of our study relates to the application of the 
decomposition methodology to distributional statistics beyond the mean through the use 
of recentered influence function (RIF) regressions. Since key contributors towards the 
gender gap might differ across farmer subpopulations f varying productivity levels, the 
RIF decomposition is a useful tool for tracing out the heterogeneity in constraints faced 
by farmers with different gender and productivity profiles, and thus, tailoring better 
targeted policies that are underlined by analyses that move beyond the “average” male vs. 
female farmer. Towards this end, we carry out (i) the aggregate decomposition of the 
gender gap at each decile of the agricultural productivity distribution, and (ii) the detailed 
decomposition of the gender gap at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles. The paper also 
discusses the changes in the shares of endowment and structure effects as part of the 
aggregate decomposition, and the variations in the contributions of key factors towards 
the endowment and structure effects at selected percentiles.  
 
Finally, the multi-topic and national-representative nature of our household 
survey data represents the third contribution to the literature on the gender gap in sub-
Saharan Africa. The availability of geo-referenced household and agricultural plot 
locations also allows us to create synergies with geographic information system (GIS) 
                                                          
8 For instance, if the researcher confirms that femal  managers, on average, have access to less inorganic 
fertilizer, and that the gender differences in inorganic fertilizer application is a key contributor twards the 
gender gap, it becomes crucial to understand why femal  managers have access to less inorganic fertiliz  




data for the purpose of incorporating relevant geospatial variables into the modelling 
efforts. 
 
There are five key findings from our study. First, on average, female-managed 
plots in Malawi are 25 percent less productive than those that are managed by males. 
Second, 82 percent of the mean gender gap is explained by the differences in observable 
covariates, i.e. the endowment effect. The direct pay-off to addressing market and 
institutional failures that affect men and women differentially is economically significant: 
ensuring that female plot managers have similar yeas of schooling and apply similar 
levels of non-labor agricultural inputs, including inorganic fertilizer, 
pesticides/herbicides, and improved and/or export crop varieties could reduce the mean 
gender gap by 50 percent. Deficiencies on female-managed plots regarding household 
adult male labor input and access to agricultural implements are other key factors 
exacerbating the gender gap. Third, the remaining 18 percent of the mean gender gap is 
mostly explained by gender differences in returns to (i) household adult male labor input 
and inorganic fertilizer application, which have significantly lower positive effects on the 
productivity of female-managed plots, and (ii) the child dependency ratio, which has a 
highly significant and negative effect on the productivity of female-managed plots, in 
contrast to no effect on the productivity of male-managed plots. Fourth, the gender gap 
increases significantly across the agricultural productivity distribution: the differential 
stands at 22 and 37 percent at the 10th and 90th percentile, respectively. Finally, we find 
that the gender gap is explained predominantly by the endowment effect in the first half 




close to 90 percent of the gender gap at the median. Above the median, however, the 
contribution of the endowment effect towards the gender gap declines steadily such that 
the structure effect culminates in explaining 34 percent of the gender gap at the 90th 
percentile. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the 
evidence on the gender gap in sub-Saharan Africa. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
Malawian context, and describes the data. Sections 4 and 5 present the mean 
decomposition methodology and the results from the mean decomposition, respectively. 
Likewise, Sections 6 and 7 present the RIF decomposition methodology and the results 
from the RIF decomposition, respectively. Section 8 offers concluding remarks and 
expands on the policy implications of our findings.  
 
2 Gender Differences in Agricultural Productivity in Sub-Saharan Africa : Review of 
Evidence 
 
The studies that investigate the gender gap in sub-Saharan Africa are quite 
heterogeneous in terms of the type of data and the estimation strategies that they use. The 
existing literature broadly features two strands. The first strand is composed of studies 
that conduct their analyses at the household-level and do not link plot-level outcomes to 
the identity of the managers and/or owners within study households. The second strand is 
composed of a handful of empirical studies that use plot-level data linked to individual 




of the results for policy have been limited due to sh rtcomings in terms of questionnaire 
design, empirical methodology, and/or sample representativeness. “[T]he 
inconclusiveness of gender research due to either methodological or data limitations 
obscures the policy and programmatic recommendations that emerge from gender 
productivity analysis, and do not enable us to ascertain whether gender matters in 
producing evidence-based agricultural policy” (Peterman et al. 2011, pp. 1486). 
 
The first strand of the literature encompasses the overwhelming majority of the 
empirical studies on the topic. These studies generally use the gender of the head of 
household as the main explanatory variable to identfy the gender gap. The common 
assumptions of these research efforts are that the members of a given household do not 
necessarily differ in their sex, age, productive capacity and/or personality profiles; that 
information is shared symmetrically between cooperative individuals; and that 
differences in the quantity and quality of land and non-land inputs used by different 
individuals within or across study households are negligible (Schultz, 2001; Peterman et 
al., 2011). The extent to which these assumptions are v lid in a given sub-Saharan 
African setting depends on (i) the complexity of familial structures, including 
monogamous, polygamous, skipped-generation, and multi-generation households 
(Peterman et al., 2011), and (ii) the persistence of rights and obligations that affect men 
and women differently and that are underscored by biological differences, social and 
religious norms, and customs that jointly dictate th division of labor, land, and proceeds 





A considerable majority of the studies of the second strand of the literature on the 
gender gap in sub-Saharan Africa originate from West Africa, specifically from Ghana 
and Burkina Faso, where it is common for households to have several agricultural plots 
and for male and female plot managers to coexist in study households. This allows 
authors to control for unobserved time-invariant household-crop-level heterogeneity in a 
multivariate regression framework and to estimate agricultural production functions for 
plots cultivated with the same crop, managed or owned by men and women in the same 
household. As such, they have evolved to be the most influential studies on gender 
differences in agricultural productivity in sub-Saharan Africa, documenting the potential 
Pareto-inefficient nature of within-household allocation of productive resources. The 
gender gap is typically identified by the magnitude and statistical significance of the 
regression coefficient associated with the gender of the plot manager/owner.  
 
The evidence from the second strand indicates that in some contexts, descriptive 
mean differences in agricultural productivity across plots owned/managed by males vs. 
females continue to be large and statistically significant in multivariate analyses that 
control for differences in input use (Saito et al.,1994 for Nigeria; Udry, 1996 for Burkina 
Faso; Quisumbing et al., 2001 for Ghana; Peterman et al., 2011 for Uganda), while in 
other contexts, the gender gap ceases to be statistically significant once the researcher 




Gilbert et al., 2002 for Malawi; Akresh, 2005 for Burkina Faso; Goldstein and Udry, 
2008 for Ghana).9  
 
A common limitation of these studies is the reliance on data that are at best 
regionally-representative in terms of population dyamics (with the exception of Akresh, 
2005), whereby results have limited external validity beyond the study area, within or 
across countries. For instance, Akresh (2005) uses nationally-representative data from 
Burkina Faso, and while he is able to replicate the findings of Udry (1996) by focusing 
on a subset of villages that are in close proximity to the areas underlying Udry’s analysis, 
Akresh cannot recover the same relationships based on the data collected in other parts of 
the country. This discrepancy highlights the importance of revisiting the body of 
evidence on the gender gap in sub-Saharan Africa by using nationally-representative data.  
 
Another limitation observed in the second strand of the relevant literature is the 
disproportionate focus on West Africa. It is important to investigate the extent and 
correlates of the gender gap in alternative sub-Saharan African settings with different sets 
of rights and obligations that differently affect the distribution of productive resources 
across men and women. Finally, in the case of empirical studies that document 
statistically insignificant differences in agricultral productivity between female-
managed and male-managed plots, conditional on plot-level observable and household-
level unobservable attributes, the analytical framework is not set up to isolate relative 
                                                          
9 See Peterman et al. (2011) for a succinct review of the main findings of the studies cited here. Only Udry 
(1996), Quisumbing et al. (2001), Akresh (2005), Goldstein and Udry (2008), and Peterman et al. (2011) 




contributions of relevant attributes towards the observed gender gap for the purpose of 
prioritizing areas for policy interventions. 
 
3 Malawi: Agricutural Productivity and Gender  
 
3.1   The Country Context10  
 
Malawi is a small, population-dense, land-locked country in Southern Africa, with 
94,080 square kilometers of land. The 2010 mid-year population projection and annual 
population growth rate stand at 14.5 million persons a d 3.25 percent, respectively, and 
85 percent of the population reside in rural areas (NSO, 2012). Agriculture is not only the 
backbone of Malawi’s economy but also an essential part of its social fabric. The sector 
accounts for 30 percent of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and 84 percent of 
Malawian households own and/or cultivate land11. The production system is 
overwhelmingly rainfed, characterized by limited access to irrigation and diminishing 
average land holding sizes due to population pressu. The rainfall is unimodal, and 
maize is the main staple crop, grown by nearly 100 percent of the farming household 
population.12  
 
                                                          
10 Unless otherwise stated, the statistics reported in Section 3.1 originate from 
data.worldbank.org/country/Malawi. 
11 The GDP contribution of agriculture is for 2011. The estimate of the percentage of Malawian households 
owning and/or cultivating land is based on the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3) data.  




Over the last two decades, agricultural productivity, as measured by maize yields 
(kilogram/hectare), has been erratic, as shown in Figure 1. The factors that are commonly 
cited as underlying the agricultural productivity trend include weather variability, 
declining soil fertility, limited use of improved agricultural technologies and sustainable 
land management practices, rationed agricultural extension services, market failures, and 
underdeveloped and poorly maintained infrastructure (World Bank, 2007). The majority 
of the farming households still practice subsistence agriculture: the rates of market 
participation among farming households in general and maize-producing households in 
particular are 42 and 15 percent, respectively.13 The inconsistent agricultural performance 
has direct implications for living standards, given the predominantly rural nature of the 
country and its heavy reliance on agriculture.  
 
Poverty remains widespread and persistent, particularly among female headed 
households. Based on the data from the Second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) 
2004/05 and the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3) 2010/11, the national 
absolute poverty rate of 52.4 percent in 2004/05 declin d only marginally to 50.7 percent 
in 2010/11. The trends in rural poverty followed a similar pattern: a rate of 55.9 percent 
in 2004/05 vs. 56.6 percent in 2010/11.14 Focusing on the gender dimensions of poverty, 
while the absolute poverty rate among male-headed households was estimated at 49 
percent in 2010/11, the comparable figure among femal -headed households was 57 
percent. In an effort to combat poverty and boost natio al food security, the Malawian 
                                                          
13 The estimate is based on the IHS3 data. 
14 The difference between the IHS2 and the IHS3 natiol absolute poverty rates is not statistically 




Government has embarked on an ambitious annual fertiliz r and seed subsidy program 
known as the Farm Input Subsidy Program (FISP), starting with the 2005/06 agricultural 
season. During the 2009/10 agricultural season (the reference agricultural season for over 
75 percent of our sample), close to 50 percent of the farming household population is 
estimated to have participated in the program.15 Stagnant poverty levels raise questions 
on the effectiveness of the FISP in alleviating poverty and food insecurity in a sustainable 
fashion, which should be subject to further empirical nvestigation.16 
 
3.2   Data 
 
This study uses data from the Third Integrated Household Survey (IHS3), 
collected from March 2010 to March 2011 by the Malawi National Statistical Office, 
with support from the World Bank Living Standards Measurement Study - Integrated 
Surveys on Agriculture (LSMS-ISA) project.17 The IHS3 data were collected within a 
                                                          
15 The exchange rate for the IHS3 period is MK150 = US$1. During the 2009/10 agricultural season, each 
FISP beneficiary was entitled to vouchers that allowed them to purchase (i) two 50 kilogram bags of maize 
fertilizer at 500 Malawi Kwacha (MK) per bag, (ii) either 3 kilograms of hybrid maize seed or 10 kilograms 
of open-pollinated variety maize seed for the commercial market value net of the 1500 MK subsidy from 
the Government, (iii) 200 grams of storage pesticide for 100 MK, and (iv) 1 kilogram of legume seed 
(groundnuts, soybeans, beans and pigeon peas) for free. Upon the allocation of vouchers across the district  
and the villages within each district, the program relies on community-based targeting to identify 
beneficiaries at the local-level, and is supposed to target households that are (i) resource poor, (ii) 
permanent village residents, and (iii) own and cultivate land, with preference given to heads of households 
that may be female, orphan, elderly, physically-challenged, or HIV-positive or individuals that look after 
the elderly and physically-challenged (MoAFS, 2009). 
16 Concerns regarding the effectiveness of FISP in reducing poverty and achieving sustainable gains in 
maize production have been raised (Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2011; Holden and Lunduka, 2010). More 
recently, Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2012) focus on the question of whether FISP can simultaneously boost 
maize production and reduce poverty, and document that major returns from subsidized fertilizer accrue 
almost exclusively to households at the top of the maize production and value of total crop output 
distributions.  





two-stage cluster sampling design, and are representative at the national, urban/rural, 
regional, and district levels, covering 12,271 households in 768 enumeration areas (EAs). 
The IHS3 instruments included Household, Agriculture, Fishery, and Community 
Questionnaires.  
 
All sample households were administered the multi-top c Household 
Questionnaire that collected individual-disaggregatd information on demographics, 
education, health, wage employment, nonfarm enterprises, anthropometrics, and control 
of income from non-farm income sources, as well as data on housing, food consumption, 
food and non-food expenditures, food security, and durable and agricultural asset 
ownership, among other topics. The sample households that were involved in agricultural 
activities (through ownership and/or cultivation of land, and/or ownership of livestock) 
were administered the Agriculture Questionnaire. The Agriculture Questionnaire solicited 
information on land areas, physical characteristics, labor and non-labor input use, and 
crop cultivation and production at the plot level, separately for the reference rainy and 
dry seasons. 18 The data allow for agricultural production estimates at the plot level and 
for the identification of the manager of the plot19, as well as household members that 
owned20 and/or worked on each plot.21 Handheld global positioning system (GPS)-based 
                                                          
18 A plot was defined as a continuous piece of land o which a unique crop or a mixture of crops is grown, 
under a uniform, consistent crop management system, not split by a path of more than one meter in width. 
Plot boundaries were defined in accordance with the crops grown and the operator. 
19 For each plot, the following question was asked to identify the primary decision maker/manager: “Who 
in this household makes the decisions concerning crops to be planted, input use and the timing of cropping 
activities on this plot?” The questionnaire allowed for identification of one manager per plot, on whom 
individual-level information could be recovered from the Household Questionnaire. 
20 For each plot, the following question was asked to identify the plot owners: “Who owns this plot?” The 




locations and land areas of the plots were recorded, p rmitting us to link household- and 
plot-level data to outside geographic information system (GIS) databases. 
 
The descriptive statistics and the results from the tests of mean differences by the 
gender of the plot manager are presented in Table 1. The full sample consists of 16,372 
plots, 26% of them managed by females.22 Table 1 clearly demonstrates the (unadjusted) 
gender gap: the average gross value of output per hectare, our proxy for agricultural 
productivity, is 25% lower for the female-managed plot sample.23 The gender differences 
in agricultural productivity are also evident in the comparison of the Kernel density 
estimates of the log of gross value of output per hectare for male- and female-managed 
plots, as displayed in Figure 2. The overwhelming majority of the differences in the 
average values of the observable covariates across male- vs. female-managed plots in 
Table 1 are statistically significant at the 1 percent level. For the purposes of the ensuing 
                                                                                                                                                                             
21 81 percent of the plots in our sample are reported to be owned. Among the owned plots, 15 percent have 
joint ownership, of which the predominant form is male-female. The remaining 38 percent and 47 percent 
of the owned plots are under sole male ownership and sole female ownership, respectively.  
22 The IHS3 identified 18,917 plots that were reported o have been owned and/or cultivated during the 
reference rainy season (2008/09 or 2009/10). 618 plots are not considered for analysis since they lacked 
either GPS-based plot coordinates or GPS-based plot area. 1,314 plots are dropped since they are either 
fallow or missing production information. 199 plots are not included in the sample since unit values could 
not be computed reliably for at least one of the crops reported to be cultivated on the plot. 11 plots do not 
have a manager identified and 67 plots have at leasone missing value among the independent variables of 
interest. Finally, top and bottom 1 percent of the distribution of the log of gross value of output per h ctare 
are trimmed, corresponding to 336 plots. These exclusions leave us with the final analysis sample of 16,372 
rainy season plots. 
23 The plot-level gross value of output in Malawi Kwach  (MK) is calculated by first multiplying the 
kilogram-equivalent quantity of production for each crop on a given plot by the median crop sales value per 
kilogram within the corresponding EA, and then aggre ating across values of crop production. The median 
crop sales value per kilogram is computed within the corresponding EA only if at least 10 values are 
available from the survey data. Otherwise, the median crop sales value per kilogram is computed at a 
higher level, in the order of traditional authority, district, region, and country. Our outcome variable is 




discussion, we focus on the differences that are statistically significant at least at the 5 
percent level. 
 
The incidence of manager-head of household correspondence is 99 percent for the 
male-managed plot sample, while the analogous statistic is 80 percent for the female-
managed plot sample. Female-managed plots are, on average, overseen by individuals 
that are 5 years older and have 2 less years of schooling with respect to their male-
managed comparators. A significantly higher percentage of female-managed plots exhibit 
manager-owner correspondence (77 vs. 58 percent) and 75 percent of the female-
managed plot sample are exclusively female-owned, featuring either a sole female owner 
or dual female owners within the household.24 The incidences of joint ownership and 
exclusive-male ownership stand at 4 and 3 percent, r spectively, among female-managed 
plots. In comparison, male-managed plots are distributed more evenly across the 
ownership categories of exclusive-male (43 percent), exclusive-female (23 percent), and 
joint male-female (15 percent). 
 
Although the average GPS-based plot area is 0.39 hectare, female-managed plots 
are, on average, 12 percent smaller than their male- naged counterparts. The use of 
inorganic fertilizer is lower on female-managed plots, whether measured by incidence, 
average unconditional amount per hectare, or average conditional amount per hectare. 
These trends may signal gender differences in FISP fertilizer voucher distribution and 
                                                          
24 The overwhelming majority of the owned plots (83 percent) are acquired through inheritance. Another 12 
percent is reported to have been granted by local leaders. The remaining are acquired as bride price (2 




redemption outcomes. In fact, the IHS3 data indicates that even though female-headed 
households are just as likely to receive a fertilizer voucher as their male-headed 
counterparts, conditional on receipt, the average number of fertilizer vouchers that are 
received among female-headed households (1.56) is lower than the analogous statistic for 
male-headed households (1.63), and the difference is statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. Similarly, conditional on receipt, the average number of fertilizer vouchers 
that are redeemed stands at 1.57 and 1.48 for male-headed and female-he ded 
households, respectively, and the difference is again statistically significant at the 1 
percent level.25  
 
In terms of household labor use, the dynamics are drastically different on female-
managed plots vis-à-vis their male-managed comparators, as can be seen in Table 1. 
Although the average incidence, average unconditional amount, and average conditional 
amount of household adult male labor input per hectar  are significantly higher on male-
managed plots, the opposite is true concerning household adult female, household child, 
and exchange labor use on female-managed plots.26 The relatively higher household child 
labor and exchange labor input on female-managed plots might be possible responses to 
being rationed out of household adult male labor. Furthermore, Table 1 shows 
statistically different cultivation patterns by gender of the plot manager, with female-
                                                          
25 The factors behind this pattern are being investigated further as part of a parallel research program on the 
FISP beneficiary targeting performance and productivity mpacts. 
26 Adult is defined as being at least 15 years of age. Th  plot-level measures of household adult male, adult 
female, and child labor input are the summations of rainy season labor hours across household members 
reported to have worked on a given plot. Individual labor input is computed as the multiplication of the 
number of weeks a household member worked on a given plot during the reference rainy season, the typical 
number of days worked per week during the reported number of weeks, and the typical number of hours 
worked per day during the reported number of weeks. The plot-level measure of hired labor (exchange) 




managed plots exhibiting a higher incidence of intercropping and male-managed plots 
recording, on average, higher shares of plot area (i) under improved seeds (mainly maize, 
complemented by groundnuts and rice) and (ii) under export crops (mainly tobacco, 
complemented by cotton). Female-managed plots are also 4 percentage points less likely 
to be associated with households that receive agricultural extension service on topics that 
relate to crop production and marketing. Lastly, male-managed plots are, on average, 
more likely to be associated with households with hgher levels of wealth and access to 
agricultural implements.27 
 
Table 2 presents the naïve plot-level regression results on the gender gap, where 
the dependent variable is the log of gross value of output per hectare. The findings 
presented in columns 1, 2 and 3 originate from regressions that, in addition to the dummy 
variable on female plot management, control only for agro-ecological zone, regional, and 
district fixed-effects, respectively. The gender gap estimates range from 22 to 25 percent. 
These results indicate a statistically and economically large difference between male and 
female farmers.  In what follows, we seek to understand the factors associated with this 
gap.    
                                                          
27 The household wealth index is constructed using principal component analysis, and takes into account 
the number of rooms in the dwelling, a set of dummy variables accounting for the ownership of (i) 
dwelling, (ii) mortar, (ii) bed, (iii) table, (iv) chair, (v) fan, (vi) radio, (vii) tape/CD player, (viii) TV/VCR, 
(ix) sewing machine, (x) paraffin/ kerosene/ electric/ gas stove, (xi) refrigerator, (xii) bicycle, (xiii) 
car/motorcycle/minibus/lorry, (xiv) beer brewing drum, (xv) sofa, (xvi) coffee table, (xvii) cupboard, (xviii) 
lantern, (xix) clock, (xx) iron, (xxi) computer, (xxii) fixed phone line, (xxiii) cell phone, (xxiv) satellite 
dish, (xxv) air-conditioner, (xxvi) washing machine, (xxvii) generator, (xxviii) solar panel, (xxix) desk, and 
a vector of dummy variables capturing access to improved (i) outer walls, (ii) roof, (iii) floor, (iv) toilet, 
and (v) water source. The household agricultural imple ent access index is also computed using principal 
components analysis, and covers a range of dummy variables on the ownership of  (i) hand hoe, (ii) slasher, 
(iii) axe, (iv) sprayer, (v) panga knife, (vi) sickle, (vii) treadle pump, (viii) watering can, (ix) ox cart, (x) ox 
plough, (xi) tractor, (xii) tractor plough, (xiii) ridger, (xiv) cultivator, (xv) generator, (xvi) motorized pump, 
(xvii) grain mail, (xviii) chicken house, (xix) livestock kraal, (xx) poultry kraal, (xxi) storage house, (xxii) 





Table 3 provides an additional estimate of the gender gap, but now conditional on 
additional covariates commonly found in the literatu e (Peterman et al., 2011). Column 1 
presents the results from a pooled regression that includes both male- and female-
managed plots. Once we control for key factors of pr duction, the gender gap is reduced 
to 4.5 percent and is now statistically significant o ly at the 10 percent level. In the end, 
this type of analysis does not allow us to delve deper into the process that underlies the 
movement from the unconditional gender gap of 25.4 percent to the conditional gender 
gap of 4.5 percent. In the following section, we apply a decomposition approach that will 
allow us to unpack the relative contributions of dif erent factors towards this gap and to 
suggest priority areas for policy interventions. 
 
4 Mean Decomposition Methodology 
 
Regression-based decomposition methods have been widely utilized in labor 
economics following the seminal papers of Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973), notably as 
part of the analyses of the gender wage gap, union wage gap, and growing wage 
inequality (O’Neill & O’Neill, 2006, Fortin, 2006). Despite the extensive use of Oaxaca-
Blinder regression-based mean decomposition among applied economists over the last 
three decades and the advances that have been made to extend the application to the 
decomposition of distributional statistics besides the mean, the questions attempted to be 





In particular, these methods follow a partial equilibrium approach, where 
observed outcomes for one group can be used to construct various counterfactual 
scenarios for the other group (Fortin et. al., 2011). Another limitation is that while 
decompositions are useful for quantifying, purely in an accounting sense, the contribution 
of various factors to a difference in an outcome across groups or a change in an outcome 
for a particular group over time, they are based on c rrelations, and hence cannot be 
interpreted as estimates of underlying causal parameters (Fortin et. al., 2011). However, 
decomposition methods do document the relative quantitative importance of factors in 
explaining an observed gap, thus suggesting priorities for further analysis and, ultimately, 
policy interventions (Fortin et. al., 2011). 
 
To document the extent and drivers of the gender gap in Malawi, we first rely on 
an Oaxaca-Blinder regression-based mean decomposition. We assume the log of an 
agricultural productivity measure (Y), namely gross value of agricultural output per 
hectare, for male- (M) and female- (F) managed plots es imated as: 
 
(1)  =  + ∑ ′ +  
 
where G indicates the gender of the plot manager; X is a vector of k observable, plot-, 
household- and/or community-level explanatory variables; β is the associated vector of 
intercept and slope coefficients; and ε is the error term under the assumption that E(εM) = 





The gender gap “D” is expressed as the mean outcome difference: 
 
(2)  = () − (). 
 
Equations (1) and (2) imply that:  
 
(3)  () =  + ∑  + 	 =  + ∑ ()  
 
(4) () =  + ∑  + 	 =  + ∑ ()  
 
and, Equation (2) could be rewritten as: 
 
(5)  = () − () =  + ∑ () −  − ∑ () 	 .  
 
Subsequently, we define β*  as the vector of coefficients that is obtained from a 
regression of Y that is based on the pooled plot sample and includes the group 
membership identifier, i.e. a dummy variable identifying female-managed plots. The 
inclusion of the group membership indicator in the pooled regression for the estimation 
of β*  takes into account the possibility that the mean difference in plot-level productivity 
measure is explained by gender of the plot manager, voiding a possible distortion of the 
decomposition results due to the residual group difference reflected in β*  (Jann, 2008). 




regression (∗),			and (ii) the return to the observable covariates of each group valued at 
β* 	(∗	and	∗), we obtain: 
 
(6)  
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where ,,∗,,,∗	(k=1….K) are the estimated intercept and slope 
coefficients of each covariate included in the regressions for the male-managed, female-
managed and pooled plot samples. 
 
Equation (6) is known as the aggregate decomposition. The first component is the 
endowment effect, i.e. the portion of the gender gap that is explained by differences in the 
levels of observable covariates between both groups. It i  simply the sum across all 
covariates, of the differences by group, valued at the corresponding “average” return. The 
second component is the structure effect, i.e. the portion of the gender gap driven by 
deviations of each group’s return from the corresponding “average” return. The first term 




structural advantage, which is equal to the portion of the gender gap accounted for by 
deviations of male regression coefficients from pooled counterparts. The second term of 
the structure effect ∗ − 	 + ∑ [()( − ∗ ] represents the female 
structural disadvantage, which is equal to the portion of the gender gap driven by 
deviations of pooled regression coefficients from fe ale counterparts.28  
 
In practice, we estimate equation 1 for (i) male-managed plots, (ii) female-
managed plots, and (iii) the pooled plot sample (with a dummy variable identifying 
female-managed plots), and use the resulting vector of coefficients βM, βF, and β*, 
together with the mean values for each covariate for each group XM and XF to compute 
the components of equation (6). Moving beyond the aggregate decomposition, the 
detailed decomposition involves subdividing the endowment and structure effects into the 
respective contributions of each observable covariate, which correspond to the variable-
specific subcomponents of the summations included in equation (6).  
 
Fortin et al. (2011) present a detailed account of he assumptions required to 
identify the population parameters of interest. Two crucial assumptions for the validity of 
aggregate decomposition are (i) overlapping support and (ii) ignorability. Overlapping 
support implies that no single value of X = x or ε = e exists to identify female plot 
                                                          
28 The use of the term “disadvantage” is tied to the subsequent section’s discussion of the regression 
coefficients estimated from the pooled, male-managed, and female-managed plot samples. With respect to 
their counterparts estimated from the pooled plot sample, the regression coefficients from the female-
managed plot sample that are expected to be positive and that are associated with key factors of production 
are consistently positive but lower in absolute terms. Conversely, the use of the term “advantage” is linked 
to the same set of regression coefficients being higher in the male-managed plot sample with respect to 




management. Ignorability refers to the random assignment of female plot management 
conditional on observable attributes. The additional essential assumptions required by 
detailed decomposition to identify the individual contribution of each covariate include 
additive linearity and zero conditional mean. The latter implies that ε is independent of X. 
In other words, we assume that there is no unobservable heterogeneity that jointly 
determines the outcome and observable attributes. It should be noted that even if the 
additional assumptions required by detailed decomposition may not hold true, aggregate 
decomposition would remain valid as long as overlapping support and ignorability 
assumptions are tenable. 
 
In exploring the existence and extent of the gender gap in a multivariate 
framework, the validity of findings largely depend on the plausibility of ignorability and 
zero conditional mean assumptions, i.e. the extent to which the identification strategy 
addresses possible unobservable household-/plot-level heterogeneity that jointly 
determines plot agricultural productivity and observable covariates, including whether a 
plot is managed by a female. While the most rigorous st dies on the gender gap recognize 
the need for an instrumental variable strategy to deal with potentially endogenous 
observables, recovering instrumental variables that predict endogenous covariates 
without directly influencing the outcome is often not possible. A subset of the studies that 
are reviewed in Section 2 and that feature plot-level analyses have attempted to address 
the potential bias by controlling for direct measures of plot soil quality and household-





Furthermore, to deal with the possibility that the male and female plots might be 
physically systematically different from each other along the dimensions that are finer 
than the observable variations in soil physical infrastructure and quality, an alternative 
identification strategy has been to rely on a spatial fixed effects estimator that allows for 
local neighborhood effect in unobserved land quality that could be correlated with the 
gender of plot manager and the other regressors. The spatial fixed effects are differenced 
out by modeling the difference between the plot-leve  outcome and the average of the 
outcome across plots from other households within a critical distance as a function of a 
vector of plot-/household-level variables that are differenced from their matched plot-
/household-level neighborhood averages (see Goldstein and Udry (2008) for an example 
of this).  
 
We lack, in our case, plot-level measures of soil quality, and the nature of farm 
organization as captured in the IHS3 data does not all w us to feature household fixed 
effects as a central piece of our empirical strategy. The average number of plots 
cultivated by Malawian farming households is 1.76, significantly less than the 
comparable statistics from West African settings that ave largely informed the analysis 
of the gender gap in sub-Saharan Africa thus far. The managers identified across 
agricultural plots cultivated by a given household also correspond to the head of 
household in an overwhelming sample of households that report to be cultivating multiple 
plots. Specifically, there are only 109 households that cultivate multiple plots and exhibit 
within-household variation in terms of the gender of the plot managers, corresponding to 




overlapping support, ignorability, and zero conditional mean assumptions as possible by 
relying on all available data and econometric methods at our disposal. These sensitivity 
analyses are presented later in Section 5.3. 
 
5 Mean Decomposition Results 
 
The first step in the mean decomposition is the estimation of equation (1). This is 
done separately for the pooled, male-managed and female-managed plot samples, and the 
results reported in Table 3, Columns 1, 2 and 3, respectively.  
 
We find that the log of GPS-based plot area has a negative coefficient that is 
statistically significant at the 1 percent level in each plot sample. This finding is 
consistent with recent studies that have investigated nd provided support for the inverse 
yield hypothesis (see Larson et al., 2012 and the references cited therein). A key variable 
that is positively associated with the log of gross value of output per hectare, irrespective 
of the plot sample, is the log of inorganic fertilizer use per hectare. However, the return to 
inorganic fertilizer use (i.e. the coefficient) is higher within the male-managed plot 
sample in comparison to the female-managed plot sample, and this difference is 
statistically significant.  
 
The log of household adult male labor hours per hectar  has a sizeable and 
positive coefficient that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level within the male-




sample is not statistically significant. In contras, the log of household adult female labor 
hours per hectare has a positive and statistically significant coefficient across both plot 
samples, albeit a larger effect, in terms of both magnitude and statistical significance, 
among female-managed plots.  
 
The coefficients for the shares of plot area under improved seeds and under export 
crops have sizably positive and statistically signif cant coefficients at the 1 percent level 
across all plot samples of interest. Conversely, the c ild dependency ratio, which is 
defined as the number of household members below the age of 10 divided by the number 
of household members aged 10 years and above, has asubstantial negative coefficient 
that is statistically significant at the 1 percent level only within the female-managed plot 
sample. The comparable statistics for the pooled and male-managed plot samples are not 
statistically significant.  
 
In addition, although household size has a positive co fficient that is statistically 
significant irrespective of the plot sample, the magnitude of the coefficient within the 
female-managed plot sample is three times larger than within the male-managed plot 
sample. The gender differences in returns to household size and child dependency ratio 
imply that the burden of childcare is more likely to reduce female agricultural 
productivity.  
 
The decomposition of the mean gender gap, which is estimated at 25.4 percent, is 




the endowment effect, the male structural advantage, and the female structural 
disadvantage. Panel C includes the results from the detailed decomposition, whereby a 
positive coefficient suggests that the relevant covariate contributes positively to 
increasing the gender gap. 
 
5.1   Aggregate Decomposition 
 
The aggregate decomposition indicates that the endowment effect (20.9 
percentage points), i.e. the portion of the gender gap driven by gender differences in 
levels of observable attributes, accounts for 82 percent of the mean gender differential in 
agricultural productivity. The female structural disadvantage is estimated at 4.5 
percentage points, explaining the remaining 18 percent of the gender gap. The aggregate 
decomposition reinforces the notion that large and significant gender disparities in access 
to inputs and in asset ownership are central factors behind the gender gap. 
 
5.2   Detailed Decomposition  
 
The detailed decomposition of the endowment effect is reported in Table 4, Panel 
C, Column 1. As noted above, the estimates are a function of the mean differences 
reported in Table 1 by the gender of the plot manager, and the pooled regression 
coefficients reported in Table 3. The percentage contributions that are noted below 




dividing the coefficient in question either by the endowment effect (0.209) or by the 
gender gap (0.254). 
 
In Section 3.2, we noted that male-managed plots tend to be overseen by 
individuals that have higher years of schooling and who originate from larger and 
wealthier households that access agricultural extension more frequently. Male-managed 
plots also exhibit higher (i) incidence of pesticide use, (ii) inorganic fertilizer use per 
hectare, (iii) household adult male labor input perh ctare, (iv) share of plot area under 
improved seeds, and (v) share of plot area under export crops. In view of the positive 
correlation with these covariates and agricultural p oductivity, we find these variables to 
be contributing positively towards the endowment effect, thereby widening the gender 
gap. Conversely, the higher rate of household adult female labor and exchange labor 
provision within the female-managed plot sample, as well as the positive association 
between these covariates and agricultural productivity imply that these variables 
contribute negatively towards the endowment effect, hence working to close the gender 
gap. The smaller plot areas farmed by female managers also appear to be a contributing 
factor in shrinking the gender gap given that in these data, there is an inverse relationship 
between cultivated plot area and agricultural productivity. 
 
The factors that comprise the majority of the endowment effect are the log of 
household adult male labor hours per hectare and the share of plot area under export 
crops. The covariates explain 46 percent and 40 percent of the endowment effect, and 




contributions of the other covariates towards the endowment effect (and the gender gap in 
parenthesis) are as follows: (i) 14 percent (11 percent) for the household agricultural 
implement access index, (ii) 9 percent (7 percent) for the household wealth index, (iii) 8 
percent (6 percent) for manager years of schooling, ( v) 8 percent (6 percent) for the log 
of plot inorganic fertilizer use per hectare, (v) 6 percent (5 percent) for household size, 
and (vi) 2 percent (2 percent) for share of plot area under improved seeds. The negative 
contributions of the aforementioned covariates towards the endowment effect (and the 
gender gap in parenthesis) are as follows: (i) 24 percent (20 percent) for the log of GPS-
based plot area and its squared term combined, (ii) 8 percent for logged household female 
adult labor hours per hectare, and (iii) 2 percent (2 percent) for the log of exchange labor 
days per hectare.  
 
The detailed decompositions of the male structural advantage and the female 
structural disadvantage are presented in Columns 2 and 3 of Table 4, Panel C. The 
coefficients that are large and statistically significant signal differential treatments of 
male vs. female plot manager by markets, formal institutions, and informal social 
institutions. Findings related to inorganic fertilizer use, plot measures of household adult 
male and adult female labor provision, household size, and child dependency ratio are 
noteworthy.  
 
First, it is not only the differences in the inorganic fertilizer endowment that 
contribute to the gender gap, but also the relatively higher return to inorganic fertilizer 




same applies to the log of household adult male labor hours per hectare. The underlying 
causes of this finding are the subject of future research but may indicate household adult 
male labor supervision difficulties on female-managed plots.  
 
The fact that household adult male labor input is as ociated with a wider gender 
gap is, however, partially offset by the higher retu ns that household adult female labor 
provides on female-managed plots. Regarding the child dependency ratio, although the 
contribution of this factor towards the endowment effect is zero, its contribution towards 
the female structural disadvantage is large and positive, driven by the sizeable and highly 
significant negative association between this variable nd agricultural productivity solely 
within the female-managed plot sample. This result highlights the differential 
productivity impacts of heterogeneous household roles assumed by male and female 
managers. Since female managers, who are just as likely to be household heads or 
spouses, are more likely to combine farm management with household duties, including 
child care, their pattern of time use is directly related to their low productivity outcomes. 
 
5.3   Sensitivity Analyses 
 
As noted earlier, the crucial assumptions for the validity of the aggregate 
decomposition include overlapping support and ignorability. The key assumptions 
additionally required by the detailed decomposition are additive linearity and zero 
conditional mean. A methodology that is proposed by Imbens and Rubin (2009) to assess 




calculating a scale-free normalized difference for each covariate. They assert that the 
overlapping support across the groups of interest, in our case female- vs. male-managed 
plots, is adequate if the scale-free normalized differences across the covariates are less 
than 0.25. Table H.1 in Appendix H presents the scale-free normalized difference of the 
variables used in the regressions. Only 2 out of 29 independent variables have a 
normalized difference greater than 0.25.  
 
In trying to lend support to ignorability and zero c nditional mean assumptions, 
we use all available data and econometric tools at our disposal, and first rely on an 
empirical approach that was pioneered by Altonji (1988), Murphy and Topel (1990), and 
Altonji et al. (2005), based on the idea that the amount of selection on observable 
variables provides a guide to the extent of selection on unobservable counterparts. We 
use an informal version of the methodology applied by Acemoglu et al. (2001) and 
Altonji et al. (2005), and incorporate into our base specification, in a phased-in fashion, 
thematically-grouped control variables such that each regression is estimated with a 
different set of additional independent variables and that the results are compared to those 
from the base specification. Our purpose is to gauge the stability of the key regression 
coefficients that underlie our decomposition results. If the coefficients on the covariates 
included in the base specification, including the female plot management dummy in the 
pooled regression, are stable subsequent to the incorporation of additional covariates, 
they are less likely to change if we are able to take into account potentially missing 





To perform this analysis, we consider the following sets of variables: (i) district 
fixed effects, (ii) plot geospatial characteristics nformed by GIS data, (iii) other plot 
characteristics solicited by the IHS3, (iv) additional household characteristics, and (v) 
additional community characteristics. Table H.2 in Appendix H includes the detailed list 
of the variables included in each set. Tables H.3, 4 and H.5 present the base regression 
results and the estimates from the regressions including the additional controls for the 
pooled, male-managed, and female-managed plot samples, respectively. An 
overwhelming majority of the coefficients, with resp ct to the base specification, are 
stable across the specifications and the plot samples, and do not change sign or 
significance. This suggests that the assumptions of ign rability and zero conditional mean 
might not be unfounded.   
 
As part of the sensitivity analyses, we also conduct o r analysis on the subset of 
plot observations from households in which male and female plot managers coexist. The 
size of this sample is 292 plots (approximately 2 percent of our sample) originating from 
109 households. The concern motivating this analysis is that there might be unobserved 
household characteristics that might jointly determine productivity outcomes and within-
household assignment of plots to managers, which may be biasing our estimates. Table 
H.6 in Appendix H presents the results from pooled regressions that use the 
aforementioned sample of 292 plots, and that are compared with the estimates from the 
base regression that is informed by the entire pooled sample (Column 1). Column 2 
includes the coefficient estimates from a regression that is identical to the base 




findings from a regression that is fit among the same sample of plots but with household 
fixed effects incorporated in the base specification.  
 
Although the coefficients associated with female plot management in Columns 2 
and 3 are not statistically significant (likely due to the small sample), they are 
economically relevant, with values of 6.6 percent ad 11.4 percent, respectively. 
Furthermore, Table H.7 in Appendix H presents the decomposition of the mean gender 
gap using the sample of 292 plots, but informed by the regression set-up that is identical 
to the base specification. The mean gender gap is equal to 27.4 percent, and the 
differential is mostly explained by the endowment effects of the inorganic fertilizer use 
and the share of plot area under export crops. These r ults are consistent with the 
findings presented earlier. 
 
Finally, we replicate the entire analysis by using the plots cultivated with maize 
and the log of maize production per hectare as an altern tive proxy for agricultural 
productivity. These results are available upon request and are strongly in line with the 
findings reported thus far. As shown in Column 1 of Table 5, the gender gap in maize 
yields is equal to 22.4 percent, and approximately three-quarters of the observed 
differential are driven by the endowment effect. The similarity of the results supports the 
hypothesis that the independent variables in our base specification that uses the log of 
plot-level gross value of output per hectare as the dependent variable capture the possible 





6 Recentered Influence Function (RIF) Decomposition 
 
Our decomposition findings suggest that more than 80 percent of the mean gender 
gap is explained by differences in observable covariates, and the direct pay-off to 
addressing market and institutional failures that affect men and women differentially is 
economically significant. While it is important to show this with nationally-representative 
data, going beyond the “average” farmer and understanding the heterogeneity in 
constraints faced by farmers with different gender and productivity profiles is crucial for 
the design and implementation of better targeted interventions aimed at bridging the gap. 
An important question is whether our findings, which are based on the sample means, are 
robust to the decomposition of alternative distributional statistics beyond the mean.  
 
A method that is similar in spirit to the mean decomp sition uses the recentered 
influence function (RIF) regressions proposed by Firpo et al. (2009) and provides a 
straightforward framework within which across-group differences in any distributional 
statistic could be decomposed. We rely on the RIF decomposition to provide estimates of 
the aggregate and detailed decomposition of the gender gap at different percentiles of the 
agricultural productivity distribution.  
 
A RIF regression is similar to a standard OLS regression, except that the 
dependent variable, Y, is replaced by the RIF of the distributional statistic of interest. The 
approach assumes that the conditional expectation of the ; 	 can be modeled as a 




mean decomposition. Assuming that (; ) is the influence function corresponding to 
an observed productivity outcome y, for the distributional statistic "	, the RIF is 
defined as:   
 
(7) 	; 	 = "	 + (; ).  
 
In the case of quantiles, the influence function is equal to:  
 
(8) ;#	 = (#$%&"'())(() ,  
 
where  ≤ # is an indicator function equal to 1 if the value of the outcome variable 
is smaller than or equal to the quantile QT and 0 otherwise, "(#) is the density of the 
marginal distribution of Y, and QT is the population T-quantile of the unconditional 
distribution of Y. Consequently,  
 
(9) ;#	 = # + ;#	.  
 
In practice, the RIF is first estimated as a function of the sample quantile QT (e.g. 
the 10th percentile), the dummy variable identifying whether the observed outcome, Y is 
smaller than or equal to the sample quantile, and the density estimated using kernel 
methods at the point of the sample quantile. In the second stage, the estimated RIF is used 




female-managed and pooled plot samples. The resulting parameters γM, γF and γ* replace 
the β counterparts in Equation (6) and are used together with the group-specific mean 
values for each covariate, XM and XF, to perform aggregate and detailed decompositions 
of any distributional statistic beyond the mean within the framework provided in Section 
4.  
 
7 RIF Decomposition Results 
7.1  RIF Aggregate Decomposition 
 
Table 6 presents the gender gap estimates and aggreg te RIF decompositions at 
the mean, and at each decile of the agricultural productivity distribution29. The graphical 
representation of these findings are reported in Figure 3. The estimations are underlined 
by RIF regressions that use the same set of indepennt variables included in the base 
specification for the mean decomposition.  
 
Two key findings emerge from Table 6. First, the estimates of the gender gap and 
the share of the gender gap attributed to female structural disadvantage increase steadily 
across the agricultural productivity distribution. While the gender gap is estimated at 25.4 
and 23.3 percent at the mean and median, respectively, th  estimates at the 10th and 90th 
percentiles are 22.6 and 37.6 percent, respectively. The female structural disadvantage 
                                                          
29 Table 5 presents the gender gap estimates and aggreg te RIF decomposition at the mean and at each 
decile of the maize yields distribution. The gender gap in maize yields is estimated at 22.4 and 24.1 percent 
at the mean and median respectively while the estimates at the 10th and 90th percentiles  are 22.2 and 20.2 





component accounts for 17.7 percent of the gender gap at the mean and 33.5 percent of 
the gender gap at the 90th percentile.  
 
Second, the gender gap at the lowest three deciles of the agricultural productivity 
distribution is explained fully by differences in observable covariates, with the 
endowment effect still accounting for close to 90 percent of the gender gap at the median. 
Given the trends in the female structural disadvantage component, the percentage 
contribution of the endowment effect toward the gender gap declines throughout and is 
more of a dominant force in the first half of the distribution.  
 
7.2  RIF Detailed Decomposition 
 
In the interest of brevity, we provide the detailed RIF decompositions at the 10th, 
50th and 90th percentiles. The RIF regressions underlying the detailed decompositions are 
reported in Tables H.8 through H.10 in Appendix H. The key variables that will be the 
subject of the RIF detailed decomposition discussion are in line with those that have been 
emphasized as part of the mean decomposition results. While this indicates that the 
policies need to address these factors for all women, their relative importance in fact 
changes across the distribution.  
 
Before discussing the detailed decomposition results in depth, we focus on the 
graphical representations of RIF regression coeffici nts for key explanatory variables 




at each decile of the agricultural productivity distribution.30 The trends in RIF regression 
coefficients for (i) the log of household adult male labor, (ii) the share of plot area under 
export crop cultivation, (iii) the log of inorganic fertilizer use, and (iv) the child 
dependency ratio are depicted in Figures 4A, 4B, 4C and 4D, respectively. We find that 
the evolution of the returns to inorganic fertilizer use and the share of plot area under 
export cultivated area are at odds with one another. The coefficient associated with 
inorganic fertilizer use declines steadily throughout the agricultural productivity 
distribution, while the return to the share of plot area under export cultivation is 
significantly higher at each decile. This result holds true independent of the plot sample 
in question.  
 
Moreover, the distribution of returns to household a ult male labor is 
considerably different within the male-managed plot sample vis-à-vis its female-managed 
counterpart. The return to household adult male labor on female-managed plots declines 
steadily and dips below zero starting with the 70th percentile. The coefficient of interest 
is, conversely, always positive, and displays a stagnant evolution across the deciles 
within the male-managed plot sample. The evolution of the coefficient associated with 
household child dependency ratio among male-managed is also always positive across 
the distribution, but negative at each decile within t e female-managed plot sample and is 
highest, in absolute terms, at the 90th percentile. 
 
                                                          




The detailed RIF decompositions at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles are reported 
in Table 7.31 We observe that at the median, the decomposition is comparable to its 
counterpart at the mean. The fact that females manage smaller plots reduces the gender 
gap through its negative contribution to the endowment effect across the majority of the 
agricultural productivity distribution. At the first decile, the log of plot area is associated 
with a 32 percent reduction in the endowment effect. Household adult female labor input 
is the other key variable that is associated with negative contributions towards both the 
endowment effect and the male structural advantage component at each decile. Although 
the magnitude of the relationship between the variable and the endowment effect 
decreases in relative and absolute terms towards the higher end of the agricultural 
productivity distribution, it remains economically significant and indicates the 
importance of household female adult labor in the context of labor market failures and 
insufficient household male adult labor. The sustained negative contributions towards the 
male structural advantage components are driven by lower returns to household adult 
female labor on male-managed plots vi -à-vis pooled and female-managed plots. 
 
The log of inorganic fertilizer use per hectare is associated with positive but 
decreasing contributions towards the endowment effect. The share of plot area cultivated 
with improved seeds exhibits a similar trend. Addressing gender differences in access to 
                                                          
31 To lend support towards the assumptions of ignorability and zero conditional mean associated with the 
RIF decomposition, we follow the added-control approach proposed by Altonji et al. (2005), and 
implemented in Section 5.3 for the mean decomposition. Tables H.11 through H.19 in the Appendix 
present the results of the RIF regressions including the additional controls for the pooled, male-managed, 
and female-managed plot samples for the 10th, 50th and 90th percentiles.  We find that the coefficients are 
largely stable in terms of magnitude, and do not change sign or significance in response to additional 




inorganic fertilizer and improved seeds would, therefo e, alleviate the gender gap mostly 
within the first half of the productivity distribution. The sustained increases in returns to 
the share of plot area under export crop cultivation at each decile of the agricultural 
productivity distribution underlies, in contrast, the surge in the portion of the endowment 
effect attributed to this variable. The share of plot area under export crop cultivation 
accounts for 40 and 56 percent of the gender gap at the 10th and 90th percentile, 
respectively. Diversification into high-value, export- riented agriculture among female 
farmers, independent of productivity level, is, therefore, a clear channel through which 
large strides could be attained in closing the gender gap. 
 
Furthermore, household adult male labor input at the plot level contributes 
differently toward the endowment and structure effect at different points of the 
agricultural productivity distribution. At the 10th percentile, its statistically significant 
contribution towards the gender gap exists only through the endowment effect, while at 
the 90th percentile, its effect exists only through the structure effect. The gender gap 
widening effect of being rationed out of household male labor is more pronounced for 
female farmers in the first half of the agricultural productivity distribution. At the upper 
deciles of the agricultural productivity distribution, the variable is associated with higher 
gender gap instead through its contribution towards the male structural advantage and the 
female structural disadvantage. While the underlying causes of this pattern need to be 
studied deeper, informal institutional constraints, including potential supervision 




may lead to higher returns to household adult male labor on male-managed plots could be 
more binding for female farmers of high productivity levels.  
 
Finally, household wealth and access to agricultural implements are associated 
with sustained, positive contributions towards the endowment effect at each decile of 
interest. The latter finding marks the importance of access to labor-saving technologies in 
bridging the gap, especially since the farm duties of female managers are usually 
compounded by their duties at home. The sustained positive contributions of household 
child dependency ratio towards the structure effect throughout the productivity 
distribution lends support to this argument, since, as noted above, the relationship 
between this variable and agricultural productivity on female-managed plots is 




This study offers a fresh look at gender differences in sub-Saharan African 
agricultural productivity, the alleviation of which ave been advocated by governments 
and international donor community as one of the key drivers of broad, agriculture-based 
economic growth and ensuing gains in living standards. Our contribution to the literature 
is to (i) apply decomposition techniques that identify the relative quantitative importance 
of factors explaining the gender gap at the mean and other points of the agricultural 
productivity distribution, and (ii) to use nationally-representative data, collected within a 




While the gender gap in Malawi is estimated at 25.4 percent at the mean, it ranges 
from 22.6 percent at the 10th percentile to 37.6 percent at the 90th percentile. The findings 
support the view that large and significant gender isparities in use of inputs and asset 
ownership are the central factors behind the gender gap, particularly in the first half of the 
agricultural productivity distribution. At the mean and the median, the differences in 
observable covariates are associated with 82 and 87 percent of the gender gap, 
respectively. Above the median, the percentage contribution of the endowment effect 
towards the gender gap declines steadily, whereby at the 80th and 90th deciles of the 
distribution of agricultural productivity, the struct re effect, which is driven by gender 
differences in returns to factors of production, explains 30 and 34 percent of the gender 
gap, respectively. 
 
Higher levels of household adult male labor and area under export crop 
cultivation on male-managed plots, in particular, widen the gender gap; a result that holds 
true across the vast majority of the agricultural poductivity distribution. These disparities 
appear to be compounded by gender differences in the availability of time devoted to 
productive activities, as negative returns to household child dependency ratio on female 
managed plots are found to exacerbate the female structural disadvantage component of 
the gender gap at each decile of the agricultural poductivity distribution. In addition, 
lower and declining returns to household adult male labor on female managed plots vi -à-
vis male-managed comparators across the agricultural productivity distribution might be 
suggestive of potential household adult male labor supervision difficulties on female-




productivity trap; as such, policies need to priorit ze and target the key factors underlying 
the gender gap. 
 
Our study shows a number of factors that seem to be driving the gender 
differences in agricultural productivity in Malawi. While we demonstrate that 
diversification among female farmers into high-value agriculture (with appropriate 
adoption support and risk mitigation mechanisms), and counteracting the effects of 
household male labor shortages on female-managed plots with enhanced access to 
inorganic fertilizer, improved seeds and labor-saving agricultural implements could lead 
to significant contractions in the gender gap across the agricultural productivity 
distribution, our analysis alone is not enough to inf rm effective policy interventions that 
will ensure the realization of these outcomes. In other words, while we can quantify the 
relative contributions of various factors towards the gender gap, we cannot determine 
why inequalities in time use, access and returns to agricultural inputs, and the like persist. 
Although this limitation is inherent in the use of decomposition methods, our empirical 
approach identifies the key inequalities that will be the focus of our future research, 
which will seek to map out their determinants in order to inform policy interventions 

















Outcome Variable           
Plot Gross Value of Output (MK)/HA 
53,067 56,810 42,477 
               
14,334 ***  
Plot Manager Characteristics           
Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.63 0.58 0.77 -0.19 *** 
Age (Years) 42.97 41.59 46.89 -5.30 *** 
Years of Schooling 5.06 5.67 3.33 2.33 *** 
Relationship to Household Head           
Head † 0.94 0.99 0.80 0.19 ***  
Wife/Husband † 0.05 0.01 0.19 -0.18 *** 
Child/Adopted Child † 0.01 0.00 0.01 -0.01 *** 
Other Relative † 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 * 
Non-Relative † 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00   
Plot Area           
-Based Plot Area (HA) 0.39 0.41 0.36 0.05 ***  
Plot Ownership Status           
Exclusively Male Owned † 0.33 0.43 0.04 0.39 *** 
Exclusively Female Owned † 0.36 0.23 0.75 -0.53 *** 
Joint Male-Female Owned † 0.12 0.15 0.03 0.12 *** 
Not Owned † 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.01   
Plot Non-Labor Input Use           
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 *** 
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.01   
Incidence of Inorganic Fertilizer Use † 0.64 0.65 0.62 0.03 ** 
Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA  
[Unconditional] 143.61 147.61 132.29 15.33 *** 
Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA  
[Conditional] 224.35 228.03 213.49 14.54 *** 
Plot Labor Input Use           
Incidence of Household Male Labor Use † 0.83 0.97 0.43 0.55 *** 
Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA  [Unconditional] 434.54 526.87 173.32 353.56 ***  
Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA  [Conditional] 523.55 541.51 407.35 134.17 *** 
Incidence of Household Female Labor Use † 0.95 0.94 0.98 -0.04 *** 
Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA  [Unconditional] 
506.88 455.52 652.18 
-
196.66 *** 
Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA  [Conditional] 
532.83 484.20 664.76 
-
180.56 *** 
Incidence of Household Child Labor Use † 0.25 0.22 0.32 -0.10 *** 
Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA  [Unconditional]  64.59 54.35 93.54 -39.19 *** 
Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA  [Conditional] 261.13 245.86 290.83 -44.98 *** 
Incidence of Hired Labor Use † 0.23 0.24 0.23 0.01   
Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA [Unconditional] 6.46 6.33 6.83 -0.50   
Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA [Conditional] 27.66 26.80 30.19 -3.38 *  
Incidence of Exchange Labor Use † 0.10 0.09 0.12 -0.04 *** 
Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA  [Unconditional] 1.34 1.15 1.87 -0.72 *** 
Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA [Conditional] 14.06 13.52 15.10 -1.58 ** 
Plot Location           















Plot Location           
Distance to Household (KM) 2.17 2.29 1.85 0.44   
Plot Cultivation           
ntercropped † 
0.33 0.30 0.41 
-
0.11 *** 
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.38 0.39 0.35 0.04 *** 
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.07 *** 
Household Farm Organization           
Number of Plots Cultivated 2.26 2.34 2.03 0.31 *** 
Cultivates…           
1 Plot † 0.27 0.24 0.35 
-
0.11 *** 
2 Plots † 0.39 0.38 0.40 
-
0.02   
3 Plots † 0.22 0.25 0.16 0.08 ***  
4 Plots † 0.09 0.09 0.07 0.03 *** 
5+ Plots † 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.02 ** 
Other Household Characteristics           
Household Size 4.92 5.14 4.29 0.85 ***  
Child Dependency Ratio 
0.69 0.68 0.71 
-
0.03   
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.28 0.29 0.25 0.04 *** 
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † 0.43 0.44 0.39 0.05 *** 
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.00   
Wealth Index -0.63 -0.54 -0.89 0.35 *** 
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.67 0.85 0.16 0.69 *** 
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 
8.03 8.02 8.07 
-
0.04   
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification           
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.48 0.49 0.48 0.01   
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 
0.30 0.28 0.35 
-
0.07 *** 
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.15 0.16 0.12 0.04 *** 
Tropic-cool/subhumid  † 0.07 0.07 0.05 0.03 *** 
Household Regional Location           
North † 0.14 0.15 0.11 0.04 *** 
Central † 0.46 0.49 0.38 0.10 *** 
South † 








(26.5%)     
Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design. ***/**/* indicate statis cal 





Table 2: Naïve Regression Results on Gender Differences in Agricultural Productivity 
  Dependent Variable: Log[Plot Gross Value of Output (MK)/HA) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Female Plot Management † -0.253*** -0.223*** -0.234*** 
  (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) 
Fixed Effects Agro-Ecological 
Zones 
Regions Districts 
Observations 16,372 16,372 16,372 
R-Squared 0.014 0.023 0.065 
Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design. 
***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1/5/10 percent level, respectively. 





Table 3: Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the Mean Decomposition 
Dependent Variable: Log[Plot Gross Value of Output (MK)/HA] 






Plot Manager Characteristics       
Female † -0.045*     
  (0.027)     
Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.016 0.020 -0.015 
  (0.020) (0.022) (0.040) 
Age (Years) -0.001 -0.002* 0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of Schooling 0.007** 0.005 0.015*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Plot Area       
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.282*** -0.261*** -0.296*** 
  (0.030) (0.034) (0.046) 
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 
  (0.009) (0.010) (0.013) 
Plot Non-Labor Input Use       
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.395*** 0.360*** 0.491*** 
  (0.076) (0.077) (0.136) 
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.043 0.054* 0.017 
  (0.027) (0.032) (0.045) 
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.077*** 0.081*** 0.066*** 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Plot Labor Input Use       
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.028*** 0.067*** 0.005 
  (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) 
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.032*** 0.016** 0.053*** 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) 
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.001 0.006 -0.011* 
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.079*** 0.080*** 0.088*** 
  (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) 
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.040*** 0.042*** 0.033 
  (0.012) (0.014) (0.020) 
Plot Location       
Elevation (M) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Distance to Household (KM) -0.001** -0.001 -0.002*** 
  (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Plot Cultivation       
Intercropped † 0.110*** 0.089*** 0.165*** 
  (0.025) (0.028) (0.039) 
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.099*** 0.095*** 0.099** 
  (0.023) (0.025) (0.041) 
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 1.213*** 1.187*** 1.255*** 









Table 3 (Cont'd) 






Household Characteristics       
Household Size 0.014*** 0.011* 0.033*** 
  (0.005) (0.006) (0.008) 
Child Dependency Ratio -0.011 0.032 -0.076*** 
  (0.016) (0.020) (0.029) 
Agricultural Extension Receipt  † 0.077*** 0.053** 0.157*** 
  (0.021) (0.022) (0.040) 
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income  † -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.057 
  (0.019) (0.021) (0.037) 
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income  † -0.054** -0.035 -0.097** 
  (0.027) (0.031) (0.043) 
Wealth Index 0.055*** 0.062*** 0.048*** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.011) 
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 
  (0.008) (0.010) (0.014) 
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 0.001 0.004 -0.005 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification       
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.170** 0.186** 0.071 
  (0.071) (0.077) (0.085) 
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.099 0.135* -0.035 
  (0.073) (0.081) (0.093) 
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.073 0.119 -0.103 
  (0.079) (0.086) (0.090) 
Observations 16,372 12,029 4,343 
R-Squared 0.336 0.342 0.307 
Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design. 
***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1/5/10 percent level, respectively. †denotes 




Table 4: Decomposition of the Gender Differential in Agricultural Productivity 
Agricultural Productivity Proxied by Log[Plot Gross Value of Output (MK)/HA] 
A. Mean Gender Differential  








Mean Gender Differential  
in Agricultural Productivity  
0.254*** 
(0.023) 
B. Aggregate Decomposition Endowment Effect 




TOTAL 0.209*** 0.000 0.045* 
  (0.024) (0.002) (0.027) 
Share of the Gender Differential 82% 0% 18% 
C. Detailed Decomposition Endowment Effect 




Plot Manager Characteristics       
Manager & Owner Overlap † -0.003 0.002 0.024 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.027) 
Age (Years) 0.004 -0.036* -0.072* 
  (0.003) (0.019) (0.044) 
Years of Schooling 0.016** -0.011 -0.028* 
  (0.007) (0.007) (0.015) 
Plot Area       
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.035*** -0.025 -0.018 
  (0.007) (0.017) (0.054) 
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] -0.016*** -0.001 0.004 
  (0.004) (0.010) (0.026) 
Plot Non-Labor Input Use       
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.003*** -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.000 0.001 0.003 
  (0.000) (0.002) (0.005) 
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.016*** 0.012* 0.035* 
  (0.004) (0.007) (0.018) 
Plot Labor Input Use       
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.096*** 0.220*** 0.055*** 
  (0.018) (0.043) (0.011) 
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.017*** -0.084*** -0.129* 
  (0.004) (0.018) (0.077) 
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.000 0.006** 0.020** 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.009) 
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.001 0.001 -0.006 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.008) 
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] -0.004*** 0.000 0.002 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
Plot Location       
Elevation (M) 0.015*** -0.020 -0.035 
  (0.004) (0.021) (0.054) 





Table 4 (Cont'd) 
C. Detailed Decomposition (cont.) Endowment Effect 




Plot Cultivation       
Intercropped † -0.012*** -0.006 -0.023* 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.013) 
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.004*** -0.002 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.005) (0.012) 
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.084*** -0.003** -0.001 
  (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) 
Household Characteristics       
Household Size 0.012*** -0.017 -0.080** 
  (0.004) (0.015) (0.032) 
Child Dependency Ratio 0.000 0.029*** 0.047*** 
  (0.001) (0.011) (0.016) 
        
Household Characteristics       
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.003** -0.007** -0.020** 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.008) 
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.004** 0.001 -0.007 
  (0.002) (0.005) (0.012) 
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † 0.000 0.004 0.010 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.009) 
Wealth Index 0.019*** -0.004** -0.007 
  (0.004) (0.002) (0.008) 
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.029*** -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.006) (0.004) (0.002) 
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) -0.000 0.024** 0.052** 
  (0.000) (0.010) (0.022) 
Household Agro-Ecological  
Zone Classification [Aggregated] -0.003 0.001 0.014 
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.018) 
Observations 16,372 
Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design. ***/**/* indicate statis cal 





Table 5: Decomposition of the Gender Differential in Agricultural Productivity At Selected Points of the Agricultural Productivity Distribution 
Agricultural Productivty Proxied by Log[Plot Quantity of Maize Production (KG)/HA] 




















Male-Managed Plot Value 6.959*** 5.777*** 6.268*** 6.569*** 6.814*** 7.031*** 7.236*** 7.456*** 7.713*** 8.040*** 
  (0.019) (0.040) (0.027) (0.024) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) 
Female-Managed Plot Value 6.734*** 5.555*** 6.026*** 6.322*** 6.583*** 6.791*** 7.006*** 7.225*** 7.473*** 7.837*** 
  (0.026) (0.042) (0.040) (0.034) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) 
Gender Differential 0.224*** 0.222*** 0.242*** 0.247*** 0.231*** 0.241*** 0.230*** 0.231*** 0.240*** 0.202*** 
  (0.026) (0.051) (0.040) (0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) 




















Endowment Effect 0.165*** 0.250*** 0.226*** 0.206*** 0.183*** 0.177*** 0.160*** 0.130*** 0.105*** 0.110*** 
  (0.025) (0.048) (0.038) (0.034) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028) (0.031) (0.033) 
Share of the Gender Differential 74% 112% 94% 83% 80% 74% 70% 57% 44% 54% 
                      
Male Structural Advantage -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Share of the Gender Differential 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
                      
Female Structural Disadvantage 0.059** -0.028 0.016 0.041 0.047 0.064* 0.069* 0.100*** 0.135*** 0.093** 
  (0.030) (0.061) (0.048) (0.043) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.039) (0.042) (0.042) 
Share of the Gender Differential 26.3% -12.5% 6.5% 16.8% 20.4% 26.4% 30.2% 43.5% 56.3% 45.7% 
Observations 11,763 
Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design. ***/**/* indicate 




Table 6: Aggregate Decomposition of the Gender Differential in Agricultural Productivity At Selected Points of the Agricultural Productivity Distribution  
Agricultural Productivty Proxied by Log[Plot Value of Output (MK)/HA] 


















A. Gender Differential                     
Male-Managed Plot Value 10.454*** 9.202*** 9.654*** 9.963*** 10.220*** 10.455*** 10.685*** 10.932*** 11.256*** 11.737*** 
  (0.017) (0.029) (0.023) (0.019) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.020) (0.025) 
Female-Managed Plot Value 10.200*** 8.976*** 9.456*** 9.750*** 9.997*** 10.223*** 10.423*** 10.671*** 10.937*** 11.361*** 
  (0.023) (0.043) (0.034) (0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.041) 
Gender Differential 0.254*** 0.226*** 0.198*** 0.213*** 0.223*** 0.233*** 0.262*** 0.260*** 0.319*** 0.376*** 
  (0.023) (0.045) (0.036) (0.029) (0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.043) 
B. Aggregate Decomposition                     
Endowment Effect 0.209*** 0.244*** 0.236*** 0.218*** 0.199*** 0.203*** 0.188*** 0.207*** 0.224*** 0.250*** 
  (0.024) (0.042) (0.033) (0.031) (0.029) (0.026) (0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.042) 
Share of the Gender Differential 82.3% 107.9% 118.8% 102.4% 89.1% 87.3% 71.9% 79.6% 70.2% 66.5% 
                      
Male Structural Advantage 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Share of the Gender Differential 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
                      
Female Structural Disadvantage 0.045* -0.018 -0.037 -0.005 0.024 0.030 0.074** 0.053 0.095*** 0.126** 
  (0.027) (0.053) (0.044) (0.037) (0.037) (0.034) (0.033) (0.037) (0.035) (0.052) 
Share of the Gender Differential 17.7% -7.9% -18.8% -2.4% 10.9% 12.7% 28.1% 20.4% 29.8% 33.5% 
Observations 16,372 
Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design. ***/**/* indicate statis cal 









Mean 10th 50th 90th Mean 10th 50th 90th Mean 10th 50th 90th 
TOTAL 0.209*** 0.244*** 0.203*** 0.250*** 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.00 0.045* -0.018 0.030 0.126**
(0.024) (0.042) (0.026) (0.042) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.027) (0.053) (0.034) (0.052)
Share of the Gender Differential 82.1% 107.9% 87.3% 66.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 17.6% -7.9% 12.7% 33.5%
C. Detailed Decomposition
Mean 10th 50th 90th Mean 10th 50th 90th Mean 10th 50th 90th 
Plot Manager Characteristics
Manager & Owner Overlap † -0.003 -0.018** -0.001 0.006 0.002 -0.000 0.003 0.008 0.024 0.006 0.036 0.041
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.012) (0.007) (0.012) (0.027) (0.058) (0.031) (0.055)
Age (Years) 0.004 0.005 -0.000 0.006 -0.036* -0.042 -0.051** 0.017 -0.072* -0.098 -0.091* 0.021
(0.003) (0.008) (0.004) (0.006) (0.019) (0.048) (0.021) (0.037) (0.044) (0.106) (0.049) (0.087)
Years of Schooling 0.016** 0.022 0.023*** 0.007 -0.011 -0.024 -0.007 -0.020 -0.028* -0.061* -0.015 -0.053
(0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.011) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.017) (0.015) (0.032) (0.018) (0.037)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.035*** -0.078*** -0.036*** 0.009 -0.025 -0.054 -0.049*** -0.033 -0.018 -0.161 -0.079 -0.050
(0.007) (0.015) (0.007) (0.007) (0.017) (0.038) (0.019) (0.04 ) (0.054) (0.134) (0.059) (0.121)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Sq.] -0.016*** 0.023*** -0.011*** -0.071*** -0.001 0.001 0.017* -0.030 0.004 0.034 0.047* -0.036
(0.004) (0.007) (0.003) (0.015) (0.010) (0.017) (0.010) (0.029) (0.026) (0.054) (0.025) (0.068)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.003*** 0.002* 0.002*** 0.005*** -0.001 -0.001* -0.001** 0.001 -0.001 -0. 03 -0.002* 0.005
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.005 0.003 -0.005 0.001 0.014
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.010)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.016*** 0.028** 0.015*** 0.007*** 0.012* -0.009 0.008 0.009 0.035* -0.017 0.027 0.032
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.002) (0.007) (0.016) (0.009) (0.014) (0.018) (0.042) (0.022) (0.037)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[HH Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.096*** 0.181*** 0.100*** 0.046 0.220*** 0.128 0.217*** 0.404*** 0.055*** 0.024 0.047*** 0.114***
(0.018) (0.034) (0.020) (0.034) (0.043) (0.083) (0.050) (0.088) (0.011) (0.022) (0.014) (0.024)
Log[HH Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.017*** -0.026*** -0.013*** -0.015** -0.084*** -0.115*** -0.080*** -0.128*** -0.129* -0.372** -0.099 -0.227
(0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.018) (0.037) (0.020) (0.042) (0.077) (0.167) (0.085) (0.182)
Log[HH Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.001 0.006** 0.007 0.006* 0.001 0.020** 0.015 0.022** 0.05
(0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.020) (0.011) (0.018)
Endowment Effect
(0.043)
Table 7: Detailed Decomposition of the Gender Differ ntial in Agricultural Productivity At Selected Po ints of the Agricultural Productivity Distribution































Mean 10th 50th 90th Mean 10th 50th 90th Mean 10th 50th 90th 
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.002 -0.001 -0.006 -0.012 -0.003 -0.017
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.006) (0.003) (0.007) (0.008) (0.015) (0.010) (0.019)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] -0.004*** -0.005** -0.005** -0.002 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.004 0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.009) (0.006) (0.010)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.015*** 0.035*** 0.012*** -0.006 -0.020 -0.032 -0.005 -0.068* -0.035 -0.081 -0.002 -0.165*
(0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.005) (0.021) (0.047) (0.024) (0.038) (0.054) (0.120) (0.063) (0.100)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.003
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.003)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † -0.012*** -0.008 -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.006 -0.016* -0.003 -0.005 -0.023* -0.051* -0.012 -0.016
(0.003) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.007) (0.013) (0.029) (0.016) (0.023)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.004*** 0.006** 0.006*** -0.000 -0.002 0.016 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 0.048* -0.002 0.006
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.028) (0.013) (0.022)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.084*** 0.019*** 0.066*** 0.211*** -0.003** 0.004 -0.001 -0.009** -0.001 0.006 0.003 -0.014
(0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.018) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.009)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.012*** 0.018** 0.008* 0.013** -0.017 -0.019 -0.008 -0.055* -0.080** -0.089 -0.065* -0.163***
(0.004) (0.008) (0.005) (0.007) (0.015) (0.031) (0.018) (0.029) (0.032) (0.064) (0.038) (0.063)
Child Dependency Ratio 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.029*** 0.041* 0.019 0.038** 0.047*** 0.065** 0.031 0.067***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.011) (0.022) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) (0.031) (0.019) (0.026)
Household Characteristics
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.003** 0.005* 0.004** 0.003 -0.007** -0.006 -0.009** -0.007 -0.020** -0.015 -0.025** -0.021
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.017) (0.010) (0.016)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.004** -0.006** -0.003** -0.006** 0.001 0.026** -0.002 -0.002 -0.007 0.062** -0.014 -0.024
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.012) (0.027) (0.014) (0.025)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.008 0.008** 0.003 0.010 0.014 0.021** 0.007
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.009) (0.018) (0.010) (0.017)
Wealth Index 0.019*** 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.019*** -0.004** -0.002 -0.005** -0.001 -0.007 -0.007 -0.014 0.014
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.008) (0.012) (0.009) (0.018)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.030*** 0.024*** -0.000 -0.011* -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.007* -0.000 -0.002
(0.006) (0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004) (0.006) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.024** 0.043* 0.016* 0.045*** 0.052** 0.105** 0.034 0.101***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.010) (0.023) (0.009) (0.014) (0.022) (0.047) (0.023) (0.034)
Household Agro-Ecological 
Zone Classification [Aggregated] -0.003 -0.008 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.006 0.002 -0.005 0.014 0.003 0.015 -0.010
(0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.01 ) (0.018) (0.041) (0.022) (0.038)
Observations
Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design. ***/**/* indicate statis cal significance at the 1/5/10 percent level, respectively. 
†denotes a dummy variable
16,372 16,372 16,372
Table 7 (Cont'd)





   Source: FAOSTAT 
 

























































































Figure 2: Kernel Density Estimates of the Log of Gross Value of Output per Hectare for 


























Figure 3: Gender Gap, Endowment Effect and Female Structural Disadvantage Estimated 
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Figures 4A: RIF Regression Coefficients for Plot Log [Household Adult Male Labor 
Hours/HA], Estimated Separately from Pooled, Male-Managed, and Female-Managed Plot 

















Figures 4B: RIF Regression Coefficients for Share of Plot Area Under  
Export Crop Cultivation, Estimated Separately from Pooled, Male-Managed, and Female-


















Figures 4C: RIF Regression Coefficients for Plot Log[Inorganic Fertilizer  
Use (KG)/HA], Estimated Separately from Pooled, Male-Managed, and Female-Managed 


















Figures 4D: RIF Regression Coefficients for Household Child  
Dependency Ratio, Estimated Separately from Pooled, Male-Managed, and Female-













GENDER GAP IN LAND PRODUCTIVITY 
 
The gender gap “D” is expressed as the mean outcome difference: 
 
( ) ( )M FD E Y E Y= −          (A.1) 
 
Equations (12a) and (12b) imply that:  
 
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
M M M M M M M M
L k k j j
k j
E Y E L E X E Zβ β β δ= + + +∑ ∑      (A.2a) 
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
F F F F F F F F
L k k j j
k j
E Y E L E X E Zβ β β δ= + + +∑ ∑      (A.2b) 
 
We rewrite equation (13) using equations (12a) and (12b): 
 
0( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
M F M M M M M M M
L k k j j
k j
D E Y E Y E L E X E Zβ β β δ= − = + + + −∑ ∑     
0 ( ) ( ) ( )
F F F F F F F
L k k j j
k j
E L E X E Zβ β β δ− − −∑ ∑   (A.3) 
 
Rearranging Equation (15) by adding and subtracting 
( ) , ( ) , ( )M F M F M FL k k j j
k j




       
labor market effect
purchased inputs effect household endowment effect
[ ( ) ( )]( ) [ ( ) ( )]( ) [ ( ) ( )]M F F M F F M F FL k k k j j j
k j





       0 0
pure marginal productivity effect
( )[ ( )] ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]M M F M M F M F M M FL L k k k j j j
k j
E L E X E Zβ β β β β β δ δ− + − + − + −∑ ∑

   
(A.4)  
 
where β0, βL, βk, δj are the estimated intercept and slope coefficients of each covariate 
included in the regressions for the male and female plot samples. 
 
Equation (16) is the aggregate decomposition. The first component is the labor 
market effect, i.e. the portion of the gender gap driven by differences in quantities of 
labor allocated to farm activities by the head of husehold. The second component is the 
purchased inputs effect, the portion of the gender gap that is explained by differences in 
levels of use of inputs that have to be bought such as fertilizer, pesticides, seeds, 
agricultural implements, and/or hired labor. The third component, the household 
endowment effect is comprised by differences in levels of observable characteristics of 
the household, including human and physical capital. The fourth component is the pure 
marginal productivity effect and corresponds to the portion of the gender gap explained 
by differences in the coefficients of each observable covariate included in L and in the X 






RECENTERED INFLUENCE FUNCTIONS AND DECOMPOSITION 
METHODOLOGY 
 
A RIF regression is similar to a standard OLS regression, except that the 
dependent variable, Y, is replaced by the RIF of the distributional statistic of interest. The 
approach assumes that the conditional expectation of the ( ; )RIF y v  can be modeled as a 
linear function of observable attributes, X, such that [ ( ; ) | ] ,E RIF y v X Xγ=  as in the 
mean decomposition. Assuming that ( ; )IF y v  is the influence function corresponding to 
an observed productivity outcome y, for the distributional statistic ( ),Yv F  the RIF is 
defined as:   
 
( ; ) ( ) ( ; )YRIF y v v F IF y v= +         (C.1) 
 








− ≤= ( 1{ })( ; ) ,
( )
       (C.2) 
 
where TY Q≤1{ }  is an indicator function equal to 1 if the value of the outcome variable 
is smaller than or equal to the quantile QT and 0 otherwise, Y Tf Q( )  is the density of the 
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marginal distribution of Y, and QT is the population T-quantile of the unconditional 
distribution of Y. Consequently,  
 
( ; ) ( ; )T T TRIF Y Q Q IF Y Q= +         (C.3) 
 
In practice, the RIF is first estimated as a function of the sample quantile QT (e.g. 
the 10th percentile), the dummy variable identifying whether the observed outcome, Y is 
smaller than or equal to the sample quantile, and the density estimated using kernel 
methods at the point of the sample quantile. In the second stage, the estimated RIF is used 
as a dependent variable in an OLS regression that is run separately for the male-managed 
and female-managed samples. The resulting parameters  and M Fγ γ  replace the vector of 
coefficients in Equations (12a) and (12b) and are used together with the group-specific 
mean values for each covariate to perform aggregate and detailed decompositions of any 

















Ln Managerial Labor (hours/ha) 5.81 6.01 -0.20 -0.16 
Pesticide/herbicide use yes/no 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.06 
Organic fertilizer use yes/no 0.11 0.1 0.01 0.02 
Ln Inorganic Fertilizer (kg/ha) 3.32 3.13 0.19 0.05 
Ln Hired labor (days/ha) 0.55 0.52 0.03 0.02 
Agricultural implements Asset Index 0.84 0.16 0.68 0.38 
Proportion of area of the plot under improved 
varieties 0.38 0.33 0.05 0.08 
Proportion of area of the plot under export crops 0.09 0.03 0.06 0.18 
Ln GPS Total Area of the plot (ha) -1.2 -1.29 0.09 0.09 
Ln GPS Total Area of the plot (ha) Squared 1.93 2.15 -0.22 -0.08 
Elevation (m) 909 843 65.32 0.14 
Plot distance to hh 2.06 1.68 0.38 0.03 
Inter-croppped 0.32 0.45 -0.13 -0.19 
Manager is equal to one of the owners 0.58 0.78 -0.20 -0.31 
Age of the manager 41.18 49.07 -7.89 -0.34 
Years of Schooling of the manager 5.8 3.21 2.59 0.50 
Ln Non-Managerial Household Labor (hours/ha) 5.77 3.8 1.97 0.60 
Ln Exchange labor (days/ha) 0.18 0.32 -0.14 -0.13 
Household Size 5.16 4 1.16 0.38 
Dependency Ratio 0.7 0.71 -0.01 -0.01 
Ag extension services receipt 0.32 0.27 0.05 0.08 
HH has any off-farm income  0.44 0.35 0.09 0.13 
HH receives other transfers/safety net help 0.21 0.23 -0.02 -0.03 
Wealth Index  -0.6 -1.03 0.43 0.16 








List of Additional Controls used in the Added Control Approach 
 
Variable  Data Source 
Plot Geospatial Characteristics 
Predominant Soil Type: Sandy † IHS3 
Farmer Assessment of Soil Quality: Good † IHS3 
Irrigated † IHS3 
Percent of Land Classified as Agriculture within 2 Km Radius of Plot Location GlobCover 2009 
Plot Slope (Percentage) SRTM v4 
Potential Wetness Index  AfSIS, TWI 
No or Slight Constraint on Nutrient Availability † HWSD 
No or Slight Constraint on Nutrient Retention Capacity † HWSD 
No or Slight Constraint on Rooting Conditions † HWSD 
No or Slight Constraint on Oxygen Availability for Roots † HWSD 
No or Slight Constraint on Excess Salts † HWSD 
No or Slight Constraint on Toxicity † HWSD 
No or Slight Constraint on Workability † HWSD 
Erosion: None †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Erosion: Slight †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Erosion: Slight to moderate † (omitted category) Soil Map of Malawi 
Soil Depth: Shallow †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Soil Depth: Deep †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Soil Depth: Very Deep † (omitted category) Soil Map of Malawi 
Surface Texture: Clay, Clay-Loamy †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Surface Texture: Loamy, Loamy-Sandy †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Surface Texture: Sandy †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Surface Texture: Sandy-Clay, Loam-Sandy-Clay †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Surface Texture: Sandy-Loam †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Surface Texture: Other † (omitted category) Soil Map of Malawi 
Sub-surface Texture: Clay, Clay-Loamy †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Sub-surface Texture: Loamy, Loamy-Sandy †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Sub-surface Texture: Sandy †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Sub-surface: Sandy-Clay, Loam-Sandy-Clay †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Sub-surface: Sandy-Loam †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Sub-surface: Other † (omitted category) Soil Map of Malawi 
Drainage: Very Poor †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Drainage: Poor †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Drainage: Poor to Imperfect †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Drainage: Imperfect †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Drainage: Imperfect to Moderately Well †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Drainage: Moderately Well †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Drainage: Moderately Well to Well †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Drainage: Well †  Soil Map of Malawi 
Drainage: Somewhat Excellent † (omitted category) Soil Map of Malawi 
Other Plot Characteristics 
Duration Between Planting and Harvesting (Months) IHS3 
Duration of Last Fallow Period (Years) IHS3 







Table C.2 (Continued) 
 
Variable  Data Source 
Household Characteristics 
# of Household Members 0-5 IHS3 
# of Household Members 6-14 IHS3 
# of Household Male Members 15-59 IHS3 
# of Household Female Members 15-59 IHS3 
# of Household Members 60+ IHS3 
Ratio of # of Sick Adult Household Members & Total # of Adult Household 
Members 
IHS3 
Household Distance to Nearest Road (Eucledian, KMs) IHS3 
Household Distance to Nearest Locality with 20,000+ Population (Eucledian, KMs) IHS3 
Community Characteristics 
Residents Pay Village Headman When Selling or Purchasing Land † IHS3 
Savings and Credit Cooperative in the Community † IHS3 
Distance to Nearest Commercial Bank (KMs) IHS3 
Distance to Nearest Micro-Finance Institution (KMs) IHS3 
Assistant Agriculture Extension Development Officer Lives in the Community † IHS3 
Distance to Nearest Agriculture Extension Development Officer KMs) IHS3 
Irrigation Scheme in the Community IHS3 
# of Fertilizer Sellers in the Community IHS3 
# of Hybrid Maize Seed Sellers in the Community IHS3 
Community Net Receiver of Population † IHS3 
Notes:  HWSD: Harmonized World Soil Database 
 Soil Map of Malawi: Land Resources Evaluation Project 





































       
Ln Managerial Labor (hours/ha) 0.227*** 0.214*** 0.226*** 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.227*** 0.224*** 
 
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Purchased Inputs 
       
Pesticide/herbicide use yes/no 0.446*** 0.430*** 0.414*** 0.434*** 0.446*** 0.448*** 0.449*** 
 
(0.054) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054) 
Organic fertilizer use yes/no 0.021 0.019 0.034 0.022 0.021 0.024 0.020 
 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Ln Inorganic Fertilizer Use (kg/ha) 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ln Hired labor (days/ha) 0.102*** 0.091*** 0.099*** 0.101*** 0.102*** 0.102*** 0.101*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
Agricultural Implements Access Index 0.036*** 0.041*** 0.035*** 0.038*** 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) 
Proportion of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.041** 0.032* 0.043** 0.041** 0.041** 0.040** 0.043** 
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Proportion of Plot Area Under Export Crops 1.078*** 1.066*** 1.081*** 1.118*** 1.078*** 1.070*** 1.068*** 
 
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030) (0.03 ) 
Household Characteristics and Endowment 
       
ln GPS Total Area of the plot (ha) -0.155*** -0.163*** -0.146*** -0.155*** -0.157*** - 0.164*** -0.158*** 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.04 ) 
ln GPS Total Area of the plot (ha) Squared 0.056*** 0.053*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.054*** 0.057*** 
 
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) 
Elevation (m) 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00 ) 
Plot distance to household -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
























Intercropped 0.230*** 0.264*** 0.240*** 0.221*** 0.231*** 0.233*** 0.228*** 
 
(0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Manager is equal to one of the owners -0.007 -0.003 -0.010 -0.008 -0.016 -0.006 -0.003 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) 
Age of the manager -0.001** -0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.002*** 0.000 -0.001** 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of Schooling of the manager 0.003 0.005** 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ln Non-Managerial Household Labor (hours/ha) 0.015** 0.017*** 0.016*** 0.015** 0.015** 0.017*** 0.016** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln Exchange labor (days/ha) 0.042*** 0.029** 0.043*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 
 
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) 
Household Size 0.013*** 0.011** 0.014*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.001 0.014*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.013) (0.004) 
Dependency Ratio -0.008 0.005 -0.012 -0.008 -0.008 0.011 -0.009 
 
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.016) 
Agricultural Extension Receipt 0.030* 0.031* 0.029* 0.033** 0.028* 0.031* 0.032* 
 
(0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
HH has any off-farm income  -0.063*** -0.047*** -0.056*** -0.063*** -0.062*** - 0.061*** -0.059*** 
 
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
HH receives other transfers/safety net help 0.007 -0.009 0.009 0.012 0.008 0.010 0.011 
 
(0.020) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.02 ) 
Wealth Index  0.062*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.062*** 0.063*** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
 Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM)  0.004** -0.006 0.0 4*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003* 0.003 
 
(0.002) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Number of observations 10,962 10,962 10,710 10,853 10,960 10,962 10,868 
R2 0.380 0.462 0.392 0.381 0.380 0.381 0.382 
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.423 0.387 0.377 0.377 0.378 0.379 
note:  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Ln Managerial Labor (hours/ha) 0.234*** 0.214*** 0.236*** 0.235*** 0.235*** 0.234*** 0.231*** 
 
(0.018) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) 
Purchased Inputs 
       
Pesticide/herbicide use yes/no 0.618*** 0.567*** 0.642*** 0.617*** 0.625*** 0.614*** 0.623*** 
 
(0.121) (0.131) (0.125) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) (0.121) 
Organic fertilizer use yes/no 0.036 0.022 0.034 0.038 0.038 0.041 0.031 
 
(0.044) (0.047) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) (0.044) 
Ln Inorganic Fertilizer Use (kg/ha) 0.058*** 0.059*** 0.060*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.057*** 0.058*** 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln Hired labor (days/ha) 0.113*** 0.088*** 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 0.114*** 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Agricultural Implements Access Index 0.048*** 0.059*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.046*** 
 
(0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
Proportion of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.025 -0.008 0.040 0.025 0.026 0.026 0.026 
(0.034) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Proportion of Plot Area Under Export Crops 1.132*** 1.115*** 1.131*** 1.149*** 1.130*** 1.139*** 1.133*** 
 
(0.086) (0.088) (0.086) (0.087) (0.086) (0.086) (0.086) 
Household Characteristics and Endowment 
       
ln GPS Total Area of the plot (ha) -0.354*** -0.379*** -0.336*** -0.341*** -0.356*** - 0.352*** -0.367*** 
(0.074) (0.081) (0.075) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) 
ln GPS Total Area of the plot (ha) Squared 0.006 0.006 0.013 0.010 0.006 0.007 0.001 
 
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) 
Elevation (m) 0.000** -0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.00 ) 
Plot distance to household -0.000 -0.004* -0.002 0.00  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 






















Intercropped 0.273*** 0.308*** 0.273*** 0.268*** 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.278*** 
 
(0.037) (0.041) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Manager is equal to one of the owners -0.002 0.020 0.013 -0.007 -0.019 -0.005 -0.010 
 
(0.033) (0.039) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033) 
Age of the manager -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003** 0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of Schooling of the manager 0.011** 0.012** 0.011** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 
 
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln Non-Managerial Household Labor (hours/ha) 0.012** 0.003 0.012** 0.012** 0.012** 0.010* 0.012** 
 
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) 
Ln Exchange labor (days/ha) 0.013 0.003 0.014 0.012 0.015 0.015 0.013 
 
(0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
Household Size 0.024*** 0.029*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.024*** -0.034 0.025*** 
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.040) (0.008) 
Dependency Ratio -0.068*** -0.076*** -0.074*** -0.069*** -0.069*** - 0.049** -0.067*** 
 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.023) (0.018) 
Agricultural Extension Receipt 0.131*** 0.127*** 0.125*** 0.127*** 0.127*** 0.129*** 0.135*** 
 
(0.031) (0.037) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
HH has any off-farm income  -0.036 -0.018 -0.019 -0.039 -0.029 -0.035 -0.038 
 
(0.029) (0.034) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
HH receives other transfers/safety net help -0.030 -0.088** -0.034 -0.023 -0.031 -0.032 -0.031 
 
(0.033) (0.042) (0.034) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Wealth Index  0.060*** 0.073*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.063*** 0.058*** 0.060*** 
 
(0.009) (0.012) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM)  -0.000 -0.046** 0.0 3 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 
(0.003) (0.020) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Number of observations 3,242 3,242 3,176 3,207 3,242 3,242 3,225 
R2 0.373 0.550 0.386 0.372 0.375 0.375 0.376 
Adjusted R2 0.362 0.435 0.368 0.360 0.363 0.363 0.363 








 Male Sample Female Sample 





















      
Ln Managerial Labor (hours/ha) 0.227*** 0.186*** 0.208*** 0.192*** 0.234*** 0.201*** 
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.012) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) 
Purchased Inputs 
      
Pesticide/herbicide use yes/no 0.446*** 0.383*** 0.429*** 0.476*** 0.618*** 0.690*** 
 (0.054) (0.052) (0.054) (0.115) (0.121) (0.124) 
Organic fertilizer use yes/no 0.021 0.025 0.023 0.001 0.036 0.047 
 (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.041) (0.044) (0.044) 
Ln Inorganic Fertilizer Use (kg/ha) 0.070*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.055*** 0.058*** 0.059*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) 
Ln Hired labor (days/ha) 0.102*** 0.093*** 0.101*** 0.107*** 0.113*** 0.111*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) 
Agricultural Implements Access Index 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.037*** 0.032*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Proportion of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.041** 0.038** 0.041** 0.024 0.025 0.033 
(0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.031) (0.034) (0.034) 
Proportion of Plot Area Under Export Crops 1.078*** 1.010*** 1.077*** 1.074*** 1.132*** 1.116*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.081) (0.086) (0.087) 
Household Characteristics and Endowment 
      
ln GPS Total Area of the plot (ha) -0.155*** -0.149*** -0.174*** -0.318*** -0.354*** -0.417*** 
(0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.070) (0.074) (0.075) 
ln GPS Total Area of the plot (ha) Squared 0.056*** 0.052*** 0.049*** 0.008 0.006 -0.016 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.024) (0.025) (0.026) 
Elevation (m) 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Plot distance to household -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Intercropped 0.230*** 0.215*** 0.233*** 0.265*** 0.273*** 0.280*** 




Table C.5 Dropping Extreme Observations (Continued) 
 
  
 Male Sample Female Sample 




















Manager is equal to one of the owners -0.007 -0.012 -0.012 -0.027 -0.002 0.000 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) 
Age of the manager -0.001** -0.001* -0.001** -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of Schooling of the manager 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.010** 0.011** 0.011** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
Ln Non-Managerial Household Labor 
(hours/ha) 0.015** 0.011* 0.014** 0.013** 0.012** 0.012** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) 
Ln Exchange labor (days/ha) 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041*** 0.017 0.013 0.014 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Household Size 0.013*** 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.023*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) 
Dependency Ratio -0.008 -0.003 -0.006 -0.061*** -0.068*** -0.065*** 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) 
Agricultural Extension Receipt 0.030* 0.026* 0.028* 0.132*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 
 (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) 
HH has any off-farm income  -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.064*** -0.017 -0.036 -0.031 
 (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.027) (0.029) (0.029) 
HH receives other transfers/safety net help 0.007 0.005 0.006 -0.024 -0.030 -0.042 
 (0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.031) (0.033) (0.034) 
Wealth Index  0.062*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 0.055*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) 
 Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM)  0.004** 0.004** 0.004** -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Constant 7.958*** 8.240*** 8.063*** 8.544*** 8.307*** 8.417*** 
(0.261) (0.245) (0.261) (0.702) (0.757) (0.755) 
Number of observations 10,962 10,738 10,755 3,181 3,242 3,164 
R2 0.380 0.364 0.368 0.361 0.373 0.357 
Adjusted R2 0.376 0.360 0.365 0.349 0.362 0.345 











Austria Finland  Italy  Spain  
Belgium France  Netherlands  Sweden  
Denmark   Germany Portugal  United Kingdom  
 
Note: Switzerland and Iceland were not included because there is no fiscal government spending and/or energy taxes 
data available for the period of analysis that uses th  same methodology as in the other countries included on the 
sample. Norway was not included because this country is not an EU country and as such the regulatory framework 
of the EU may not apply; in addition,  it is the world’s largest producer of oil and natural gas outside the Middle 
East (on a per-capita basis ), which may set it apart from  the other countries. 
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Table D.2  







Year average of daily  mean SO2 concentration, micrograms 
per cubic meter 
1995-2006 AirBase from the 
European Topic Centre 
on Air and Climate 
Change, under contract 
to the European 
Environment Agency 
Nitrogen Dioxide 
Year average of daily  mean NO2 concentration, micrograms 
per cubic meter 
1995-2008 
Ozone 
Year average of daily  mean O3 concentration, micrograms 




per capita (3 year moving 
average) 
Market value of all goods and services including durable 




Share of government 
expenditure on public 
goods 
Government expenditure on public goods over total 
government expenditure. Including: Public order andsafety, 
Environment protection, Housing and community ameniti s, 
Health,  Recreation, culture and Religion,  Education, Social 
protection 
1989-2008 
Share of total government 
expenditure over GDP 
Total Government Expenditure over GDP  1989-2008 
Trade Intensity 
Imports of goods and services plus exports of goods an  
services over GDP 
1994-2008 
Energy Tax Rate Implicit Tax Rate on Energy 1995-2008 
EUROSTAT Statistical 
Books (2009) 




The Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCP) refers to the 
Directive 2001/80/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 23 October 2001 on the limitation of emission of 
certain pollutants into the air from Large Combustion Plants. 
The LCP Directive entered into force on 27 November 2001. 
The Directive sets emission level values (ELV’s) for SO2, 
NOX and dust into the air from combustion plants with a 
rated thermal input equal to or exceeding 50 MW. New 
combustion plants (licensed after 1 July 1987) must meet the 
ELVs given in the LCP Directive. A distinction is made 
between new plants licensed before and after 27 November 
2002, with the latter ones having to meet more stringent 
ELVs. The regulation dummy, takes the value of 1 from 
2001 (year in which it was enforced), and 0 otherwise if the 
country was an EU member in those years. 
1990-2008 EEA Report No 2/2007 
Regulation on NOx 
This variable is reciprocal of the standard emission level 
values of NOx under the EURO I, II, III, IV Directives for 
Large Goods Vehicles, measured in g/kWh: 1992-1995=.0, 
1995-1999=7.0, 1999-2005=5.0,  
2005-2008=3.5. 
1990-2008 EEA Report No 2/2007 
Heating Degree Days 
Measurement that reflects the demand for energy needed to 
heat a home or business. The measured used is Relative 
Degree Days  (RDD25) that  is the ratio between Actual 
heating degree-days (ADD)  and Mean heating degree-days 
over period 1980 – 2004 (MDD25) 
ADD express the severity of the cold in a specific t me 
period taking into consideration outdoor temperature and 
room temperature. 
To establish a common and comparable basis, Eurostat 
defined the following method for the calculation of heating 
degree days:  (18 °C - Tm) x d,  if Tm is lower than or equal 
to 15 °C (heating  threshold), where Tm is the mean 
(Tmin  + Tmax / 2) outdoor temperature over a period of d 
days. Calculations are to be executed on a daily basis (d=1), 
added up to a calendar month -and subsequently to a ear- 





















SO2 5.47 0.81 
NO2 15.72 0.54 
O3 13.91 0.29 
 
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Units 
SO2 
6.73 5.47 0.003 85.47 
ug/m3 microgram 
per Cubic Meter 
NO2 
29.26 15.72 0.31 120.13 
O3 
48.31 13.91 0.96 117.17 
Household final 
consumption expenditure 
per capita (3 year moving 
average) 
2.08 1.14 -0.45 5.30 
1995 Euros 
Share of government 
expenditure on public 
goods 
0.74 0.03 0.65 0.80 
 
Share of total government 
expenditure over GDP 0.47 0.05 0.38 0.63 
 
Energy Tax Rate 1.66 0.37 0.91 3.16 
Euros per Ton of 
Oil Equivalent 
Trade Intensity 0.74 0.26 0.47 1.73 
 










  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 12.9 9.4 7.5 6.3 5.9 5.2 5.3 5.1 3.8 3.9 3.9 3.0 2.5 
Belgium 18.4 15.6 14.1 9.4 8.4 9.2 8.2 8.7 8.4 8.0 8.5 7.6 6.2 
Denmark 7.9 3.6 2.7 1.9 2.0 1.0 2.2 2.6 1.7 1.9 1.5 1.5 1.5 
Finland 4.1 2.9 2.9 2.0 1.4 1.8 1.9 2.5 2.0 2.0 2.4 2.0 2.0 
France          7.6 7.0 6.5 6.8 5.5 5.1 5.1 4.7   
 Germany 14.2 9.9 7.4 6.0 5.2 4.8 4.7 5.0 4.2 4.4 4.5 4.1 3.9 
Italy       9.9 8.0 7.7 7.9 7.9 6.9 5.3 4.7 4.4 3.9 
Netherlands 8.9 6.7 5.6 4.7 4.4 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.5 3.6 3.4 2.5 2.5 
Portugal     11.0 10.7 10.6 9.2 7.6 4.6 5.0 4.4 3.2 3.9 2.9 
Spain 17.7 13.7 15.9 13.9 10.7 9.6 10.3 8.0 8.2 8.2 7.9 7.7 6.3 
Sweden 3.1 2.2 1.6 2.0 1.6 1.8 1.6 1.8 1.7 2.3 1.8 1.6 1.3 
United 
Kingdom 









 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 25.2 23.8 23.5 23.1 23.5 22.6 23.0 25.4 24.2 25.3 26.9 24.6 24.1 
Belgium 33.9 33.7 29.5 30.9 30.0 32.1 32.1 34.8 32.2 32.4 31.8 30.5 29.5 
Denmark 31.5 30.3 24.6 25.4 22.7 22.6 26.3 28.2 25.9 27.2 28.2 24.4 25.4 
Finland 24.7 20.8 24.5 16.4 15.0 16.4 18.4 16.8 18.6 15.1 16.6 15.3 14.1 
France         31.2 30.4 28.8 31.3 27.5 27.8 26.8 26.3   
Germany 31.7 31.6 29.5 28.1 26.7 26.1 26.3 29.1 26.2 27.6 29.2 28.2 28.5 
Italy         46.4 45.8 43.6 45.6 39.9 37.9 38.9 35.2 34.4 
Netherlands 35.2 35.3 31.8 31.1 29.5 29.4 29.1 30.7 30.1 28.9 28.4 30.2 31.0 
Portugal     28.4 28.2 29.0 29.1 29.9 30.1 28.3 26.8 24.3 26.6 25.0 
Spain 60.4 64.9 42.0 41.5 35.9 33.1 26.5 26.1 25.6 26.2 24.2 23.6 20.8 
Sweden 8.8 9.0 12.0 14.8 15.9 17.6 18.5 18.4 17.8 17.6 18.5 16.6 17.3 
United 
Kingdom 










1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
Austria 
52.1 52.0 55.2 54.7 57.2 57.5 57.5 63.7 55.7 57.5 57.6 55.6 53.7 
Belgium 
37.2 42.0 43.5 47.1 41.2 42.8 41.6 46.3 41.5 42.1 44.0 39.7 41.4 
Denmark 
    54.7 51.3   51.5 48.8 51.1 49.9 47.5 52.3 50.8 50.9 
Finland 
61.3 61.4 57.7 61.2 55.6 56.7 60.6 57.3 56.4 58.8 58.5 51.6 52.8 
France 
        45.2 47.9 49.1 54.4 49.0 50.3 51.1 48.3   
Germany 
40.9 42.6 44.9 46.9 43.8 45.0 45.4 51.8 47.3 47.4 49.6 47.1 47.0 
Italy 
        48.1 48.6 44.3 54.2 50.0 51.3 54.2 51.2 49.0 
Netherlands 
34.4 34.7 36.2 40.1 35.3 37.2 37.1 40.6 40.1 38.0 40.1 38.8 38.0 
Portugal 
    28.8 27.4 36.9 41.3 42.6 47.6 47.3 51.8 52.6 53.2 50.8 
Spain 
    46.6 45.7 46.2 47.7 46.6 49.7 47.2 49.8 50.2 49.9 51.6 
Sweden 
59.2 56.9 52.6 57.0 54.2 53.2 59.9 56.9 57.9 54.9 58.2 54.7 55.9 
United 





















































































































Comparison of Different Specifications of the Regressions of SO2 
 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
 






Effects and Year 
Fixed Effects
RSE with 











-0.027 -0.58** -0.06 -0.41 -1.18** -1.08 -2.52** -3.60** -5.32**
[0.10] [0.18] [0.18] [0.22] [0.39] [0.56] [0.79] [0.92] [1.27]
0.20** -0.89** -0.2 0.48 -0.95 -0.53 -2.19 -3.12* -5.52**
[0.07] [0.24] [0.27] [0.40] [0.64] [0.83] [1.18] [1.32] [1.78]
-0.01 -0.04 0.01 0.05 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.11
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.6]
-0.035** -0.06** -0.49** -0.46** -0.45** -0.46** -0.46** -0.48** -0.49**
[0.01] [0.01] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.7]
Time difference of Log of Trade (X+M)/GDP -0.95** -1.06** -0.14 -0.56* -0.59* -0.59* -0.70* -0.73* -1. 3**
[0.10] [0.12] [0.20] [0.22] [0.23] [0.26] [0.28] [0.29] [0.40]
0.01** 0.02** 0.03** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.05** 0.04* 0.05**
[0.003] [0.006] [0.007] [0.008] [0.009] [0.01] [0.01] [0.02] [0.02]
Time difference of 3-Year Moving Average of 
Ln of Household final consumption per capita  
Share of expenditures in public goods over total 
government expenditures (lagged)
Share of total government expenditures over 
Time difference of Energy Tax Rate 
Time difference of Regulation over large Plants
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Table E.2  
Comparison of Different Specifications of the Regressions of NO2 
 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 






Effects and Year 
Fixed Effects
RSE with 











0.01 -0.12 0.29** 0.20 -0.17 -0.10 -0.33 -0.30 -0.19
[0.05] [0.08] [0.09] [0.11] [0.17] [0.24] [0.30] [0.35] [0.49]
0.11** -0.06 -0.15 -0.23 -0.90** -0.41 -0.67 -0.70 -0.37
[0.04] [0.10] [0.12] [0.19] [0.28] [0.34] [0.45] [0.51] [0.71]
-0.07** -0.08** -0.14** -0.13** -0.13** -0.15** -0.18** -0.19** -0.18**
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.0221] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Time difference of Regulation over NOx 0.10* 0.12* -0.81 -0.84 -0.76 -0.84 -0.90 -0.83 -0.34
[0.05] [0.05] [0.52] [0.52] [0.51] [0.51] [0.51] [0.52] [0.51]
Time difference of Log of Trade (X+M)/GDP -0.21** -0.26** 0.21* 0.26* 0.24 0.12 0.179 0.1 -0.41
[0.05] [0.06] [0.11] [0.12] [0.13] [0.14] [0.15] [0.17] [0.25]
0.003 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02** 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.004
[0.002] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.009] [0. 1] [0.01]
Time difference of 3-Year Moving Average of 
Ln of Household final consumption per capita  
Share of expenditures in public goods over total 
government expenditures (lagged)
Share of total government expenditures over 
GDP (lagged)
Time difference of Energy Tax Rate 
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Table E.3  
Comparison of Different Specifications of the Regressions of O3 
 
 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 






Effects and Year 
Fixed Effects
RSE with 











-0.0298 -0.40** -0.26** -0.25* -0.24 -0.58* -0.634 -1.21** -1.70**
[0.08] [0.08] [0.09] [0.11] [0.178] [0.26] [0.33] [0.40] [0.52]
-0.0655 -0.47** -0.48** -0.31 -0.34 -0.99** -0.10* -1.65** -1.73*
[0.06] [0.10] [0.13] [0.18] [0.28] [0.37] [0.45] [0.52] [0.77]
0.10** 0.09** 0.03 0.05* 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.07* 0.06
[0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.02] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.4]
Time difference of Regulation over NOx 0.17** 0.18** 1.44 1.60 1.49 1.37 1.35 1.47 1.54
[0.04] [0.04] [0.86] [0.86] [0.86] [0.86] [0.86] [0.86] [0.83]
Time difference of Log of Trade (X+M)/GDP -0.44** -0.44** -0.04 -0.17 -0.09 -0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.22
[0.07] [0.07] [0.15] [0.16] [0.17] [0.19] [0.20] [0.23] [0.43]
0.002 0.001 -0.006 -0.001 0.004 0.02* 0.03** 0.03** 0.03*
[0.003] [0.003] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.008] [0.01] [0.1] [0.01]
Share of expenditures in public goods over total 
government expenditures (lagged)
Share of total government expenditures over 
GDP (lagged)
Time difference of Energy Tax Rate 
Time difference of 3-Year Moving Average of 






F.1 Extreme Observations Checks 
Dropping the top and bottom 1% of the observations on each year. 
 
 Table F.1 
Coefficient of Share of Expenditures in Public Goods in the RSE-TVCE Regressions 
Regression  
Bottom 1% of Share of 
Public Goods 
Expenditures  
Top 1% of Share of 
Public Goods 
Expenditures  
Top and Bottom 1% of 
Share of Public Goods 
Expenditures  
SO2 -5.35** -5.33** -4.33** 
O3 -1.40** -1.65** -3.13** 




Coefficient of Share of Expenditures in Public Goods in the RSE-TVCE Regressions 
Regression Bottom 1% of 
Pollutant  
Top 1% of Pollutant  Top and Bottom 1% 
of Pollutant  
SO2 -6.34** -4.22** -5.04** 
O3 -1.66** -1.13* -1.19** 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
 
Table F.3 
Coefficient of Energy Tax in the RSE-TVCE Regression   
Regressions 
Bottom 1% of Energy 
Tax Rate  
Top 1% of Energy Tax 
Rate 
Top and Bottom 1% of 
Energy Tax Rate 
NO2 -0.19** -0.19** -0.32** 





Coefficient of Energy Tax in the RSE-TVCE Regression   
Regressions 
Bottom 1% of 
Pollutant  
Top 1% of Pollutant  Top and Bottom 1% 
of Pollutant  
NO2 -0.19** -0.19** -0.20** 





Coefficient of Trade Intensity in the RSE-TVCE Regressions  
Regressions 
Bottom 1% of Trade 
Intensity  
Top 1% of Trade 
Intensity 
Top and Bottom 1% of 
Trade Intensity 
SO2 -1.19** -0.93* -1.04* 





Coefficient of Trade Intensity in the RSE-TVCE Regressions  
Regressions 
Bottom 1% of 
Pollutant  
Top 1% of Pollutant  Top and Bottom 1% 
of Pollutant  
SO2 -0.21 -1.27** -0.46 




F.2 Country dominance Checks 
Dropping one country in each estimation  
 
Figure F.1 

























Table G.1  
Analysis of the Predicted Values of the Time-Varying Country Effects ( jtν ) 
 
 SO2 NO2 O3 
Number of countries with b1j=b2j=b3j=0 4 5 5 
Signs of the Predicted jtν Values    
Number of countries with positive predicted 
values for all years 
0 0 0 
Number of countries with negative 
predicted values for all years 
6 0 4 
Number of countries with predicted values 
that change sign over time 
5 11 7 
Monotonicity of the Predicted jtν Values    
Number of countries with monotonic 
predicted values over time 
0 0 0 
Number of countries with one turning point 
in the predicted values  
3 0 0 
Number of countries with two turning 
points in the predicted values 
































Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.58 0.77 -0.19 -0.19
Age (Years) 41.59 46.89 -5.30 -0.14
Years of Schooling 5.67 3.33 2.34 0.28
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -1.18 -1.31 0.13 0.07
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 2.00 2.36 -0.36 -0.06
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.04
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.12 0.11 0.01 0.01
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 3.36 3.16 0.20 0.03
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 5.76 2.38 3.38 0.59
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 5.47 6.00 -0.53 -0.17
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 1.08 1.65 -0.57 -0.10
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.67 0.65 0.02 0.01
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.20 0.31 -0.11 -0.06
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 946.02 878.46 67.56 0.10
Distance to Household (KM) 2.29 1.85 0.44 0.02
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.30 0.41 -0.11 -0.10
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.39 0.35 0.04 0.04
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.10 0.03 0.07 0.15
Household Characteristics
Household Size 5.14 4.29 0.85 0.17
Child Dependency Ratio 0.68 0.71 -0.03 -0.02
Agricultural Extension Receipt  †
Household Characteristics 0.29 0.25 0.04 0.04
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income  † 0.44 0.39 0.05 0.04
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income  † 0.22 0.23 -0.01 -0.01
Wealth Index -0.54 -0.89 0.35 0.08
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.85 0.16 0.69 0.23
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 8.02 8.07 -0.05 0.00
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.49 0.48 0.01 0.01
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.28 0.35 -0.07 -0.07
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.05




Variable  Data Source
Plot Geospatial Characteristics
Predominant Soil Type: Sandy † IHS3
Farmer Assessment of Soil Quality: Good † IHS3
Irrigated † IHS3
Percent of Land Classified as Agriculture within 2 Km Radius of Plot 
Location GlobCover 2009
Plot Slope (Percentage) SRTM v4
Potential Wetness Index Africa Soil Information Service (AfSIS): 
Topographic 
No or Slight Constraint on Nutrient Availability † Harmonized World Soil Database (HWSD)
No or Slight Constraint on Nutrient Retention Capacity † Harmonized World Soil Database (HWSD)
No or Slight Constraint on Rooting Conditions † Harmonized World Soil Database (HWSD)
No or Slight Constraint on Oxygen Availability for Roots † Harmonized World Soil Database (HWSD)
No or Slight Constraint on Excess Salts † Harmonized World Soil Database (HWSD)
No or Slight Constraint on Toxicity † Harmonized World Soil Database (HWSD)
No or Slight Constraint on Workability † Harmonized World Soil Database (HWSD)
Erosion: None † 
Erosion: Slight † 
Erosion: Slight to moderate † (omitted category)
Soil Depth: Shallow † 
Soil Depth: Deep † 
Soil Depth: Very Deep † (omitted category)
Surface Texture: Clay, Clay-Loamy † 
Surface Texture: Loamy, Loamy-Sandy † 
Surface Texture: Sandy † 
Surface Texture: Sandy-Clay, Loam-Sandy-Clay † 
Surface Texture: Sandy-Loam † 
Surface Texture: Other † (omitted category)
Sub-surface Texture: Clay, Clay-Loamy † 
Sub-surface Texture: Loamy, Loamy-Sandy † 
Sub-surface Texture: Sandy † 
Sub-surface: Sandy-Clay, Loam-Sandy-Clay † 
Sub-surface: Sandy-Loam † 
Sub-surface: Other † (omitted category)
Drainage: Very Poor † 
Drainage: Poor † 
Drainage: Poor to Imperfect † 
Drainage: Imperfect † 
Drainage: Imperfect to Moderately Well † 
Drainage: Moderately Well † 
Drainage: Moderately Well to Well † 
Drainage: Well † 
Drainage: Somewhat Excellent † (omitted category)
Other Plot Characteristics
Duration Between Planting and Harvesting (Months) IHS3
Duration of Last Fallow Period (Years) IHS3
Tree/Permanent Crops Grown on Plot † IHS3
Table H.2: List of Additional Controls





Variable  Data Source
Household Characteristics
# of Household Members 0-5 IHS3
# of Household Members 6-14 IHS3
# of Household Male Members 15-59 IHS3
# of Household Female Members 15-59 IHS3
# of Household Members 60+ IHS3
Ratio of # of Sick Adult Household Members & Total # of Adult 
Household Members IHS3
Household Distance to Nearest Road (Eucledian, KMs) IHS3
Household Distance to Nearest Locality with 20,000+ Population 
(Eucledian, KMs) IHS3
Community Characteristics
Residents Pay Village Headman When Selling or Purchasing Land † IHS3
Savings and Credit Cooperative in the Community † IHS3
Distance to Nearest Commercial Bank (KMs) IHS3
Distance to Nearest Micro-Finance Institution (KMs) IHS3
Assistant Agriculture Extension Development Officer Lives in the 
Community † IHS3
Distance to Nearest Agriculture Extension Development Officer KMs) IHS3
Irrigation Scheme in the Community IHS3
# of Fertilizer Sellers in the Community IHS3
# of Hybrid Maize Seed Sellers in the Community IHS3

















Female † -0.045* -0.059** -0.051* -0.049* -0.048* -0.041
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.016 0.004 0.022 0.015 0.016 0.014
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Age (Years) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.007** 0.003 0.006** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.282*** -0.296*** -0.284*** -0.284*** -0.278*** -0.287***
(0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.395*** 0.436*** 0.377*** 0.390*** 0.397*** 0.397***
(0.076) (0.068) (0.074) (0.078) (0.077) (0.075)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.043 0.042 0.051** 0.046* 0.043 0.041
(0.027) (0.027) (0.026) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.077*** 0.081*** 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.078***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.028*** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.030*** 0.029***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.031*** 0.032*** 0.034*** 0.032***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.001 0.000 0.003 0.001 -0.003 -0.000
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.079*** 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.080*** 0.079*** 0.078***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.040*** 0.026** 0.032*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.039***
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Dependent Variable: Log[Plot Value of Output (MK)/HA]
Pooled Sample
Table H.3: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the Mean Decomposition
















Distance to Household (KM) -0.001** -0.001 -0.001 -0.001** -0.001** -0.001**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.110*** 0.291*** 0.179*** 0.096*** 0.111*** 0.114***
(0.025) (0.027) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.099*** 0.079*** 0.100*** 0.094*** 0.097*** 0.100***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 1.213*** 1.183*** 1.218*** 1.230*** 1.213*** 1.205***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.014*** 0.011** 0.012*** 0.013*** -0.067*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.024) (0.005)
Child Dependency Ratio -0.011 -0.014 -0.020 -0.008 -0.014 -0.012
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.016)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.077*** 0.034* 0.071*** 0.075*** 0.079*** 0.082***
(0.021) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.076*** -0.076*** -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.080*** -0.075***
(0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † -0.054** -0.010 -0.027 -0.053* -0.057** -0.054**
(0.027) (0.025) (0.024) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Wealth Index 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.055***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.042*** 0.030*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.041***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.170** 0.017 0.190*** 0.175** 0.171** 0.183***
(0.071) (0.088) (0.069) (0.072) (0.074) (0.065)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.099 0.157* 0.158** 0.096 0.101 0.115
(0.073) (0.086) (0.073) (0.075) (0.076) (0.071)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.073 -0.044 0.098 0.069 0.068 0.093
(0.079) (0.089) (0.074) (0.080) (0.081) (0.075)
Observations 16,372 16,372 16,016 16,153 16,372 16,234
Adjusted R-Squared 0.335 0.365 0.357 0.335 0.336 0.336


















Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.020 -0.005 0.024 0.018 0.021 0.018
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Age (Years) -0.002* -0.002* -0.002* -0.002** 0.000 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.005 0.005 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.261*** -0.267*** -0.260*** -0.262*** -0.262*** -0.268***
(0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.043*** 0.042***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.360*** 0.405*** 0.326*** 0.358*** 0.367*** 0.363***
(0.077) (0.070) (0.075) (0.078) (0.077) (0.077)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.054* 0.046 0.063** 0.056* 0.055* 0.052*
(0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.081*** 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.080*** 0.081*** 0.081***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.063*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.069***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.016** 0.015* 0.017** 0.017** 0.019** 0.017**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.004 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.080*** 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.081*** 0.081*** 0.080***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.042*** 0.028** 0.036*** 0.040*** 0.044*** 0.041***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Male-Managed Plot Sample
Table H.4: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the Mean Decomposition
Category of Additional Covariates Integrated into the Base Regression
















Distance to Household (KM) -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.089*** 0.270*** 0.156*** 0.077*** 0.089*** 0.094***
(0.028) (0.032) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.095*** 0.078*** 0.091*** 0.088*** 0.093*** 0.098***
(0.025) (0.023) (0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.025)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 1.187*** 1.162*** 1.191*** 1.202*** 1.183*** 1.178***
(0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.042) (0.040) (0.040)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.011* 0.008 0.008 0.010* -0.061** 0.012**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.028) (0.006)
Child Dependency Ratio 0.032 0.024 0.024 0.033 0.039 0.029
(0.020) (0.019) (0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.021)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.053** 0.015 0.048** 0.053** 0.054** 0.056**
(0.022) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.075*** -0.076*** -0.081*** -0.073*** -0.076*** -0.071***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † -0.035 0.004 -0.011 -0.028 -0.035 -0.031
(0.031) (0.029) (0.029) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030)
Wealth Index 0.062*** 0.066*** 0.061*** 0.063*** 0.062*** 0.062***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.041*** 0.029*** 0.038*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.040***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 0.004 0.005* 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.186** 0.038 0.213*** 0.196** 0.189** 0.215***
(0.077) (0.091) (0.076) (0.078) (0.081) (0.070)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.135* 0.168* 0.174** 0.136* 0.136* 0.161**
(0.081) (0.091) (0.080) (0.082) (0.082) (0.077)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.119 -0.005 0.158** 0.117 0.118 0.152*
(0.086) (0.093) (0.080) (0.087) (0.088) (0.082)
Observations 12,029 12,029 11,755 11,887 12,029 11,920
R-Squared 0.341 0.369 0.360 0.341 0.341 0.343


















Manager & Owner Overlap † -0.015 0.026 -0.004 -0.009 -0.018 -0.014
(0.040) (0.038) (0.038) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Age (Years) 0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.001 0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.015*** 0.011** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.014***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.296*** -0.326*** -0.322*** -0.292*** -0.288*** -0.299***
(0.046) (0.046) (0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.046)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.042*** 0.039*** 0.040*** 0.043*** 0.044*** 0.041***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.491*** 0.526*** 0.536*** 0.471*** 0.487*** 0.501***
(0.136) (0.118) (0.119) (0.139) (0.137) (0.134)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.017 0.030 0.020 0.022 0.013 0.008
(0.045) (0.044) (0.043) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.066*** 0.068*** 0.070*** 0.065*** 0.065*** 0.065***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.007 0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.053*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.056*** 0.050*** 0.054***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.011* -0.013** -0.007 -0.011* -0.015** -0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.088*** 0.087*** 0.084*** 0.090*** 0.088*** 0.090***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.033 0.023 0.018 0.030 0.029 0.032*
(0.020) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female-Managed Plot Sample
Table H.5: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the Mean Decomposition
Category of Additional Covariates Integrated into the Base Regression
















Distance to Household (KM) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.165*** 0.344*** 0.233*** 0.146*** 0.167*** 0.169***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.038)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.099** 0.070* 0.107*** 0.101** 0.098** 0.093**
(0.041) (0.040) (0.037) (0.041) (0.042) (0.043)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 1.255*** 1.212*** 1.245*** 1.273*** 1.277*** 1.257***
(0.090) (0.096) (0.089) (0.092) (0.090) (0.091)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.033*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 0.031*** -0.020 0.032***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.044) (0.008)
Child Dependency Ratio -0.076*** -0.080*** -0.090*** -0.072** -0.047 -0.075**
(0.029) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029) (0.032) (0.029)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.157*** 0.103*** 0.147*** 0.149*** 0.157*** 0.168***
(0.040) (0.038) (0.036) (0.041) (0.040) (0.040)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.057 -0.048 -0.041 -0.059 -0.060 -0.062*
(0.037) (0.035) (0.034) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † -0.097** -0.045 -0.068* -0.106** -0.113*** -0.104**
(0.043) (0.038) (0.040) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043)
Wealth Index 0.048*** 0.054*** 0.051*** 0.047*** 0.043*** 0.045***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.043*** 0.030** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.041***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.012) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) -0.005 -0.002 -0.000 -0.006 -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.071 -0.127 0.096 0.053 0.071 0.026
(0.085) (0.138) (0.085) (0.090) (0.088) (0.087)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † -0.035 0.046 0.078 -0.055 -0.022 -0.064
(0.093) (0.136) (0.093) (0.098) (0.094) (0.095)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † -0.103 -0.217 -0.117 -0.115 -0.116 -0.127
(0.090) (0.135) (0.090) (0.096) (0.095) (0.092)
Observations 4,343 4,343 4,261 4,266 4,343 4,314
R-Squared 0.303 0.338 0.334 0.299 0.308 0.303













Female † -0.045* -0.066 -0.114
(0.027) (0.097) (0.113)
Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.016 0.155 0.306**
(0.020) (0.096) (0.134)
Age (Years) -0.001 0.005 0.002
(0.001) (0.004) (0.004)
Years of Schooling 0.007** 0.029* -0.017
(0.003) (0.016) (0.023)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.282*** -0.404** -0.117
(0.030) (0.166) (0.178)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.044*** 0.008 0.061*
(0.009) (0.036) (0.033)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.395*** 1.837*** 1.497***
(0.076) (0.280) (0.350)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.043 0.049 -0.017
(0.027) (0.178) (0.205)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.077*** 0.097*** 0.076***
(0.004) (0.019) (0.028)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.028*** -0.025 0.016
(0.005) (0.028) (0.033)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.032*** 0.050 0.048
(0.007) (0.036) (0.032)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.001 0.013 -0.001
(0.004) (0.023) (0.029)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.079*** 0.048 0.075
(0.008) (0.034) (0.061)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.040*** -0.045 -0.075
(0.012) (0.040) (0.047)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000*** 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.001** 0.002 -0.022
(0.001) (0.007) (0.032)
Table H.6: Within Household OLS Regression Results 












Intercropped † 0.110*** 0.126 0.233
(0.025) (0.142) (0.155)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.099*** 0.247* 0.235
(0.023) (0.147) (0.173)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 1.213*** 1.316*** 1.197***
(0.040) (0.168) (0.131)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.014*** 0.031
(0.005) (0.026)
Child Dependency Ratio -0.011 -0.007
(0.016) (0.117)
Agricultural Extension Receipt  † 0.077*** -0.152
(0.021) (0.157)
Household Characteristics
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income  † -0.076*** -0.120
(0.019) (0.112)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income  † -0.054** -0.229
(0.027) (0.142)
Wealth Index 0.055*** -0.023
(0.006) (0.028)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.042*** 0.111*
(0.008) (0.061)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 0.001 -0.013
(0.003) (0.018)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.170** -0.013
(0.071) (0.231)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.099 -0.017
(0.073) (0.276)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.073 -0.312
(0.079) (0.249)
Observations 16,372 292 292
R-Squared 0.336 0.430 0.707
Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design.
 ***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1/5/10 percent level, respectively.













TOTAL 0.208** -0.000 0.066
(0.093) (0.027) (0.093)






Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.013 -0.009 0.001
(0.013) (0.072) (0.067)
Age (Years) 0.026 -0.069 -0.109
(0.023) (0.140) (0.204)
Years of Schooling 0.034 -0.049 -0.148*
(0.021) (0.071) (0.085)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.096 -0.348 -0.292
(0.059) (0.225) (0.327)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] -0.007 0.236* 0.205
(0.031) (0.126) (0.152)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † -0.008 0.001 0.004
(0.019) (0.003) (0.008)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.003 -0.008 0.021
(0.012) (0.023) (0.018)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.099*** 0.066 0.042
(0.037) (0.066) (0.080)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.006 0.104 0.200
(0.008) (0.155) (0.172)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.008 0.155 -0.063
(0.011) (0.217) (0.264)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.000 -0.011 -0.029
(0.002) (0.028) (0.033)
Table H.7: Decomposition of the Gender Differential in Agricultural Productivity - Within Household Sa mple 









Mean Gender Differential 






Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design. 
***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1/5/10 percent level, respectively. 
†denotes a dummy variable. 
  





Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] -0.005 0.075** 0.108**
(0.008) (0.036) (0.053)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] -0.005 0.009 -0.006
(0.008) (0.017) (0.017)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.008 -0.052 -0.155
(0.021) (0.221) (0.278)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.001 0.004 0.004
(0.004) (0.015) (0.017)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † -0.014 0.012 -0.014
(0.016) (0.031) (0.046)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds -0.011 -0.024 -0.053
(0.019) (0.036) (0.054)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.158*** 0.002 -0.003
(0.054) (0.014) (0.007)
Household Characteristics
Household Size -0.004 -0.195 -0.288
(0.005) (0.132) (0.202)
Child Dependency Ratio -0.000 0.069 0.072
(0.000) (0.075) (0.097)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † -0.003 -0.007 0.015
(0.005) (0.021) (0.032)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † 0.008 -0.046 -0.078
(0.008) (0.039) (0.072)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † 0.013 0.006 -0.019
(0.010) (0.038) (0.062)
Wealth Index -0.002 0.005 0.007
(0.003) (0.011) (0.019)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.015 -0.049 -0.053
(0.010) (0.037) (0.044)





















Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.086** 0.093** 0.085
(0.036) (0.042) (0.084)
Age (Years) -0.000 -0.002 0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
Years of Schooling 0.009* 0.005 0.028***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.010)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.617*** -0.572*** -0.741***
(0.060) (0.072) (0.113)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] -0.064*** -0.063*** -0.078***
(0.015) (0.019) (0.024)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.331*** 0.269** 0.601**
(0.121) (0.135) (0.292)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.081 0.072 0.124
(0.053) (0.063) (0.102)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.132*** 0.133*** 0.141***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.016)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.051*** 0.076*** 0.043***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.012)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.052*** 0.029** 0.112***
(0.012) (0.013) (0.031)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.004 0.006 -0.009
(0.007) (0.009) (0.013)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.065*** 0.061*** 0.084***
(0.012) (0.015) (0.024)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.056*** 0.051** 0.038
(0.020) (0.025) (0.035)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.076* 0.022 0.197**
(0.041) (0.050) (0.077)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.121*** 0.169*** -0.010
(0.043) (0.050) (0.090)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.247*** 0.306*** 0.055
(0.043) (0.048) (0.145)
Table H.8: Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the RIF Decomposition at the 10th Percentile
Dependent Variable: RIF(Log[Plot Value of Output (MK)/HA])
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Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design. ***/**/* 










Household Size 0.021** 0.017 0.042**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.017)
Child Dependency Ratio -0.003 0.085** -0.067
(0.034) (0.038) (0.052)
Agricultural Extension Receipt  † 0.125*** 0.081* 0.163**
(0.035) (0.041) (0.072)
Household Characteristics
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income  † -0.098*** -0.048 -0.267***
(0.035) (0.041) (0.075)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income  † -0.141*** -0.108** -0.208**
(0.043) (0.051) (0.088)
Wealth Index 0.050*** 0.056*** 0.044***
(0.009) (0.010) (0.015)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.042*** 0.033** 0.086***
(0.014) (0.016) (0.029)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) -0.002 0.004 -0.014**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.416*** 0.436*** 0.443***
(0.079) (0.091) (0.163)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.168** 0.273*** 0.021
(0.083) (0.096) (0.170)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.111 0.155 -0.029
(0.085) (0.098) (0.181)
Observations 16,372 12,029 4,343















Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.019 0.012 -0.039
(0.020) (0.023) (0.041)
Age (Years) -0.000 -0.001 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.014**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.006)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.277*** -0.247*** -0.349***
(0.025) (0.030) (0.049)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.032*** 0.039*** 0.011
(0.007) (0.009) (0.011)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.348*** 0.305*** 0.560***
(0.064) (0.069) (0.139)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.051* 0.059* 0.050
(0.029) (0.033) (0.052)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.075*** 0.077*** 0.066***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.025*** 0.067*** 0.010
(0.005) (0.010) (0.007)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.030*** 0.010 0.041**
(0.007) (0.008) (0.017)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.002 0.006 -0.013*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.007)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.075***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.015)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.031
(0.013) (0.017) (0.020)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.002*** -0.002 -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.106*** 0.121*** 0.160***
(0.022) (0.027) (0.038)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.121*** 0.123*** 0.133***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.043)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.905*** 0.944*** 0.864***
(0.029) (0.033) (0.070)
Table H.9: Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the RIF Decomposition at the 50th Percentile
Dependent Variable: RIF(Log[Plot Value of Output (MK)/HA])
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Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design. ***/**/* 










Household Size 0.007 0.008 0.025***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.009)
Child Dependency Ratio 0.005 0.031 -0.040
(0.017) (0.023) (0.025)
Agricultural Extension Receipt  † 0.068*** 0.058** 0.188***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.039)
Household Characteristics
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income  † -0.060*** -0.063*** -0.022
(0.020) (0.023) (0.036)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income  † -0.044* -0.007 -0.137***
(0.024) (0.028) (0.042)
Wealth Index 0.061*** 0.070*** 0.045***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.010)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.045*** 0.041*** 0.046***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.014)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 0.004** 0.004** -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.181*** 0.185*** 0.036
(0.045) (0.051) (0.094)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.117** 0.108** -0.029
(0.047) (0.053) (0.096)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.090** 0.145*** -0.102
(0.046) (0.052) (0.096)
Observations 16,372 12,029 4,343















Manager & Owner Overlap † -0.026 -0.021 -0.088
(0.033) (0.036) (0.083)
Age (Years) -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.001 -0.000 0.019*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.011)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] 0.065 0.101* 0.035
(0.054) (0.059) (0.105)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.188*** 0.183*** 0.213***
(0.021) (0.024) (0.033)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.703*** 0.765*** 0.232
(0.137) (0.154) (0.320)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.077 0.127* -0.038
(0.055) (0.065) (0.094)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.023
(0.006) (0.007) (0.014)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.020** 0.084*** -0.034***
(0.009) (0.017) (0.013)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.031** 0.005 0.067**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.032)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.000 0.002 -0.001
(0.007) (0.008) (0.013)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.104*** 0.117*** 0.144***
(0.015) (0.017) (0.033)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.013 0.015 0.022
(0.020) (0.025) (0.039)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) -0.000* -0.000** 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) 0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.135*** 0.097** 0.152**
(0.034) (0.040) (0.070)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.023 -0.010 -0.022
(0.031) (0.034) (0.073)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 3.062*** 2.950*** 3.521***
(0.107) (0.114) (0.336)
Dependent Variable: RIF(Log[Plot Value of Output (MK)/HA])




Note: The estimates are weighted in accordance with the complex survey design. 
***/**/* indicate statistical significance at the 1/5/10 percent level, respectively. 









Household Size 0.006 0.005 0.054***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.017)
Child Dependency Ratio -0.006 0.029 -0.121***
(0.026) (0.037) (0.042)
Agricultural Extension Receipt  † 0.052 0.039 0.147*
(0.034) (0.038) (0.076)
Household Characteristics
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income  † -0.130*** -0.116*** -0.049
(0.031) (0.036) (0.067)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income  † -0.016 0.004 -0.043
(0.039) (0.045) (0.084)
Wealth Index 0.060*** 0.056*** 0.069***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.023)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.036*** 0.033** 0.045*
(0.013) (0.014) (0.025)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 0.003 0.007** -0.011**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † -0.200*** -0.142* -0.185
(0.072) (0.075) (0.188)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † -0.146* -0.062 -0.178
(0.076) (0.079) (0.194)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † -0.114 -0.011 -0.298
(0.073) (0.076) (0.190)
Observations 16,372 12,029 4,343

















Female † 0.008 -0.012 -0.009 0.001 0.006 0.023
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.051)
Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.086** 0.056 0.086** 0.076** 0.085** 0.080**
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Age (Years) -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.009* 0.005 0.007 0.009* 0.009* 0.008
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.617*** -0.637*** -0.622*** -0.616*** -0.613*** -0.636***
(0.060) (0.060) (0.061) (0.061) (0.060) (0.060)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] -0.064*** -0.065*** -0.063*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.068***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.331*** 0.484*** 0.325*** 0.299** 0.329*** 0.327***
(0.121) (0.119) (0.119) (0.123) (0.121) (0.120)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.081 0.087* 0.096* 0.108** 0.082 0.093*
(0.053) (0.053) (0.053) (0.049) (0.053) (0.053)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.132*** 0.134*** 0.134*** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.131***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.047*** 0.052*** 0.055*** 0.053***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.052*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.052*** 0.052*** 0.048***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.004 -0.005 -0.000 -0.003 -0.009 -0.005
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.065*** 0.060*** 0.060*** 0.064*** 0.066*** 0.065***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.056*** 0.037* 0.047** 0.054*** 0.056*** 0.058***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Pooled Sample
Category of Additional Covariates Integrated into the Base Regression
Table H.11: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the RIF Decomposition at the 10th 
















Intercropped † 0.076* 0.368*** 0.173*** 0.044 0.079* 0.083**
(0.041) (0.051) (0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.076* 0.368*** 0.173*** 0.044 0.079* 0.083**
(0.041) (0.051) (0.044) (0.042) (0.041) (0.042)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.121*** 0.082* 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.117*** 0.123***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.247*** 0.219*** 0.247*** 0.312*** 0.245*** 0.242***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.047) (0.043) (0.043)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.021** 0.013 0.015* 0.019** -0.004 0.021**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.045) (0.009)
Child Dependency Ratio -0.003 -0.013 -0.012 -0.005 -0.011 0.001
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.048) (0.034)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.125*** 0.046 0.107*** 0.116*** 0.123*** 0.125***
(0.035) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.098*** -0.090** -0.092*** -0.094*** -0.099*** -0.101***
(0.035) (0.035) (0.036) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † -0.141*** -0.065 -0.091** -0.139*** -0.147*** -0.132***
(0.043) (0.044) (0.044) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
Wealth Index 0.050*** 0.054*** 0.050*** 0.051*** 0.050*** 0.048***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.042*** 0.033** 0.033** 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.043***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.416*** 0.141 0.441*** 0.434*** 0.432*** 0.421***
(0.079) (0.108) (0.087) (0.080) (0.080) (0.081)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.168** 0.194* 0.274*** 0.167** 0.181** 0.180**
(0.083) (0.109) (0.087) (0.084) (0.084) (0.086)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.111 0.059 0.157* 0.121 0.120 0.143
(0.085) (0.113) (0.092) (0.086) (0.086) (0.087)
Observations 16,372 16,372 16,016 16,153 16,372 16,234
Adjusted R-Squared 0.091 0.113 0.099 0.091 0.091 0.091
Table H.11 (Cont'd)

















Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.093** 0.058 0.088** 0.083** 0.092** 0.086**
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Age (Years) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.005 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.572*** -0.569*** -0.561*** -0.581*** -0.572*** -0.591***
(0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.074) (0.072) (0.073)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] -0.063*** -0.060*** -0.058*** -0.063*** -0.064*** -0.066***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.269** 0.414*** 0.256* 0.228 0.264* 0.287**
(0.135) (0.134) (0.133) (0.140) (0.136) (0.135)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.072 0.066 0.080 0.101* 0.073 0.088
(0.063) (0.062) (0.063) (0.059) (0.063) (0.063)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.133*** 0.134*** 0.138*** 0.133*** 0.133*** 0.135***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.076*** 0.076*** 0.073*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.079***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.029** 0.028** 0.028** 0.029** 0.027** 0.026*
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.013)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.006 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.003 0.005
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.061*** 0.056*** 0.055*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.060***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.051** 0.031 0.036 0.050* 0.051** 0.050*
(0.025) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male-Managed Plot Sample
Category of Additional Covariates Integrated into the Base Regression
Table H.12: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the RIF Decomposition at the 10th 
















Intercropped † 0.022 0.288*** 0.108** 0.002 0.024 0.026
(0.050) (0.062) (0.053) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.022 0.288*** 0.108** 0.002 0.024 0.026
(0.050) (0.062) (0.053) (0.051) (0.050) (0.050)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.169*** 0.137*** 0.149*** 0.166*** 0.168*** 0.162***
(0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050) (0.050)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.306*** 0.290*** 0.292*** 0.373*** 0.303*** 0.286***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.053) (0.047) (0.048)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.017 0.011 0.011 0.016 0.022 0.017
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.057) (0.011)
Child Dependency Ratio 0.085** 0.073* 0.083** 0.081** 0.104* 0.083**
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.054) (0.038)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.081* 0.019 0.063 0.079* 0.077* 0.085**
(0.041) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.041) (0.041)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.048 -0.047 -0.046 -0.048 -0.048 -0.042
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † -0.108** -0.036 -0.068 -0.099** -0.115** -0.098*
(0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050)
Wealth Index 0.056*** 0.058*** 0.055*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.052***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.033** 0.024 0.031* 0.031* 0.034** 0.037**
(0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 0.004 0.005 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.005
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.436*** 0.187 0.495*** 0.476*** 0.450*** 0.456***
(0.091) (0.126) (0.101) (0.094) (0.092) (0.094)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.273*** 0.269** 0.353*** 0.292*** 0.283*** 0.296***
(0.096) (0.126) (0.101) (0.100) (0.097) (0.099)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.155 0.064 0.221** 0.177* 0.167* 0.194*
(0.098) (0.128) (0.105) (0.101) (0.099) (0.100)
Observations 12,029 12,029 11,755 11,887 12,029 11,920
Adjusted R-Squared 0.087 0.104 0.096 0.086 0.087 0.088
Table H.12 (Cont'd)

















Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.085 0.130 0.124 0.073 0.085 0.101
(0.084) (0.086) (0.086) (0.083) (0.084) (0.086)
Age (Years) 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Years of Schooling 0.028*** 0.019* 0.023** 0.024** 0.027*** 0.025**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.741*** -0.815*** -0.815*** -0.749*** -0.735*** -0.785***
(0.113) (0.109) (0.114) (0.110) (0.112) (0.114)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] -0.078*** -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.080*** -0.075*** -0.084***
(0.024) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.601** 0.750*** 0.659** 0.535* 0.600** 0.609**
(0.292) (0.288) (0.281) (0.290) (0.292) (0.298)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.124 0.139 0.147 0.133 0.119 0.116
(0.102) (0.106) (0.102) (0.100) (0.103) (0.104)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.141*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.140***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.036*** 0.045*** 0.047*** 0.046***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.112*** 0.106*** 0.105*** 0.090*** 0.103*** 0.095***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.030) (0.027) (0.031) (0.028)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.009 -0.012 -0.003 -0.011 -0.013 -0.010
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015) (0.014)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.084*** 0.079*** 0.078*** 0.080*** 0.084*** 0.080***
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.025)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.038 0.024 0.020 0.033 0.032 0.036
(0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.001*** -0.000 0.000** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Female-Managed Plot Sample
Category of Additional Covariates Integrated into the Base Regression
Table H.13: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the RIF Decomposition at the 10th 

















Intercropped † 0.197** 0.578*** 0.326*** 0.140* 0.198*** 0.222***
(0.077) (0.097) (0.084) (0.078) (0.077) (0.080)
Distance to Household (KM) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.197** 0.578*** 0.326*** 0.140* 0.198*** 0.222***
(0.077) (0.097) (0.084) (0.078) (0.077) (0.080)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds -0.010 -0.081 -0.036 -0.027 -0.013 -0.038
(0.090) (0.091) (0.090) (0.089) (0.091) (0.091)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.055 0.025 -0.008 0.079 0.085 0.045
(0.145) (0.155) (0.147) (0.149) (0.142) (0.148)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.042** 0.027* 0.035** 0.039** -0.064 0.043**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.054) (0.017)
Child Dependency Ratio -0.067 -0.085* -0.086* -0.074 -0.004 -0.067
(0.052) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.064) (0.053)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.163** 0.067 0.157** 0.140* 0.164** 0.177**
(0.072) (0.074) (0.074) (0.071) (0.072) (0.074)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.267*** -0.239*** -0.240*** -0.260*** -0.269*** -0.281***
(0.075) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.075) (0.077)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † -0.208** -0.120 -0.152* -0.204** -0.231*** -0.202**
(0.088) (0.089) (0.088) (0.087) (0.088) (0.088)
Wealth Index 0.044*** 0.058*** 0.051*** 0.043*** 0.036** 0.044***
(0.015) (0.016) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.086*** 0.075** 0.076** 0.088*** 0.084*** 0.090***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) -0.014** -0.008 -0.009 -0.015** -0.013* -0.014*
(0.007) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.443*** -0.164 0.352** 0.367** 0.445*** 0.451***
(0.163) (0.225) (0.177) (0.158) (0.165) (0.172)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.021 0.114 0.209 -0.060 0.037 0.043
(0.170) (0.227) (0.186) (0.167) (0.171) (0.176)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † -0.029 -0.292 -0.094 -0.044 -0.050 0.008
(0.181) (0.267) (0.198) (0.176) (0.184) (0.189)
Observations 4,343 4,343 4,261 4,266 4,343 4,314
Adjusted R-Squared 0.103 0.135 0.120 0.102 0.105 0.102
Table H.13 (Cont'd)
















Female † -0.075** -0.086*** -0.074** -0.079*** -0.080*** -0.071**
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.019 0.007 0.025 0.018 0.018 0.021
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Age (Years) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.009*** 0.006* 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.277*** -0.288*** -0.279*** -0.279*** -0.273*** -0.280***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.032*** 0.033*** 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.032***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.348*** 0.366*** 0.328*** 0.347*** 0.348*** 0.341***
(0.064) (0.062) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064) (0.064)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.051* 0.047 0.054* 0.049* 0.050* 0.046
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.075*** 0.080*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.075*** 0.076***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.025*** 0.024*** 0.026*** 0.025*** 0.023*** 0.026***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.030*** 0.028*** 0.029*** 0.031*** 0.033*** 0.031***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.002 -0.002 0.000 -0.001 -0.004 -0.003
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.076*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.077*** 0.076*** 0.074***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.047*** 0.033** 0.041*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.049***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.013)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Pooled Sample
Category of Additional Covariates Integrated into the Base Regression
Table H.14: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the RIF Decomposition at the 50th 
















Intercropped † 0.106*** 0.277*** 0.165*** 0.096*** 0.108*** 0.112***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.002*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.106*** 0.277*** 0.165*** 0.096*** 0.108*** 0.112***
(0.022) (0.026) (0.024) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.121*** 0.107*** 0.121*** 0.112*** 0.119*** 0.120***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.905*** 0.878*** 0.907*** 0.904*** 0.906*** 0.900***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) (0.029) (0.029)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.007 0.004 0.003 0.006 -0.061** 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.026) (0.005)
Child Dependency Ratio 0.005 0.002 -0.002 0.005 0.008 0.006
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.023) (0.017)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.068*** 0.034* 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.069*** 0.082***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.060*** -0.065*** -0.059*** -0.057*** -0.064*** -0.057***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † -0.044* -0.014 -0.023 -0.047** -0.045* -0.047**
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024) (0.024)
Wealth Index 0.061*** 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.045*** 0.033*** 0.043*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.046***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 0.004** 0.006*** 0.004** 0.004** 0.004** 0.003*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.181*** 0.000 0.202*** 0.183*** 0.184*** 0.189***
(0.045) (0.062) (0.049) (0.045) (0.046) (0.046)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.117** 0.114* 0.162*** 0.114** 0.121** 0.132***
(0.047) (0.060) (0.049) (0.047) (0.047) (0.048)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.090** -0.057 0.109** 0.080* 0.085* 0.113**
(0.046) (0.059) (0.049) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
Observations 16,372 16,372 16,016 16,153 16,372 16,234
Adjusted R-Squared 0.204 0.224 0.219 0.203 0.205 0.205
Table H.14 (Cont'd)

















Manager & Owner Overlap † 0.012 -0.011 0.015 0.010 0.013 0.015
(0.023) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Age (Years) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 -0.001*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.009*** 0.005 0.008** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.247*** -0.255*** -0.250*** -0.247*** -0.247*** -0.250***
(0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.039*** 0.039***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.305*** 0.332*** 0.266*** 0.306*** 0.312*** 0.301***
(0.069) (0.067) (0.069) (0.069) (0.070) (0.069)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.059* 0.045 0.067** 0.053 0.060* 0.054
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.077*** 0.082*** 0.080*** 0.077*** 0.077*** 0.078***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.067*** 0.066*** 0.065*** 0.067*** 0.065*** 0.067***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.010 0.008 0.009 0.010 0.014* 0.012
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.004 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.075*** 0.069*** 0.070*** 0.076*** 0.075*** 0.072***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.045*** 0.032* 0.037** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.042**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000*** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.002 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Male-Managed Plot Sample
Category of Additional Covariates Integrated into the Base Regression
Table H.15: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the RIF Decomposition at the 50th 
















Intercropped † 0.121*** 0.303*** 0.185*** 0.116*** 0.121*** 0.125***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002** -0.002 -0.002*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.121*** 0.303*** 0.185*** 0.116*** 0.121*** 0.125***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.123*** 0.109*** 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.120*** 0.127***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.944*** 0.920*** 0.939*** 0.930*** 0.940*** 0.933***
(0.033) (0.034) (0.033) (0.036) (0.033) (0.033)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.008 0.006 0.006 0.009 -0.074** 0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.031) (0.006)
Child Dependency Ratio 0.031 0.025 0.020 0.029 0.019 0.027
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.034) (0.023)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.058** 0.033 0.051** 0.056** 0.060** 0.062***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.063*** -0.069*** -0.069*** -0.062*** -0.065*** -0.059***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † -0.007 0.015 0.015 -0.008 -0.004 -0.011
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)
Wealth Index 0.070*** 0.074*** 0.068*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.069***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.041*** 0.027*** 0.037*** 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.041***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 0.004** 0.006** 0.003 0.004** 0.004** 0.004*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.185*** -0.010 0.195*** 0.188*** 0.187*** 0.204***
(0.051) (0.069) (0.055) (0.051) (0.051) (0.052)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † 0.108** 0.071 0.143** 0.112** 0.109** 0.130**
(0.053) (0.067) (0.056) (0.054) (0.054) (0.054)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † 0.145*** -0.015 0.176*** 0.129** 0.143*** 0.173***
(0.052) (0.066) (0.056) (0.052) (0.053) (0.054)
Observations 12,029 12,029 11,755 11,887 12,029 11,920
Adjusted R-Squared 0.211 0.231 0.226 0.210 0.211 0.212
Table H.15 (Cont'd)

















Manager & Owner Overlap † -0.039 -0.000 -0.032 -0.029 -0.040 -0.032
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)
Age (Years) 0.002* 0.001 0.001 0.002* 0.003* 0.002
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.014** 0.012** 0.014** 0.014** 0.013** 0.012**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] -0.349*** -0.365*** -0.358*** -0.351*** -0.342*** -0.359***
(0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) (0.049)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.011 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.013 0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.560*** 0.564*** 0.612*** 0.550*** 0.547*** 0.576***
(0.139) (0.144) (0.144) (0.138) (0.141) (0.136)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.050 0.056 0.049 0.045 0.047 0.040
(0.052) (0.051) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052) (0.052)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.066*** 0.069*** 0.069*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.065***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.010 0.009 0.009 0.011 0.005 0.010
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.041** 0.036** 0.036** 0.043** 0.040** 0.041**
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.013* -0.014** -0.011 -0.012* -0.013* -0.013*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.075*** 0.074*** 0.070*** 0.078*** 0.075*** 0.076***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.031 0.023 0.018 0.027 0.027 0.029
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000** 0.000 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000** 0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female-Managed Plot Sample
Category of Additional Covariates Integrated into the Base Regression
Table H.16: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the RIF Decomposition at the 50th 
















Intercropped † 0.160*** 0.311*** 0.224*** 0.152*** 0.164*** 0.172***
(0.038) (0.044) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.160*** 0.311*** 0.224*** 0.152*** 0.164*** 0.172***
(0.038) (0.044) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.133*** 0.116*** 0.152*** 0.139*** 0.132*** 0.125***
(0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.043)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 0.864*** 0.810*** 0.876*** 0.871*** 0.889*** 0.854***
(0.070) (0.073) (0.072) (0.073) (0.069) (0.070)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.025*** 0.022** 0.021** 0.022** -0.014 0.024***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.025) (0.009)
Child Dependency Ratio -0.040 -0.038 -0.048* -0.032 -0.010 -0.037
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.032) (0.026)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.188*** 0.151*** 0.183*** 0.182*** 0.188*** 0.202***
(0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.040)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.022 -0.025 -0.011 -0.033 -0.024 -0.031
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † -0.137*** -0.100** -0.126*** -0.137*** -0.146*** -0.142***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Wealth Index 0.045*** 0.048*** 0.045*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.042***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.046*** 0.033** 0.050*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) -0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † 0.036 -0.148 0.091 0.009 0.030 0.010
(0.094) (0.138) (0.100) (0.094) (0.096) (0.096)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † -0.029 0.005 0.082 -0.062 -0.022 -0.026
(0.096) (0.137) (0.101) (0.096) (0.097) (0.097)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † -0.102 -0.289** -0.138 -0.123 -0.118 -0.101
(0.096) (0.134) (0.101) (0.096) (0.098) (0.098)
Observations 4,343 4,343 4,261 4,266 4,343 4,314
Adjusted R-Squared 0.188 0.210 0.206 0.185 0.192 0.191
Table H.16 (Cont'd)
















Female † -0.082* -0.097** -0.077* -0.088** -0.083* -0.080*
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)
Manager & Owner Overlap † -0.026 -0.018 -0.009 -0.027 -0.025 -0.029
(0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
Age (Years) -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Years of Schooling 0.001 -0.002 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] 0.065 0.055 0.064 0.057 0.069 0.070
(0.054) (0.054) (0.055) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.188*** 0.190*** 0.190*** 0.188*** 0.188*** 0.191***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.021) (0.021) (0.020) (0.021)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.703*** 0.712*** 0.705*** 0.712*** 0.711*** 0.706***
(0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.141) (0.138) (0.138)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.077 0.081 0.090 0.068 0.076 0.076
(0.055) (0.054) (0.055) (0.056) (0.054) (0.055)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.035*** 0.039*** 0.038*** 0.037*** 0.035*** 0.036***
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.020** 0.019** 0.021** 0.019** 0.023** 0.023**
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.031** 0.028** 0.031** 0.032** 0.035** 0.035***
(0.014) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.000 -0.000 0.002 0.001 -0.007 -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.104*** 0.102*** 0.103*** 0.103*** 0.104*** 0.104***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.013 -0.001 0.007 0.013 0.014 0.013
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Pooled Sample
Category of Additional Covariates Integrated into the Base Regression
Table H.17: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the RIF Decomposition at the 90th 
















Intercropped † 0.135*** 0.239*** 0.193*** 0.120*** 0.132*** 0.135***
(0.034) (0.042) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Distance to Household (KM) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.135*** 0.239*** 0.193*** 0.120*** 0.132*** 0.135***
(0.034) (0.042) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds 0.023 0.018 0.033 0.016 0.022 0.026
(0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) (0.031)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 3.062*** 3.044*** 3.066*** 3.118*** 3.057*** 3.068***
(0.107) (0.107) (0.108) (0.111) (0.108) (0.108)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.006 0.006 0.005 0.006 -0.118*** 0.006
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.037) (0.008)
Child Dependency Ratio -0.006 -0.009 -0.015 -0.001 -0.018 -0.005
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.027) (0.033) (0.026)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.052 0.020 0.049 0.055 0.055 0.057
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.130*** -0.129*** -0.128*** -0.136*** -0.131*** -0.127***
(0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.032)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † -0.016 0.024 0.001 -0.025 -0.019 -0.016
(0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.040)
Wealth Index 0.060*** 0.064*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.061*** 0.063***
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.036*** 0.022* 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.034***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 0.003 0.004 0.006** 0.002 0.003 0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † -0.200*** -0.206** -0.160** -0.190*** -0.208*** -0.180**
(0.072) (0.102) (0.079) (0.074) (0.073) (0.076)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † -0.146* 0.009 -0.115 -0.140* -0.151** -0.131*
(0.076) (0.101) (0.082) (0.077) (0.076) (0.077)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † -0.114 -0.231** -0.080 -0.100 -0.122* -0.107
(0.073) (0.092) (0.077) (0.074) (0.074) (0.076)
Observations 16,372 16,372 16,016 16,153 16,372 16,234
Adjusted R-Squared 0.258 0.265 0.267 0.258 0.259 0.259
Table H.17 (Cont'd)

















Manager & Owner Overlap † -0.021 -0.020 -0.003 -0.017 -0.017 -0.030
(0.036) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Age (Years) -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
Years of Schooling -0.000 -0.003 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] 0.101* 0.093 0.097 0.094 0.100* 0.103*
(0.059) (0.059) (0.060) (0.061) (0.059) (0.059)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.183*** 0.186*** 0.184*** 0.185*** 0.182*** 0.184***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.765*** 0.767*** 0.744*** 0.703*** 0.778*** 0.768***
(0.154) (0.156) (0.156) (0.162) (0.155) (0.155)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † 0.127* 0.119* 0.142** 0.114* 0.123* 0.123*
(0.065) (0.065) (0.066) (0.067) (0.065) (0.066)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.036*** 0.039*** 0.039*** 0.036*** 0.035*** 0.036***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.084*** 0.083*** 0.078*** 0.087*** 0.082*** 0.091***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.005 0.003 0.007 0.008 0.011 0.007
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.002 0.003 0.004 0.004 -0.001 0.000
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.111*** 0.120*** 0.116*** 0.118***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.015 0.005 0.012 0.013 0.015 0.014
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) -0.000** -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** -0.000** -0.000**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Male-Managed Plot Sample
Category of Additional Covariates Integrated into the Base Regression
Table H.18: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the RIF Decomposition at the 90th 
















Intercropped † 0.097** 0.196*** 0.138*** 0.074* 0.093** 0.092**
(0.040) (0.047) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Distance to Household (KM) 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.097** 0.196*** 0.138*** 0.074* 0.093** 0.092**
(0.040) (0.047) (0.041) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds -0.010 -0.014 -0.004 -0.020 -0.010 -0.006
(0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 2.950*** 2.933*** 2.962*** 2.972*** 2.947*** 2.933***
(0.114) (0.114) (0.115) (0.118) (0.114) (0.114)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.005 0.006 0.004 0.004 -0.120*** 0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.045) (0.010)
Child Dependency Ratio 0.029 0.024 0.023 0.036 0.038 0.026
(0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.037)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.039 0.013 0.038 0.042 0.044 0.038
(0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.116*** -0.112*** -0.126*** -0.124*** -0.117*** -0.111***
(0.036) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.036)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † 0.004 0.030 0.018 0.000 0.004 0.014
(0.045) (0.045) (0.045) (0.046) (0.045) (0.045)
Wealth Index 0.056*** 0.062*** 0.057*** 0.056*** 0.056*** 0.058***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.033** 0.019 0.032** 0.031** 0.031** 0.030**
(0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) 0.007** 0.008** 0.008** 0.007** 0.007** 0.007**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † -0.142* -0.160 -0.096 -0.118 -0.156** -0.120
(0.075) (0.104) (0.084) (0.076) (0.076) (0.079)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † -0.062 0.054 -0.045 -0.043 -0.076 -0.048
(0.079) (0.105) (0.087) (0.080) (0.079) (0.081)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † -0.011 -0.141 0.026 0.025 -0.024 0.008
(0.076) (0.094) (0.081) (0.077) (0.076) (0.080)
Observations 12,029 12,029 11,755 11,887 12,029 11,920
Adjusted R-Squared 0.271 0.278 0.278 0.271 0.272 0.272
Table H.18 (Cont'd)

















Manager & Owner Overlap † -0.088 -0.040 -0.096 -0.106 -0.098 -0.101
(0.083) (0.086) (0.085) (0.086) (0.083) (0.082)
Age (Years) -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 -0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Years of Schooling 0.019* 0.015 0.026** 0.021* 0.020* 0.017
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Plot Area
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA)] 0.035 -0.004 0.027 0.040 0.043 0.072
(0.105) (0.107) (0.112) (0.109) (0.107) (0.105)
Log[GPS-Based Plot Area (HA) Squared] 0.213*** 0.211*** 0.220*** 0.217*** 0.216*** 0.221***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.033) (0.033)
Plot Non-Labor Input Use
Incidence of Pesticide/Herbicide Use † 0.232 0.223 0.254 0.229 0.236 0.242
(0.320) (0.313) (0.334) (0.328) (0.316) (0.322)
Incidence of Organic Fertilizer Use † -0.038 0.001 -0.058 -0.032 -0.038 -0.045
(0.094) (0.095) (0.097) (0.097) (0.093) (0.094)
Log[Inorganic Fertilizer Use (KG)/HA] 0.023 0.027* 0.029** 0.022 0.022 0.024*
(0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.014) (0.014)
Plot Labor Input Use
Log[Household Male Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.034*** -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.035** -0.030* -0.032**
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.017) (0.013)
Log[Household Female Labor Use (Hours)/HA] 0.067** 0.061* 0.061* 0.069** 0.066** 0.079**
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032)
Log[Household Child Labor Use (Hours)/HA] -0.001 -0.004 0.002 -0.001 -0.011 -0.002
(0.013) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.013)
Log[Hired Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.144*** 0.149*** 0.139*** 0.142*** 0.146*** 0.148***
(0.033) (0.033) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.033)
Log[Exchange Labor Use (Days)/HA] 0.022 0.008 -0.003 0.024 0.020 0.019
(0.039) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Plot Location
Elevation (M) 0.000 -0.000 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002* -0.000 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Female-Managed Plot Sample
Category of Additional Covariates Integrated into the Base Regression
Table H.19: Exploring the Presence of Omitted Variable Bias in Base OLS Regression Results Underlying the RIF Decomposition at the 90th 















Intercropped † 0.152** 0.264*** 0.226*** 0.135* 0.155** 0.132*
(0.070) (0.084) (0.076) (0.074) (0.071) (0.071)
Distance to Household (KM) -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.002* -0.000 -0.002**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Plot Cultivation
Intercropped † 0.152** 0.264*** 0.226*** 0.135* 0.155** 0.132*
(0.070) (0.084) (0.076) (0.074) (0.071) (0.071)
Share of Plot Area Under Improved Seeds -0.022 -0.058 0.019 -0.021 -0.026 -0.014
(0.073) (0.074) (0.074) (0.075) (0.074) (0.074)
Share of Plot Area Under Export Crops 3.521*** 3.426*** 3.616*** 3.554*** 3.530*** 3.518***
(0.336) (0.338) (0.344) (0.345) (0.334) (0.334)
Household Characteristics
Household Size 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.053*** -0.029 0.051***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) (0.045) (0.017)
Child Dependency Ratio -0.121*** -0.111*** -0.150*** -0.111** -0.087 -0.115***
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.044) (0.053) (0.042)
Agricultural Extension Receipt † 0.147* 0.089 0.121 0.147* 0.147* 0.169**
(0.076) (0.079) (0.076) (0.078) (0.076) (0.077)
Access to Non-Farm Labor Income † -0.049 -0.046 -0.018 -0.050 -0.054 -0.048
(0.067) (0.067) (0.070) (0.069) (0.067) (0.066)
Access to Non-Farm Non-Labor Income † -0.043 0.009 -0.008 -0.073 -0.069 -0.060
(0.084) (0.084) (0.087) (0.087) (0.084) (0.084)
Wealth Index 0.069*** 0.082*** 0.070*** 0.069*** 0.064*** 0.059**
(0.023) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.024)
Agricultural Implement Access Index 0.045* 0.023 0.049** 0.037 0.043* 0.034
(0.025) (0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025)
Distance to Nearest ADMARC (KM) -0.011** -0.009 -0.004 -0.012** -0.011** -0.009*
(0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Household Agro-Ecological Zone Classification
Tropic-warm/semiarid  † -0.185 -0.077 -0.089 -0.218 -0.156 -0.310
(0.188) (0.258) (0.210) (0.195) (0.191) (0.191)
Tropic-warm/subhumid  † -0.178 0.058 -0.094 -0.190 -0.146 -0.282
(0.194) (0.262) (0.211) (0.201) (0.196) (0.196)
Tropic-cool/semiarid  † -0.298 -0.317 -0.239 -0.326* -0.291 -0.403**
(0.190) (0.245) (0.202) (0.195) (0.195) (0.192)
Observations 4,343 4,343 4,261 4,266 4,343 4,314
Adjusted R-Squared 0.204 0.209 0.217 0.200 0.206 0.208
Table H.19 (Cont'd)
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